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<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) as amended [22 U.S.C. 2751 et. seq.] and a fundamental tool of U.S. foreign policy. Under Section 3 of the AECA the U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace. Under FMS the U.S. Government and a foreign government enter into a government-to-government agreement called a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA). </source> [/INST] <claim>FMS is a form of security assistance</claim> <psg>The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program is a form of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA the U.S. may sell defense articles and services to foreign countries and international organizations when the President formally finds that to do so will strengthen the security of the U.S. and promote world peace.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February the Baltic states of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid. It will not happen interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show. This is partly because the proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel and tackling new frontiers in space. Since Russia invaded the U.S. Congress has approved extra funds and the Pentagon sent F-35 stealth fighters as well as attack helicopters to Estonia. Britain doubled its force presence at Estonia's Tapa military base to around 1 700 personnel. But for many people in the region which has been occupied by both Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany and which lies within striking distance of a Russian garrison at St. Petersburg that is not enough. For instance 84.6% of Latvian respondents to a Benu Aptiekas/Gemius poll in May said they were highly anxious about Russia's invasion. 'The fact that we could be in danger it's been on the table all the time ' said Dzintra Bungs 82 head of the Latvian Occupation Museum Association in Riga. 'It is very important that we have woken up and that all Europe awakes.' The Baltics with a combined population of just over six million want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5 000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold as well as adding air and maritime defences. Many of NATO's 30 allies in Europe and the United States support the calls for a bigger force in principle but in reality say allies can only commit to maintaining higher troop levels pre-positioning more equipment weapons and ammunition in the region and promising rapid reinforcements. The broad outline for leaders to agree at the summit the diplomats and NATO officials said is a model of larger multinational NATO battlegroups in the Baltics with a commitment to quickly reinforce if Russia were about to invade. Planning for new air and maritime defences will come later. Many members including Britain and the United States do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics three of the diplomats told Reuters. They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow. 'The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division ' a NATO diplomat said referring to their request for up to 15 000 troops across the region as well as more on stand-by in allied countries to complement national forces. 'Whatever is decided must be sustainable.' </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO says no – other issues take priority – Arctic insurgencies and space</claim> <psg>Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February the Baltic states of Estonia Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid. It will not happen interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show. proposals come as the NATO alliance faces a slew of demands not seen in decades: from countering Russia and China in the Arctic to quelling Islamic insurgencies in the Sahel and tackling new frontiers in space. The Baltics with a combined population of just over six million want the alliance to boost its pre-Ukraine invasion presence of around 5 000 multinational soldiers by as much as tenfold as well as adding air and maritime defences. allies can only commit to maintaining higher troop levels pre-positioning more equipment weapons and ammunition in the region and promising rapid reinforcements. Many members including Britain and the United States do not favour permanent new bases in the Baltics They said it would cost billions and be hard to sustain: The states may not have enough troops and weaponry and a permanent presence would be highly provocative for Moscow. 'The Baltic states will not each get enough NATO troops to create a division</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Divisions are opening among NATO members about how to boost military deployments in Eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine amid disagreements about whether the Kremlin’s faltering battlefield effort means it cannot significantly threaten alliance territory. The debate underlines different assessments of the lessons from nearly three months of war in Ukraine. The Baltic states and Poland are asking for a significantly expanded military presence on their soil and new capabilities such as antiaircraft defense that could make it far harder for Russia to invade. Other policymakers including from France and Italy are voicing skepticism that the shambolic Russian invasion force will pose a threat to NATO territory anytime soon. An initial decision must be made by the end of June when NATO leaders will meet at a summit in Madrid. At that gathering they are also expected to give initial approval to Finland and Sweden’s membership applications assuming Turkey dials back its objections. The expansion would itself significantly increase NATO’s military capability in the eastern part of the alliance. “Russia’s direct military aggression against NATO allies cannot be excluded ” according to a confidential joint proposal from the Baltic states of Lithuania Latvia and Estonia that was obtained by The Washington Post. “Russia can rapidly mass military forces against NATO’s eastern border and confront the Alliance with a short war and fait accompli ” the document said proposing that a division-size contingent of about 20 000 troops be tasked with speeding to each of the countries if they are under threat. Other countries are more cautious about robust new commitments in Eastern Europe wary of signing on to large deployments that would be costly and would divert troops from other areas. </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO says no – they don’t believe the Russian threat</claim> <psg>Divisions are opening among NATO members about how to boost military deployments in Eastern Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine The Baltic states and Poland are asking for a significantly expanded military presence on their soil and new capabilities such as antiaircraft defense that could make it far harder for Russia to invade. Other policymakers including from France and Italy are voicing skepticism that the shambolic Russian invasion force will pose a threat to NATO territory anytime soon. Other countries are more cautious about robust new commitments in Eastern Europe wary of signing on to large deployments that would be costly and would divert troops from other areas.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Germany is blocking North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Estonia from giving military support to Ukraine by refusing to issue permits for German-origin weapons to be exported to Kyiv as it braces for a potential Russian invasion. Unlike the U.S. Britain Poland and other allies the German government has declined to export lethal weapons directly to Ukraine. In the case of Estonia a small country on Russia’s northern border Berlin is also refusing to allow a third country to send artillery to Ukraine because the weaponry originated in Germany according to Estonian and German officials. The issue is being seen by Western security specialists and Ukraine as a test of Berlin’s arms-transfer policy during a mounting crisis in Europe and points to the difficulties the U.S. and its European allies are facing in forging a common response to Russia’s military buildup near Ukraine and demands. “Germany they have a lot of hesitation to deliver to us ” Ukraine’s Defense Minister Oleksiy Reznikov said in an interview with The Wall Street Journal. German officials said the impasse results from a longstanding policy regarding arms exports to tense regions. “The principle governing arms exports is always the same—whether they come directly from Germany or from third countries—and no permission has been issued at this stage ” a German government spokesman said. “It is not possible to estimate the outcome of the process at this moment ” he added. </source> [/INST] <claim>Germany says no – concerns over escalation</claim> <psg>Germany is blocking North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally Estonia from giving military support to Ukraine by refusing to issue permits for German-origin weapons to be exported to Kyiv as it braces for a potential Russian invasion. the German government has declined to export lethal weapons directly to Ukraine. Berlin is also refusing to allow a third country to send artillery to Ukraine because the weaponry originated in Germany according to Estonian and German officials. Germany they have a lot of hesitation to deliver to us The principle governing arms exports is always the same—whether they come directly from Germany or from third countries—and no permission has been issued at this stage ” a German government spokesman said. “It is not possible to estimate the outcome of the process at this moment</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Estonia in recent weeks has sought permission from Berlin to send the artillery units to Ukraine which is required under Germany export laws the German and Estonian officials said. Finland which isn’t a member of NATO is also required to authorize the delivery of the weapons by agreement with Germany. A spokesman for the Finnish government said that the procedure was a mere formality unrelated to the current situation in Ukraine. Germany is one of the world’s largest arms exporters and ships weapons to non-allied countries such as Egypt or Pakistan. German officials have said however that exporting arms to Ukraine is out of question due to the current tensions and because of Germany’s role in starting World War II and the Nazi atrocities committed in the region. “Our restrictive position is well known and is rooted in history ” Annalena Baerbock Germany’s foreign minister said Monday in Kyiv as she stood beside her Ukrainian counterpart. Dmytro Kuleba Ukraine’s foreign minister sought to play down the dispute saying his nation’s “dialogue with Germany on this issue will continue.” Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany Andrij Melnyk was more blunt: “This responsibility should be toward the Ukrainian people who lost at least 8 million lives during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.” </source> [/INST] <claim>Germany says no – historic tensions</claim> <psg>Estonia in recent weeks has sought permission from Berlin to send the artillery units to Ukraine which is required under Germany export laws German officials have said however that exporting arms to Ukraine is out of question due to the current tensions and because of Germany’s role in starting World War II and the Nazi atrocities committed in the region. “Our restrictive position is well known and is rooted in history Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany Andrij Melnyk was more blunt: “This responsibility should be toward the Ukrainian people who lost at least 8 million lives during the Nazi occupation of Ukraine.”</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Executive Director of Europol Catherine De Bolle told German media in late May that they were very concerned that the military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and in the hands of terrorists and criminals. Previous reports show that the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups including extremist organizations as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces. After US President Joe Biden formally signed the $40 billion aid package to Ukraine this worry became more pressing. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back? Several experts told the Global Times that it is difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield. They noted that not only Europe which has been deprived of its security autonomy by the US and NATO but also the third world countries will suffer the costs. Those who prefer to live by the sword will fall by the sword. While the military-industrial complex profiteers it is only a matter of time before this backfires experts noted. Flow of illegal weapons Jürgen Stock the head of Interpol warned that once the Russia-Ukraine conflict ends guns and heavy arms will flood the international market according to a Guardian report. 'Once the guns fall silent [in Ukraine] illegal weapons will come. We know this from many other instances of conflict. Criminals are even now as we speak focusing on them ' said Stock stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge. </source> [/INST] <claim>The plan’s arms sales get routed to terrorists and criminals in the black market </claim> <psg>Heartless terrorists turned dreadful mercenaries weapons scattered in a chaotic battlefield… These disturbing signs showed that a big horrible disaster is sprawling in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. military equipment the West is sending to Ukraine will end up on the black market and in the hands of terrorists and criminals. (SVR) found the US was stepping up its efforts to recruit members of international terrorist groups including extremist organizations as mercenaries to fight in Ukraine and take part in sabotage operations against Russian forces. Can the flow of weapons from NATO and the US to Ukraine be monitored? Is it only a matter of time before terrorist groups take hold of those weapons? Who is laughing behind Europe's worried back? Several experts told the Global Times that it is difficult to control the flow of weapons on the battlefield While the military-industrial complex profiteers it is only a matter of time before this backfires illegal weapons will come Criminals are even now as we speak focusing on them ' said Stock stressing that the illegal weapons flowing into the criminal market will create a challenge.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> This uncomfortable reality for the United States and its allies comes amid urgent pleas from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to provide artillery needed to counter Russian forces in the country’s east and south. The Ukrainian leader’s appeals are credited with uniting House lawmakers behind the latest funding request in a bipartisan 368-to-57 vote on Tuesday. But the unprecedented influx of arms has prompted fears that some equipment could fall into the hands of Western adversaries or reemerge in faraway conflicts — for decades to come. “It’s just impossible to keep track of not only where they’re all going and who is using them but how they are being used ” said Rachel Stohl an arms-control expert and vice president at the Stimson Center. A State Department spokesman said the United States has conducted thorough vetting of the Ukrainian units it supplies while forcing Kyiv to sign agreements that “do not allow the retransfer of equipment to third parties without prior U.S. government authorization.” But the means of enforcing such contracts are relatively weak — and made even weaker by Washington’s own mixed history of compliance as recently as last month. In mid-April the United States boosted its involvement in the Ukraine conflict by announcing that it would transfer a fleet of Mi-17 helicopters to Ukraine that it originally purchased from Russia about a decade ago. The initial sale of the aircraft required the United States to sign a contract promising not to transfer the helicopters to any third country “without the approval of the Russian Federation ” according to a copy of the certificate posted on the website of Russia’s Federal Service on Military-Technical Cooperation. Russia has denounced the transfer saying it “grossly violates the foundations of international law.” Arms experts say Russia’s brutal aggression in Ukraine more than justifies U.S. support but the violation of weapons contracts chips away at the foundations of counter-proliferation efforts. “Breaking of those end-use agreements is a serious threat to the underlying but weak capacity for countries to control how weapons are used ” said Jeff Abramson an expert on conventional arms transfers at the Arms Control Association. A Pentagon spokesman dismissed the criticisms calling Russian charges a distraction and the transfer “permissible under U.S. law and consistent with our national security priorities.” “Russia’s claims are a disingenuous attempt to distract attention from Russia’s unprovoked invasion and its history of aggressive actions against Ukraine since 2014 ” said Marine Corps Lt. Colonel Anton T. Semelroth. The job of ensuring U.S. weapons are used for their intended purpose — a joint responsibility of the departments of State and Defense — is made all the more difficult by the sheer volume of arms making their way to Ukraine. The emergency spending bill awaiting approval in the Senate will cement Ukraine’s status as the world’s single largest recipient of U.S. security assistance receiving more in 2022 than the United States ever provided to Afghanistan Iraq or Israel in a single year. It will add to the stocks of weapons the U.S. already committed to Ukraine including 1 400 Stinger antiaircraft systems 5 500 antitank missiles 700 Switchblade drones 90 long-range Howitzers artillery systems 7 000 small arms 50 000 000 rounds of ammunition and numerous other mines explosives and laser-guided rocket systems. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles capable of downing commercial airliners are just one of the weapon systems experts worry could slip into the possession of terrorist groups seeking to carry out mass-casualty events. The Biden administration’s funding request includes $8.7 billion to replenish U.S. stores of weapons shipped to Ukraine $6 billion to train and equip Ukrainian forces and $3.9 billion for U.S. forces deployed throughout Europe in response to the security crisis that’s been set off by the war. Other NATO countries have transferred billions of dollars in arms and military equipment since the start of hostilities. “The assistance exceeds the peak year of U.S. military assistance to Afghan security forces during that 20-year war ” said William Hartung an arms control expert at the Quincy Institute think tank. “In that case the U.S. had a major presence in-country that created at least the possibility of tracking where weapons were ending up. By comparison the U.S. government is flying blind in terms of monitoring weapons supplied to civilian militias and the military in Ukraine.” Ukraine’s history as a hub for arms trafficking dates to the fall of the Soviet Union when the Soviet military left behind large amounts of small arms and light weapons in Ukraine without adequate record-keeping and inventory control. According to the Small Arms Survey a Geneva-based research organization a portion of the Ukrainian military’s 7.1 million small arms in stock in 1992 “were diverted to conflict areas” underscoring “the risk of leakage to the local black market.” The problem grew more acute after Russia’s invasion in 2014 which saw combatants looting arms and munition-storage facilities of Ukraine’s Security Service Interior and Defense ministries. “Irregular fighters on both sides progressively gained access to a wide range of military-grade equipment including the full spectrum of small arms and light weapons ” according to a report by the Small Arms Survey in 2017. “Officials estimated that at least 300 000 small arms and light weapons were looted or lost between 2013 and 2015 ” providing a boon the country’s black market run by Mafia-style groups in Donbas region and other criminal networks. The U.S. government is well aware of the country’s challenges with weapons proliferation though it has been vague in describing the precautions it’s taking. Weeks after Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24 a group of interagency officials in the Biden administration met with outside arms-control experts to discuss the risk of small-arms proliferation in the conflict. According to Stohl who attended one of the meetings U.S. officials offered assurances about vetting Ukrainian security forces and addressing reports of unauthorized transfer — but scant details on how the vetting or monitoring happens. “It does not inspire much confidence ” said Stohl. Other arms experts feel similarly in the dark. “It is unclear what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the U.S. and other countries have taken or what guarantees they have obtained to ensure the protection of civilians through these very large transfers ” said Annie Shiel a senior adviser at the Center for Civilians in Conflict. Some of the recommended steps include establishing a special investigator as the U.S. government did in Afghanistan ensuring any weapons transfers contain strong tracking procedures adding human rights obligations in the terms of sale and including specifics about what units can be authorized to receive such transfers. (In 2018 Congress banned Ukraine’s Azov battalion a far-right nationalist group associated with neo-Nazism from receiving U.S. weapons.) There are additional concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya Syria and Chechnya as well as the Wagner Group a Russian contractor. During a televised meeting of Russia’s Security Council in March Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16 000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine. In response Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his approval saying “We need to give them what they want and help them get to the conflict zone.” At the same meeting Shoigu proposed handing over captured U.S. Javelin and Stinger missiles to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region. “Please do this ” Putin told Shoigu. The introduction of foreign fighters to a conflict runs the risks of weapons returning to those individuals’ countries of origin when the fighting in Ukraine ends. There are conflicting reports about the presence of foreign fighters there however and it’s unclear precisely how many have in fact traveled to Ukraine. The lack of information has spurred calls for answers from the administration and attention from Congress. “Some of the weapons being provided in the conflict in Ukraine are likely to be found years and possibly decades later ” said Abramson. “Congressional leaders should be asking these questions in classified briefings if needed and the public should be better informed.” </source> [/INST] <claim>Black market arms trade in Ukraine causes arms racing and escalates terrorism. </claim> <psg>some equipment could fall into the hands of Western adversaries or reemerge in faraway conflicts the means of enforcing contracts are relatively weak the violation of weapons contracts chips away at the foundations of counter-proliferation efforts. Breaking of those end-use agreements is a serious threat to the capacity for countries to control how weapons are used The job of ensuring U.S. weapons are used for their intended purpose — a joint responsibility of the departments of State and Defense — is made all the more difficult by the sheer volume of arms making their way to Ukraine. Shoulder-fired Stinger missiles capable of downing commercial airliners are just one of the weapon systems experts worry could slip into the possession of terrorist groups seeking to carry out mass-casualty events. The U.S. government is well aware of the country’s challenges with weapons proliferation though it has been vague in describing the precautions it’s taking. group of interagency officials in the Biden administration met with outside arms-control experts to discuss the risk of small-arms proliferation in the conflict There are concerns among watchdog groups about arms proliferation stemming from Moscow amid reports it has enlisted mercenaries from Libya Syria and Chechnya as well as the Wagner Group a Russian contractor Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 16 000 volunteers in the Middle East stood ready to fight alongside Russian-backed forces in Eastern Ukraine. Shoigu proposed handing over captured U.S. Javelin and Stinger missiles to pro-Russian separatists in Donbas region The introduction of foreign fighters to a conflict runs the risks of weapons returning to those individuals’ countries of origin when the fighting in Ukraine ends</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> This policy paper aims to explore the new flows and trade of illicit arms across the MENA region that have created and continue to feed ongoing conflicts most notably in Libya Syria Iraq and Yemen. This situation threatens the human and national security of the region’s nations. Combatting war economy activities in war-ridden countries will be a critical issue in the post-conflict context and this pertains to countering small arms and light weaponry transfers that may reignite conflicts on both communal and ethnic levels. Examining illicit arms transfers in Libya and Yemen the paper draws policy options that address the economic social and political aspects of this threat. Consequently it will investigate the existing international legal framework and mechanisms employed by regional and international organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the UN as well as how to fill the gap between them and the national authorities in charge of stemming out this threat. MAPPING OUT CONFLICT AND ARMS TRAFFICKING IN THE MENA REGION Legal arms and weaponry owned by the state and law enforcement are essential to peace and stability. Illicit arms transfer is key to enduring conflicts social strife and crime notably terrorism. Illicit arms transfer or arms trafficking can be defined as those arms and weaponry possessed stored traded and used in clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control. these transfers may involve corrupt government officials acting on their own for personal gain (see Small Arms Survey definitions). Basically non-state actors whether they are terrorist organizations militias or criminal gangs are the most relevant to the illicit arms transfer. nevertheless states are major players in this trade since they are the main manufacturers and suppliers of illicit arms. For example while the arms trafficking black market is dominated by criminal and trafficker groups the illicit grey market arms transfer refers to deals done by governments or their clients and agents exploiting loopholes or intentionally circumventing national and international laws governing arms trade. By applying this understanding to illicit arms trade in the MENA region this paper tends to focus on the implications of the arms proliferation of small arms and light weaponry (SALW) that refer to heavy machine-guns. hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers. portable anti-aircraft guns. portable anti-tank guns. recoilless rifles. portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems etc. Therefore proliferation in this regard does not include the use of non-conventional arms such as nuclear chemical and biological weapons which are subject to a different non-proliferation set of policies. In the MENA region illicit arms transfer is both a cause and effect of the unfolding armed conflicts that continue to rage on. While arms trafficking had been always around the corner before the Arab Uprisings in 2011 and mostly related to the state-softness and the states’ clientelist political structure the disintegration of the Arab states in Iraq Syria Yemen and Libya gave rise to illicit arms trafficking and other criminal activities. Moreover the rise of violent non-state actors and their trans-border networks and the intensification of the regional geopolitical rivalries namely between Russia Turkey Iran Saudi Arabia the UAE and Egypt in addition to the EU and USA turned the conflict into prolonged proxy wars where local and national warring parties are provided with arms and funds to gain political ground. Setting aside direct military intervention by some of these powers in the conflicts of the four war-ridden countries these interventions were in violation of the UN-imposed embargo designed to disarm the national conflict parties be it national parties such as the Government of National Accord (GNA) and Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya the Assad Regime in Syria or terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda across the region. On the other hand the proliferation of arms especially SALW is perpetuating conflicts in many ways. It sustains the power balance between conflicting parties. and it entrenches war economy activities such as human trafficking drugs and goods allowing local criminal organizations to become armed to the teeth. Additionally it deteriorates social stability since it fuels communal and social strife especially in sectarian tribal or ethnic conflicts which is an underlying cause for most of the Arab civil wars. For these socio-economic and political reasons disarmament and arms control is integral to post-conflict stabilization and regional security. </source> [/INST] <claim>That causes escalation of wars in the middle east. </claim> <psg>flows and trade of illicit arms across the MENA region continue to feed ongoing conflicts in Libya Syria Iraq and Yemen This situation threatens the human and national security of the region’s nations. Combatting war economy activities in war-ridden countries will be a critical issue in the post-conflict context and this pertains to countering small arms and light weaponry transfers that may reignite conflicts on both communal and ethnic levels Illicit arms transfer is key to enduring conflicts social strife and crime notably terrorism Illicit arms transfer or arms trafficking can be defined as those arms and weaponry possessed stored traded and used in clear violation of national and/or international laws and without official government consent or control By applying this understanding to illicit arms trade in the MENA region this paper tends to focus on the implications of the arms proliferation of small arms and light weaponry (SALW) that refer to heavy machine-guns. hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers. portable anti-aircraft guns. portable anti-tank guns. recoilless rifles. portable launchers of anti-tank missiles and rocket systems etc illicit arms transfer is a cause of the unfolding armed conflicts that continue to rage on. disintegration of the Arab states in Iraq Syria Yemen and Libya gave rise to illicit arms trafficking and other criminal activities the rise of violent non-state actors and their trans-border networks and the intensification of the regional geopolitical rivalries namely between Russia Turkey Iran Saudi Arabia the UAE and Egypt in addition to the EU and USA turned the conflict into prolonged proxy wars proliferation of arms is perpetuating conflicts It sustains the power balance between conflicting parties. and it entrenches war economy activities such as human trafficking drugs and goods allowing local criminal organizations to become armed to the teeth. it deteriorates social stability since it fuels communal and social strife especially in sectarian tribal or ethnic conflicts which is an underlying cause for most of the Arab civil wars. For these socio-economic and political reasons disarmament and arms control is integral to post-conflict stabilization and regional security</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Of the many conflicts in the Middle East the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Israel is potentially the most explosive. Built into the DNA of the Iranian Revolution from its start in 1979 was the aim of destroying Israel as a preliminary step toward the destruction of Western democracy as exemplified by the US. In pursuit of this fundamental objective Iran’s leaders have provided funding weapons and training to groups including Lebanese Hezbollah Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) which have carried out attacks on Israel and which have been designated terrorist organizations by many countries Because Israel perceives the Iranian regime as a threat to its very existence it has consistently opposed Iran’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It seeks also to downgrade Iran’s allies and proxies and prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria another sworn enemy of Israel. For years Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war quietly attacking each other –directly or by proxy – on land by air and at sea. Escalation to all-out war has been deliberately avoided and attacks usually remain either unattributed or plausibly denied. For example the assassination of five Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2020 remains unexplained and unacknowledged to say nothing of the series of mysterious explosions at various of Iran’s nuclear facilities in 2020. In April 2021 Iran blamed Israel and vowed revenge for an explosion at its largest uranium enrichment facility in Natanz which it said caused significant damage to its centrifuges. It was the second time in less than a year that the site had been hit by a suspicious blast. Israel neither confirmed nor denied it was responsible for either attack. A cyber attack that paralyzed Iran’s gas stations nationwide on October 26 2021 has also not been acknowledged. Backed heavily by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Hezbollah’s military forces in Lebanon have if the boasts of its leaders are to be believed accrued a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles along the border. Israeli forces have repeatedly struck at Hezbollah’s rocket pipeline within Lebanon and Hezbollah has on occasion retaliated by firing rockets into Israel and attacking Israeli troops along the border. As for Syria ever since the civil conflict started in 2011 Iran has been strengthening its military presence in the country in support of Assad. Using its so-called “Shia Crescent” Iran transfers weaponry meant for Hezbollah through Iraq and Syria. In an effort to stop the arms flow and counter this second hostile presence on its northern border Israel has conducted an increasingly open campaign of air strikes in Syria against the flow of weaponry and its storage. At sea tit-for-tat attacks on commercial vessels in and around the Gulf of Hormuz began in 2019 – again with little by way of explanation for each incident. Since several targets have been Iranian tankers carrying oil towards Syria media and the public have been left free to speculate. There is always a risk of this long-standing proxy war suddenly igniting into direct military conflict between Israel and Iran. Whether this nightmare scenario ever materializes turns on how Iran’s nuclear program emerges from the current negotiations in Vienna around reviving the nuclear deal. The administration of President Joe Biden seems dead set on concluding a new agreement which all reports indicate would delay but not eliminate Iran’s eventual acquisition of a nuclear military capability. Iran‘s leaders say they have no ambition to build nuclear weapons. The hoard of secret documents spirited out of Iran in 2018 suggests otherwise. In Washington on October 20 2021 foreign minister Yair Lapid warned that Israel was prepared to use military force to stop Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capability. “Iran has publicly stated it wants to wipe us out ” said Lapid. “We have no intention of letting this happen.” Should force be required to stop an Iranian bomb Israel would have to act and almost certainly act alone. That is how the long-standing Israel-Iran proxy war could assume a terrible reality. </source> [/INST] <claim>That cauess Israel-Iran escalation – goes nuclear. </claim> <psg>Of the many conflicts in the Middle East the ongoing proxy war between Iran and Israel is potentially the most explosive. Iran’s leaders have provided funding weapons and training to groups including Lebanese Hezbollah Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)) which have carried out attacks on Israel and which have been designated terrorist organizations by many countries Because Israel perceives the Iranian regime as a threat to its very existence it has consistently opposed Iran’s nuclear weapon and missile programs. It seeks also to downgrade Iran’s allies and proxies and prevent Iranian entrenchment in Syria another sworn enemy of Israel. For years Iran and Israel have engaged in a shadow war quietly attacking each other –directly or by proxy – on land by air and at sea. Escalation to all-out war has been deliberately avoided and attacks usually remain either unattributed or plausibly denied Iran blamed Israel and vowed revenge for an explosion at its largest uranium enrichment facility in Natanz which it said caused significant damage to its centrifuges. Backed heavily by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Hezbollah’s military forces in Lebanon have if the boasts of its leaders are to be believed accrued a vast arsenal of rockets and missiles along the border. Israeli forces have repeatedly struck at Hezbollah’s rocket pipeline within Lebanon and Hezbollah has on occasion retaliated by firing rockets into Israel and attacking Israeli troops along the border. As for Syria ever since the civil conflict started Iran has been strengthening its military presence Israel has conducted an increasingly open campaign of air strikes in Syria against the flow of weaponry and its storage. There is always a risk of this long-standing proxy war suddenly igniting into direct military conflict between Israel and Iran Should force be required to stop an Iranian bomb Israel would have to act and almost certainly act alone. That is how the long-standing Israel-Iran proxy war could assume a terrible reality.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Firstly the human cost of the illicit trade accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is tremendous. Illegal small arms and light weapons are on a global scale responsible for 90 per cent of all deaths during armed conflict and for 60 per cent of all violent deaths outside of armed conflict. This makes small arms and light weapons the most deadly weapons worldwide thereby justifying their qualification as a ‘global public bad’. Moreover the proliferation of small arms and light weapons increases the risk that both smaller and larger conflicts give rise to mass atrocities. As the Security Council acknowledged in Resolution 2117 the misuse of these weapons can result in grave crimes and can thereby pose a threat to international peace and security. In this respect the Kingdom of the Netherlands would also like to underline the importance of the protection of civilians in armed conflict and the Responsibility to Protect populations from genocide war crimes ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. </source> [/INST] <claim>It causes smaller conflicts to escalate. </claim> <psg>human cost of the illicit trade accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons is tremendous. Illegal small arms and light weapons are on a global scale responsible for 90 per cent of all deaths during armed conflict and for 60 per cent of all violent deaths outside of armed conflict This makes small arms and light weapons the most deadly weapons worldwide thereby justifying their qualification as a ‘global public bad’. the proliferation of small arms and light weapons increases the risk that both smaller and larger conflicts give rise to mass atrocities the misuse of these weapons can result in grave crimes and can thereby pose a threat to international peace and security</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Western countries have been ramping up weapons and ammunition shipments to Ukraine as Kyiv fights off a Russian invasion but arms trade experts warn some of the lethal assistance could end up falling into the wrong hands. Ukraine in particular has a history as a hub of the arms trade during the 1990s setting off alarm bells for those who study illicit flows. 'There are very significant risks associated to the proliferation of weapons in Ukraine at the moment in particular regarding small arms and light weapons ' said Nils Duquet a researcher and director of the Flemish Peace Institute. Western nations above all the US have announced successive shipments of both light and heavy weapons for Kyiv's forces since Russian troops crossed the Ukrainian border on February 24. Washington alone has delivered or promised military gear including hundreds of Switchblade kamikaze drones 7 000 assault rifles with 50 million rounds of ammunition laser-guided missiles and radar systems to detect enemy drones and incoming artillery fire. 'While the response to provide more weapons to Ukraine is understandable... it would be prudent to consider the immediate and long-term security implications ' the US-based Stimson Center think-tank said in March. 'We’ve seen time and time again how arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields often in the hands of groups at odds with US interests or those of civilians ' it added pointing especially to small arms. 'Overwhelming challenge' Following the collapse of the Soviet Union many weapons stockpiled in Ukraine were shipped off to other countries and conflict zones around the world. That looting of the country's arms supplies resumed following Russia's 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian Black Sea peninsula of Crimea and the seizure of two regions in the east of Ukraine by pro-Moscow separatists. According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS) by the Geneva-based Institute of International and Development Studies 300 000 light weapons were stolen or lost between 2013 and 2015 with just 4 000 retrieved since then. Rather than being shipped abroad as in the 1990s most of these ended up on the black market within Ukraine the SAS found. 'The unresolved conflict in the eastern part of the country and general anxiety towards local security conditions' could explain increased demand for weapons among ordinary people SAS researcher Matt Schroeder said. Looking ahead 'collecting these weapons and disposing of them properly would be an overwhelming challenge for any government let alone one that is still fighting an existential threat ' he added. 'Bank robberies with Javelins' Even before the current conflict the US military's inspector general in 2020 questioned the level of surveillance of weapons sent to Ukraine. Annie Shiel of the Center for Civilians in Conflict (Civic) warned that 'there has been very little transparency around what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the US and other countries sending weapons to Ukraine have taken if any... to ensure the protection of civilians'. The aid group has called for deliveries to be tied to human rights commitments and for the arms to be tracked after they are handed over. Other experts see the task of following arms through conflict zones as all but impossible. 'It's an illusion to think that in a context of war you can actually have control of weapons there. We know that many weapons will not return to the official forces but they will remain in the region for many years ' said Nils Duquet. 'Look at Yugoslavia success has been made but these weapons are still being smuggled in all parts of Europe ' he added predicting similar outcomes for Ukraine. One senior French military officer evoked a lurid possible outcome. 'We'll be laughing on the other side of our faces once we're seeing bank robberies with Javelins ' he said referring to the US-made anti-tank missiles. </source> [/INST] <claim>Increased arms to Ukraine risks lethal weapons ending up in the wrong hands</claim> <psg>Western countries have been ramping up weapons and ammunition shipments to Ukraine as Kyiv fights off a Russian invasion but arms trade experts warn some of the lethal assistance could end up falling into the wrong hands. There are very significant risks associated to the proliferation of weapons in Ukraine at the moment in particular regarding small arms and light weapons Washington alone has delivered or promised military gear including hundreds of Switchblade kamikaze drones 7 000 assault rifles with 50 million rounds of ammunition laser-guided missiles and radar systems to detect enemy drones and incoming artillery fire. arms aimed at aiding an ally in one conflict have found their way to the frontlines of unforeseen battlefields often in the hands of groups at odds with US interests or those of civilians According to the Small Arms Survey (SAS) by the Geneva-based Institute of International and Development Studies 300 000 light weapons were stolen or lost between 2013 and 2015 with just 4 000 retrieved since then. collecting these weapons and disposing of them properly would be an overwhelming challenge for any government let alone one that is still fighting an existential threat there has been very little transparency around what risk mitigation or monitoring steps the US and other countries sending weapons to Ukraine have taken if any... to ensure the protection of civilians 'It's an illusion to think that in a context of war you can actually have control of weapons there. We know that many weapons will not return to the official forces but they will remain in the region for many years</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The US has few ways to track the substantial supply of anti-tank anti-aircraft and other weaponry it has sent across the border into Ukraine sources tell CNN a blind spot that’s due in large part to the lack of US boots on the ground in the country – and the easy portability of many of the smaller systems now pouring across the border. It’s a conscious risk the Biden administration is willing to take. In the short term the US sees the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of equipment to be vital to the Ukrainians’ ability to hold off Moscow’s invasion. A senior defense official said Tuesday that it is “certainly the largest recent supply to a partner country in a conflict.” But the risk both current US officials and defense analysts say is that in the long term some of those weapons may wind up in the hands of other militaries and militias that the US did not intend to arm. “We have fidelity for a short time but when it enters the fog of war we have almost zero ” said one source briefed on US intelligence. “It drops into a big black hole and you have almost no sense of it at all after a short period of time.” In making the decision to send billions of dollars of weapons and equipment into Ukraine the Biden administration factored in the risk that some of the shipments may ultimately end up in unexpected places a defense official said. But right now the official said the administration views a failure to adequately arm Ukraine as a greater risk. Because the US military is not on the ground the US and NATO are heavily reliant on information provided by Ukraine’s government. Privately officials recognize that Ukraine has an incentive to give only information that will bolster their case for more aid more arms and more diplomatic assistance. “It’s a war – everything they do and say publicly is designed to help them win the war. Every public statement is an information operation every interview every Zelensky appearance broadcast is an information operation ” said another source familiar with western intelligence. “It doesn’t mean they’re wrong to do it in any way.” For months US and western officials have offered detailed accounts about what the West knows about the status of Russian forces inside Ukraine: how many casualties they’ve taken their remaining combat power their weapons stocks what kinds of munitions they are using and where. But when it comes to Ukrainian forces officials acknowledge that the West – including the US – has some information gaps. Western estimates of Ukrainian casualties are also foggy according to two sources familiar with US and western intelligence. “It’s hard to track with nobody on the ground ” said one source familiar with the intelligence. </source> [/INST] <claim>Nobody knows what happens to weapon shipments</claim> <psg>The US has few ways to track the substantial supply of anti-tank anti-aircraft and other weaponry it has sent across the border into Ukraine But the risk both current US officials and defense analysts say is that in the long term some of those weapons may wind up in the hands of other militaries and militias that the US did not intend to arm. It drops into a big black hole and you have almost no sense of it at all after a short period of time.” the US and NATO are heavily reliant on information provided by Ukraine’s government. Privately officials recognize that Ukraine has an incentive to give only information that will bolster their case for more aid more arms and more diplomatic assistance. “It’s hard to track with nobody on the ground ” said one source familiar with the intelligence.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> “I couldn’t tell you where they are in Ukraine and whether the Ukrainians are using them at this point ” a senior defense official told reporters last week. “They’re not telling us every round of ammunition they’re firing and who and at when. We may never know exactly to what degree they’ve using the Switchblades.” The Defense Department doesn’t earmark the weapons it sends for particular units according to Pentagon press secretary John Kirby. Trucks loaded with pallets of arms provided by the Defense Department are picked up by Ukrainian armed forces – primarily in Poland – and then driven into Ukraine Kirby said “then it’s up to the Ukrainians to determine where they go and how they’re allocated inside their country.” </source> [/INST] <claim>There is no information about where weapons end up</claim> <psg>I couldn’t tell you where they are in Ukraine and whether the Ukrainians are using them at this point They’re not telling us every round of ammunition they’re firing and who and at when. We may never know exactly to what degree they’ve using the Switchblades.” it’s up to the Ukrainians to determine where they go and how they’re allocated inside their country.”</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Inevitably some weapons ended up on the black market including anti-aircraft Stinger missiles the same kind the US is now providing to Ukraine. The United States famously scrambled to recover Stingers after the Soviet war in Afghanistan. It wasn’t successful in finding all of them and when the US itself invaded Afghanistan in 2001 some officials feared that they could be used by the Taliban against the United States. Other weapons have ended up arming US adversaries. Much of what the US left behind to help Afghan forces became part of the Taliban arsenal after the collapse of the Afghan government and military. The problem is not unique to Afghanistan. Weapons sold to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates found their way into the hands of fighters linked to al-Qaeda and Iran. The risk of a similar scenario happening in Ukraine also exists the defense official acknowledged. In 2020 the Defense Department inspector general released a report raising concerns about the end-use monitoring of weapons being sent to Ukraine. </source> [/INST] <claim>Weapons are likely to end up on the black market</claim> <psg>some weapons ended up on the black market including anti-aircraft Stinger missiles the same kind the US is now providing to Ukraine. The United States famously scrambled to recover Stingers after the Soviet war in Afghanistan Other weapons have ended up arming US adversaries. Much of what the US left behind to help Afghan forces became part of the Taliban arsenal after the collapse of the Afghan government and military. The risk of a similar scenario happening in Ukraine also exists the defense official acknowledged</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> But these stories overlook the danger or risk of illegal diversion that comes with issuing weapons with little to no oversight something that the Ukrainian government does not seem to realize despite the fact that the diversion of military-grade weapons such as hand grenades rockets and landmines has been a profitable business in Ukraine in recent years giving the country a very bad name in the process. A Hub Of Illicit Arms According to the Global Organized Crime Index apart from being a source of transit and destination point for human trafficking Ukraine is one of the largest arms trafficking markets with a substantial stockpile of weapons few barriers to accessing arms and millions of small arms and light weapons on the black market. “While it has long been a key link in the global arms trade its role has only intensified since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Most arms are reportedly trafficked domestically but the illicit arms trade is also linked to criminal arms markets in Russia Belarus Moldova Georgia and Turkey as well as countries in the EU and the former Yugoslavia ” the index points out. “Within Ukraine the cities of Odesa Dnipro Kharkiv and Kyiv are significant logistical centers for criminal networks. The increasing number of arms combined with relatively limited controls and conflict in parts of eastern Ukraine has resulted in a sharp increase in the size of the criminal market for small arms and light weapons particularly Makarov and Tokarev pistols AK-pattern assault rifles and Dragunov sniper rifles. “Additionally there is a smaller market for light machine guns. Firearm seizures have been the largest in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions where fighting has been the most intense. Conflict-affected areas constitute the major sources of illicit flows for the rest of the country.” </source> [/INST] <claim>Weapons have no oversight – increased lethal arms inevitably ends up in the illicit arms market</claim> <psg>these stories overlook the danger or risk of illegal diversion that comes with issuing weapons with little to no oversight something that the Ukrainian government does not seem to realize Ukraine is one of the largest arms trafficking markets with a substantial stockpile of weapons few barriers to accessing arms and millions of small arms and light weapons on the black market. its role has only intensified since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Most arms are reportedly trafficked domestically but the illicit arms trade is also linked to criminal arms markets in Russia Belarus Moldova Georgia and Turkey as well as countries in the EU and the former Yugoslavia ” The increasing number of arms combined with relatively limited controls and conflict in parts of eastern Ukraine has resulted in a sharp increase in the size of the criminal market for small arms and light weapons particularly Makarov and Tokarev pistols AK-pattern assault rifles and Dragunov sniper rifles.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The White House announced a new military aid package of $800 million on April 21 just five days after the previous $800 million aid package. The new package has many similarities to the earlier one described in a recent CSIS commentary: it expands U.S. support by including U.S. weapons requires the United States to train Ukrainians in the use of these systems and implicitly assumes a long war. The new aid package includes two new items: an increase in the overall rate of support and a mysterious custom-designed unmanned aerial vehicle. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States federal government should end all military aid to Ukraine.</claim> <psg>The White House announced a new military aid package of $800 million on April 21 just five days after the previous $800 million aid package it expands U.S. support by including U.S. weapons requires the United States to train Ukrainians in the use of these systems and implicitly assumes a long war.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Russia may also be incentivized to enter negotiations if it receives a pledge that incremental sanctions relief will follow its implementation of a negotiated peace deal with Ukraine. Another card that can be played by the West is NATO expansion into Sweden and Finland. The process of the two countries joining NATO has been stalled by Turkey’s opposition. Bringing Sweden and Finland into the alliance may have its pros and cons for the United States and its allies. On the one hand adding two strong member states could strengthen the alliance. On the other hand it will extend U.S. and allied commitments in Europe at a time when a bigger strategic challenge in Asia requires more resources and attention. But this issue aside it would be hard to dispute that ending the war in Ukraine is not more important than Sweden and Finland joining NATO. Russia has long opposed Sweden and Finland’s membership in NATO and will likely be willing to make concessions on Ukraine if their bid to join NATO seems imminent. Turkey may be willing to play nice if the resolution on the table could end the Ukraine war. After angering Russia by supplying effective Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Ukraine Turkey returned to its policy of balancing between the West and Russia as soon as it became apparent that Ukraine is unlikely to fall. Turkey’s opposition to Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids should be seen primarily in this context. Inflation in Turkey recently hit a twenty-three-year high of 73.5 percent and the war in Ukraine is doing even more harm to the Turkish economy. A recent survey shows that public support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has fallen to 26.5 percent a near-historic low. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will certainly welcome a boost to the Turkish economy especially given next year’s presidential and parliamentary elections. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States federal government should condition incremental sanctions relief and military aid to Ukraine on Russian agreement to end military engagement in Ukraine.</claim> <psg>Russia may also be incentivized to enter negotiations if it receives a pledge that incremental sanctions relief will follow its implementation of a negotiated peace deal with Ukraine Turkey may be willing to play nice if the resolution on the table could end the Ukraine war. After angering Russia by supplying effective Bayraktar TB-2 drones to Ukraine Turkey returned to its policy of balancing between the West and Russia as soon as it became apparent that Ukraine is unlikely to fall</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The U.S. and other western allies have unleashed a barrage of economic penalties on Russia in the weeks since it first invaded Ukraine. As the violence continues — and the two countries return to the negotiating table — how much are sanctions actually helping push Russia to end the war? Morning Edition's A Martínez posed that question to Juan Zarate a former assistant secretary of the Treasury who is now global co-managing partner at K2 Integrity. Zarate says the sanctions have had a dramatic impact on the Russian economy when it comes to things like the value of the ruble and the selloff of bonds and assets but are not enough on their own to turn back the tanks especially when there's 'a committed actor like [Russian President Vladimir Putin] with a design on invading a country and potentially destroying its cities. 'Sanctions have a tail to them — they take time to take effect the effects on the economy in Russia are still just being felt and so I think it's asking sanctions to do too much to actually stop the war. But it certainly can be part of a tableau of pressure that's put on Putin to try to change his behavior change his calculus ' Zarate explains pointing to other factors like the Ukrainian resistance diplomatic isolation and companies pulling out of Russia. Sanctions can however play an important role in the ongoing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. And Zarate says we may also see more action taken against sanctions evaders and countries that are continuing to do business with Russia. How sanctions factor into negotiations Zarate says sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions something he says should play into the calculus of negotiators at the bargaining table. In other words he says they should understand that things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to include the lifting of certain sanctions such as restrictions on trade or investment. 'Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot ' Zarate says adding that he has seen this in the case of Iran and other countries that are seeking to get out from under the pressure of economic sanctions. </source> [/INST] <claim>Sanctions are key to effective negotiation</claim> <psg>sanctions have had a dramatic impact on the Russian economy when it comes to things like the value of the ruble and the selloff of bonds and assets it certainly can be part of a tableau of pressure that's put on Putin to try to change his behavior change his calculus Sanctions can however play an important role in the ongoing negotiations between Russia and Ukraine How sanctions factor into negotiations sanctions could play two important roles in the ongoing peace talks. For one they help shape how Russia feels the costs of its actions things are only going to get worse for Russia as its economy continues to feel the effects of sanctions. The conversation could also come to include the lifting of certain sanctions such as restrictions on trade or investment. 'Every sanction that is used as a stick can also be used as a carrot '</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> “It’s not that I want to talk to Putin ” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said last week about Russia’s president. “I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war.” The United States should heed this plea. Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked and illegal invasion has been both heroic and effective but its situation is precarious. For all their flaws Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government. Moreover even if Ukraine can hold off Russian forces indefinitely the prospect of forcibly evicting them from its territory—particularly in the south—is daunting. All the while Russia is slaughtering Ukraine’s citizens ever more indiscriminately. But as Zelensky’s statement suggests Ukraine’s plan to end this war is probably not to vanquish the invading forces. Rather its goal appears to be to make the prospect of continuing the war and the occupation that could follow it exceptionally painful for Russia—so painful that Putin comes to view a settlement agreement that preserves Ukraine’s independence as the lesser of two evils. Putin may already be feeling the pain. The United States believes that Putin embarked on this war seeking to conquer most or all of Ukraine. Today Moscow has implicitly recognized Zelensky’s government by demanding in return for an end to the war that Kyiv agree to Ukrainian neutrality acknowledge Crimea as Russian territory and recognize Donetsk and Lugansk as independent states. If Ukrainian forces continue to perform well Putin will have to settle for still less and may even have to pay Ukraine reparations. (Conversely if Russian forces achieve breakthroughs Putin will be able to drive a harder bargain.) Even in the best case if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. Any such concessions will probably be bitterly opposed by many in the United States and Europe. Ultimately though it is not their call. The democratically elected government of Ukraine should get to decide what price it is willing to pay for an end to the slaughter of its citizens and the preservation of Ukraine’s existence as a sovereign state. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. By the same token however it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief. For this reason the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions—including on Russia’s central bank—if Russia and Ukraine negotiate and implement a settlement agreement. To date the United States and its allies have sent out mixed messages about sanctions relief. U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland indicated an openness to it. By contrast French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire has declared “economic and financial war on Russia” with the goal of causing “the collapse of the Russian economy.” In a similar vein British Foreign Secretary Elizabeth Truss stated that “the purpose of the sanctions is to debilitate the Russian economy.” This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation. U.S. President Joe Biden should clear up the confusion by stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war not to remove the government of Russia. In coordination with Kyiv he should dispatch a trusted lieutenant—such as Secretary of State Antony Blinken or CIA Director William Burns—to try to negotiate with Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns and vice versa through the implementation of reciprocal arms control measures—as the United States and NATO proposed in January. Success in this endeavor would be far from guaranteed and the Biden administration would take heat for even trying. This criticism however could be undercut by Zelensky’s stating publicly that he would support sanctions relief for Russia in return for the implementation of any agreement he negotiated. </source> [/INST] <claim>Sanctions are key to force Russia to the negotiating table BUT continued arms collapses negotiations</claim> <psg>I need to talk to Putin. The world needs to talk to Putin. There is no other way to stop this war. Russia’s armed forces may yet prevail in a prolonged conflict and there is still a real danger that much of Ukraine will become a Russian vassal state under a puppet government if Zelensky wants a negotiated settlement he will likely have to make significant concessions to Russia—as he has acknowledged. The United States and its allies should support Zelensky in any diplomatic course he pursues. Indeed he cannot end the war without them. Economic sanctions on Russia strengthen his hand at the negotiating table by raising the costs to Russia of continuing to fight. it is virtually inconceivable that Russia would agree to a settlement without sanctions relief the United States and its allies must be prepared to lift sanctions This ambiguity is dangerous because it risks obscuring the existence of an off-ramp for Putin and could thus prolong the conflict and increase the small but real chance of nuclear escalation. Biden should clear up the confusion by stating publicly that the purpose of sanctions is to end the war not to remove the government of Russia. Washington and its allies could also explore whether they could address Russian security concerns and vice versa through the implementation of reciprocal arms control measures</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> We must avoid nuclear wars and we can. A diplomatic settlement in Ukraine is feasible especially now that Russia has been defeated. But it requires U.S. officials to be committed to statesmanship and shed bizarre delusions about Russia cannibalizing the world unless its military is destroyed beyond repair. World War I showed that world leaders who think themselves perfectly reasonable can in fact lead millions to their deaths in total needless catastrophes. We have not yet seen the end of “crackpot realist” ideology—the mentality that presents itself as pragmatic and realistic while in fact agitating for the insanity of war as the solution to problems. The existence of op-eds like Romney’s should alarm every person who values the continued existence of human civilization. Instead of treating nuclear conflict as an unthinkable horror and focusing on steps to ensure that it never ever happens Romney thinks we should be making plans and simply reassures us that things definitely won’t end in catastrophe even though we would be depending on the (clearly delusional and violent) Vladimir Putin to act with caution and restraint. There is no need for a U.S.-Russia war to happen but if one does come about it will be because there are political elites in this country who do not understand the reality of war and accept no responsibility for actions that might exacerbate conflict. They peddle silly myths about Putin as a world-dominating Hitler type (he is more like George W. Bush as even George W. Bush recently hinted). These people are dangerous and should not be published in mainstream newspapers. </source> [/INST] <claim>Diplomatic settlement succeeds now – failure causes US-Russia war</claim> <psg>A diplomatic settlement in Ukraine is feasible especially now that Russia has been defeated But it requires U.S. officials to be committed to statesmanship and shed bizarre delusions about Russia cannibalizing the world unless its military is destroyed beyond repai . There is no need for a U.S.-Russia war to happen but if one does come about it will be because there are political elites in this country who do not understand the reality of war and accept no responsibility for actions that might exacerbate conflict</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Calls that nothing short of a “true defeat” be visited on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s are growing in both frequency and intensity. And nowhere is this on more prominent display than in Anne Applebaum’s recent Atlantic piece calling for a victory over Russia that is rapid comprehensive (involving military defeat economic pain and even some type of NATO membership for Ukraine) and above all humiliating. According to Applebaum only such a profound and profoundly humiliating defeat will permanently chasten Russia. Only such a true defeat will “force the reckoning that should have happened in the 1990s…. the moment when Russians should have realized the folly of Moscow’s imperial overreach when they should have figured out why so many of their neighbors hate and fear them.” Only such a true defeat she avers will end the historical pattern of Russian aggression and bring about permanent peace on its periphery. But while it might be emotionally gratifying to issue such calls and even to fantasize about inflicting terrible pain on such obvious malefactors the goal of inflicting such a defeat on Russia must not become allowed to become policy. For if history teaches us anything relevant to the current conflict it is that inflicting such a defeat would most definitely not have the salutary effect on international security that its advocates assume. Indeed quite the opposite. Inflicting a comprehensive and humiliating defeat on Russia would be far more likely to set the stage for further discord conflict and war on Europe’s eastern marches than to usher in an era of regional peace and tranquility. To put it bluntly indulging fantasies of inflicting near-total defeat on Russia would be a terrible mistake — one that we can and must avoid making. To understand why inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia would be such a terrible mistake it is necessary to pay attention to a motivating factor that is often overlooked or minimized in conventional accounts of foreign policy and grand strategy: humiliation. Most theories of international relations of course tend to assume rational actors either anthropomorphized states or actual state officials seeking to rationally advance or defend the state’s national interest. While not entirely blind to “non-rational” factors in individual or collective decisionmaking these approaches tend to systematically downplay or ignore the role of emotion in shaping the foreign policies of states. But as Clausewitz cautioned us long ago emotions in general (or the passions as he called them) can and do play an important role in foreign policy especially when it comes to war. And as Joslyn Barnhart argues in her recent book “The Consequences of Humiliation: Anger and Status in World Politics ” historically the specific emotion of “humiliation” has proven to be a major driver of foreign policy – especially the kind of revanchist and revisionist foreign policy that all too often leads to war. Barnhart’s compelling argument begins with a definition: Humiliation “is a complex and negative self-conscious emotion which combines the sense that one has been mistreated with a painful sense of self-doubt and helplessness in the face of this injustice.” It is the substrate for “national humiliation ” which “arises when individuals who identify as members of the state experience humiliation as the overwhelming emotional response to an international event.” National humiliation occurs Barnhart further argues either when a state suffers “rapid defeat to a state with lesser military capability” or when it has “been unfairly undermined by ill-intended others.” Either way such humiliation involves a “loss of status or prestige which they [policy makers] believe has undeservedly threatened the state’s image on the world stage.” Finally Barnhart shows how humiliated states have historically attempted to overcome their humiliation and restore their status and prestige by engaging in “the use of force against the state responsible for one’s humiliation or against third-party states that were not involved in the original humiliating event.” Although Barnhart’s book was published before Russia reinvaded Ukraine earlier this year its implications for today’s Russo-Ukraine war are perhaps obvious. Indeed it doesn’t take much imagination to see how inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia of the kind Applebaum advocates would both humiliate the country’s leaders and incentivize them to take whatever steps they deem necessary – up to and including starting another war – to overcome this humiliation. The strategic implications of this are perhaps obvious. As Barnhart notes in her conclusion prudent policy that seeks to minimize both the humiliation of defeated states and all of the undesirable consequences of such humiliation should “avoid the codification of inferiority within formal and informal treaties and negotiations.” They should avoid in other words imposing punitive treaties and settlements that formalize inferiority or that seek to diminish the defeated nation’s status or standing beyond some unavoidable minimum. In the absence of a 1945-scale total victory by one side or the other (which is obviously not in the cards) this suggests that the goal now should be a negotiated settlement that leaves both Russia and Ukraine (a) exhausted (b) relatively satisfied and (c) as little humiliated as possible. </source> [/INST] <claim>Either side could win the war now BUT it’ll be close – the aff ensures a crushing defeat for Russia which spurs Putin lashout</claim> <psg>Calls that nothing short of a “true defeat” be visited on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s are growing in both frequency and intensit According to Applebaum only such a profound and profoundly humiliating defeat will permanently chasten Russia Only such a true defeat she avers will end the historical pattern of Russian aggression and bring about permanent peace on its periphery. But while it might be emotionally gratifying to issue such calls and even to fantasize about inflicting terrible pain on such obvious malefactors the goal of inflicting such a defeat on Russia must not become allowed to become policy inflicting such a defeat would most definitely not have the salutary effect on international security that its advocates assume. . Inflicting a comprehensive and humiliating defeat on Russia would be far more likely to set the stage for further discord conflict and war on Europe’s eastern marches than to usher in an era of regional peace and tranquility inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia would be such a terrible mistake humiliation Most theories of international relations of course tend to assume rational actors these approaches tend to systematically downplay or ignore the role of emotion in shaping the foreign policies of states. National humiliation occurs Barnhart further argues either when a state suffers “rapid defeat to a state with lesser military capability” or when it has “been unfairly undermined by ill-intended others humiliated states have historically attempted to overcome their humiliation and restore their status and prestige by engaging in “the use of force against the state responsible for one’s humiliation or against third-party states that were not involved in the original humiliating event.” inflicting a devastating defeat on Russia of the kind Applebaum advocates would both humiliate the country’s leaders and incentivize them to take whatever steps they deem necessary – up to and including starting another war – to overcome this humiliation. prudent policy that seeks to minimize both the humiliation of defeated states and all of the undesirable consequences of such humiliation should “avoid the codification of inferiority within formal and informal treaties and negotiations.” goal now should be a negotiated settlement that leaves both Russia and Ukraine (a) exhausted (b) relatively satisfied and (c) as little humiliated as possible.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Senior White House officials designing the strategy to confront Russia have begun quietly debating a new concern: that the avalanche of sanctions directed at Moscow which have gained speed faster than they imagined is cornering President Vladimir V. Putin and may prompt him to lash out perhaps expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine. In Situation Room meetings in recent days the issue has come up repeatedly according to three officials. Mr. Putin’s tendency American intelligence officials have told the White House and Congress is to double down when he feels trapped by his own overreach. So they have described a series of possible reactions ranging from indiscriminate shelling of Ukrainian cities to compensate for the early mistakes made by his invading force to cyberattacks directed at the American financial system to more nuclear threats and perhaps moves to take the war beyond Ukraine’s borders. The debate over Mr. Putin’s next moves is linked to an urgent re-examination by intelligence agencies of the Russian leader’s mental state and whether his ambitions and appetite for risk have been altered by two years of Covid isolation. Those concerns accelerated after Mr. Putin’s order on Sunday to place the country’s strategic nuclear weapons on a “combat ready” alert to respond to the West’s “aggressive comments.” (In the ensuing days however national security officials say they have seen little evidence on the ground that Russia’s nuclear forces have actually moved to a different state of readiness.) </source> [/INST] <claim>That causes nuclear war</claim> <psg>cornering President Vladimir V. Putin and may prompt him to lash out perhaps expanding the conflict beyond Ukraine. Mr. Putin’s tendency American intelligence officials have told the White House and Congress is to double down when he feels trapped by his own overreach. So they have described a series of possible reactions ranging from indiscriminate shelling of Ukrainian cities to compensate for the early mistakes made by his invading force to cyberattacks directed at the American financial system to more nuclear threats and perhaps moves to take the war beyond Ukraine’s borders. concerns accelerated after Mr. Putin’s order on Sunday to place the country’s strategic nuclear weapons on a “combat ready” alert to respond to the West’s “aggressive comments</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges. Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day rebuilding Ukraine with the political goal of welcoming it into the EU and NATO will be a task of Herculean proportions. And the West must not fail Ukraine again. Alternatively a weak form of Russian control over Ukraine could mean a fractured destabilized area of continuous fighting with limited or no governance structures just east of NATO’s border. The humanitarian catastrophe would be unlike anything Europe has seen in decades. No less worrisome is the prospect of a weakened and humiliated Russia harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. If Putin maintains his grip on power Russia will become a pariah state a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact. The guilt and stain of the Ukraine war will stay with Russian politics for decades. rare is the country that profits from a lost war. The futility of the costs spent on a lost war the human toll and the geopolitical decline will define the course of Russia and Russian foreign policy for many years to come and it will be very difficult to imagine a liberal Russia emerging after the horrors of this war. Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a nuclear-armed military dictatorship. Policymakers would not be wrong to hope for a better Russia and for the time when a post-Putin Russia could be genuinely integrated into Europe. they should do what they can to enable this eventuality even as they resist Putin’s war. They would be foolish however not to prepare for darker possibilities. History has shown that it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist humiliated power near its center especially one of the size and weight of Russia. To do so the West would have to adopt an approach of continuous isolation and containment. Keeping Russia down and the United States in would become the priority for Europe in such a scenario as Europe will have to bear the main burden of managing an isolated Russia after a lost war in Ukraine. Washington for its part would want to finally focus on China. China in turn could try to strengthen its influence over a weakened Russia—leading to exactly the kind of bloc-building and Chinese dominance the West wanted to prevent at the beginning of the 2020s. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russian loss in Ukraine causes nuclear lash out AND an emboldened China</claim> <psg>The consequences of a Russian loss in Ukraine would present Europe and the United States with fundamental challenges. Assuming Russia will be forced to withdraw one day rebuilding Ukraine with the political goal of welcoming it into the EU and NATO will be a task of Herculean proportions No less worrisome is the prospect of a weakened and humiliated Russia harboring revanchist impulses akin to those that festered in Germany after World War I. Russia will become a pariah state a rogue superpower with a chastened conventional military but with its nuclear arsenal intact. Even if Putin loses his grip on Russia the country is unlikely to emerge as a pro-Western democracy. It could split apart especially in the North Caucasus. Or it could become a nuclear-armed military dictatorship it is immensely difficult to build a stable international order with a revanchist humiliated power near its center especially one of the size and weight of Russia. China in turn could try to strengthen its influence over a weakened Russia—leading to exactly the kind of bloc-building and Chinese dominance the West wanted to prevent at the beginning of the 2020s</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Another risk is that even a small Ukrainian victory might be preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin. Putin has departed from Cold War precedent by instrumentalizing nuclear weapons for political reasons rather than just for ones related to national security. His menacing statements have come across as bluster. But Putin could up the ante. To scare his adversaries he could order technical preparations for the potential use of nuclear weapons. The West should react to such threats with deterrence signaling clearly that Putin would achieve nothing through the use of nuclear weapons. If that does not work and Putin acts on his threats then NATO should consider carrying out a limited conventional response either against Russian forces in Ukraine or within Russia itself. In the meantime the West needs to build a broad coalition to condemn and deter nuclear saber rattling by linking sanctions and threats of retaliation to Putin’s nuclear brinkmanship. China might not join in but out of fear of nuclear instability it might approve of the idea. Finally even if Ukraine wins small Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict. Zelensky has indicated as much by saying that postwar Ukraine will resemble Israel in its full-time orientation toward self-defense. Putin meanwhile would continue to probe for Western vulnerabilities: much as he responded to Western sanctions in 2014 by meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016 he would likely mix cyberattacks disinformation and “active measures ” such as operations that would damage political parties and leaders Russia dislikes undermine the internal stability of “anti-Russian” countries and degrade the integrity of the transatlantic alliance and similar such alliances in the Indo-Pacific. The West would be forced to contain Russia for the foreseeable future. After all the West can do little to influence Russia from within other than to hope for the emergence of less combative Russian leadership. </source> [/INST] <claim>Even a small Ukrainian victory guarantees nuclear response</claim> <psg>even a small Ukrainian victory might be preceded or followed by nuclear threats from Putin Putin has departed from Cold War precedent by instrumentalizing nuclear weapons for political reasons rather than just for ones related to national security To scare his adversaries he could order technical preparations for the potential use of nuclear weapons even if Ukraine wins small Kyiv and its partners would have to prepare for years of continued conflict. Putin would continue to probe for Western vulnerabilities: much as he responded to Western sanctions in 2014 by meddling in the U.S. presidential election in 2016</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Beware the Cornered Putin Many people and organizations from cereal companies to Hogwarts houses have animal mascots meant to represent their core values. Sometimes they’re almost too revealing. For example the animal with which Vladimir Putin has publicly identified is the cornered rat. Not to be confused with Pizza Rat which is just trying to bring dinner home on the subway or Scabby the Rat which is just trying to helpfully point out non-union workers Cornered Rat is the most dangerous rat of all because it will attack unexpectedly to escape. Putin is cornered in Ukraine where no amount of war crimes have been able to break the will of a nation he expected to subjugate two months ago. Andreas Kluth sees hints Putin is now looking for new ways to attack. Cutting off gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria is one. A string of mysterious explosions in Moldova hints at another darker avenue. And if he gets truly desperate he has plenty of chemical and nuclear weapons. In a sense the West is playing a game of chicken to see how much it can damage Russia’s economy and war machine along with Putin’s standing at home without triggering a nightmarish response. Russia deprived of Western goods must revert to being the starved autarky that made living in the Soviet Union such a pleasant experience writes Leonid Bershidsky. Unfortunately for the Russian people the only way to enforce it will be full-on fascism. It’s worth remembering that a young Putin escaped from the cornered rat that impressed him so much by attacking him. We should be so lucky. </source> [/INST] <claim>Increased militarization forces Putin into a corner – he resorts to chemical and nuclear escalation</claim> <psg>Beware the Cornered Putin Putin is cornered in Ukraine where no amount of war crimes have been able to break the will of a nation he expected to subjugate two months ago Putin is now looking for new ways to attack. Cutting off gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria is one. A string of mysterious explosions in Moldova hints at another darker avenue. And if he gets truly desperate he has plenty of chemical and nuclear weapons. the West is playing a game of chicken to see how much it can damage Russia’s economy and war machine along with Putin’s standing at home without triggering a nightmarish response Unfortunately for the Russian people the only way to enforce it will be full-on fascism.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Cornering Vladimir Putin In The Spectator Harry J. Kazianis warns that backing Putin into a corner could result in the use of nuclear weapons: If both sides can’t come to a deal Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv determining that a scorched earth policy and winning at any cost is better than taking weeks or months to take the country in full. The level of carnage we would see would be something akin to images from World War II: bombed-out cities bodies on the streets and total carnage everywhere. The world would be horrified—and would demand action against Russia. What would the West do? It’s likely that more weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale putting more pressure on Putin to respond. More sanctions would then follow including disconnecting all of Russia’s banks and financial institutions from SWIFT including entities tied to Russian energy the lifeblood of Moscow’s economy. At that point Russia’s way of life its ability to exist would be threatened. The Putin regime would be threatened. What oh what would Moscow do then? Think “escalate to deescalate”—and that could mean something horrible for all of us. Citing similar concerns National Review editorializes that Putin should be given some way to avoid complete humiliation: There is a danger that Putin—trapped and risking a humiliating defeat—will choose a desperate escalation threatening the West with nuclear blackmail or saber-rattling on the border of a NATO country. The United States must stand firm and support our allies but we must also look for ways that might allow Putin to back down while retaining some semblance of face. </source> [/INST] <claim>Increased arms to Ukraine puts more pressure on Putin to respond - miscalc</claim> <psg>Cornering Vladimir Putin backing Putin into a corner could result in the use of nuclear weapons: Putin may decide to truly go all in against Kyiv determining that a scorched earth policy and winning at any cost is better than taking weeks or months to take the country in full. bombed-out cities bodies on the streets and total carnage everywhere. more weapons would flow into Ukraine on a grand scale putting more pressure on Putin to respond. The Putin regime would be threatened. What oh what would Moscow do then? Think “escalate to deescalate”—and that could mean something horrible for all of us. Putin should be given some way to avoid complete humiliation: There is a danger that Putin—trapped and risking a humiliating defeat—will choose a desperate escalation threatening the West with nuclear blackmail or saber-rattling on the border of a NATO country.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Defusing a Russian intervention and getting out of this crisis implies pressuring Ukraine to implement the constitutional reforms necessary to grant autonomy and amnesty to the Donbas republics. These separatist republics have significant support from the local population and are backed by a major power. They have thousands of civil servants especially soldiers who are more determined to fight – and die – than NATO. Ultimately the main driver of Russian-Western tensions is Ukraine. Kyiv’s desire to join NATO is in direct opposition to Russia’s conception of national and territorial security. Russia is ready to fight to secure its interests as are the Ukrainians. However Ukrainians have no real chance of winning against Russia without Western support. The Atlantic Alliance lacks the cohesion and interest to pay the costs associated with real support for Ukraine. The current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia and it even encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine’s steady military modernization. To truly deter Russia NATO would have to provide assets and endure costs that its members do not want to bear. This is why implementing a strategy that corresponds to NATO’s accurate means and interests would help to avoid crisis escalation. And such strategy entails convincing Moscow that a legal way out exists in the Donbas by reorienting Western pressure from Moscow to Kyiv. </source> [/INST] <claim>Militarizing Ukraine forces escalation – only minute concessions solve</claim> <psg>Ultimately the main driver of Russian-Western tensions is Ukraine. Kyiv’s desire to join NATO is in direct opposition to Russia’s conception of national and territorial security. Ukrainians have no real chance of winning against Russia without Western support. The Atlantic Alliance lacks the cohesion and interest to pay the costs associated with real support for Ukraine The current half-support is insufficient to deter Russia and it even encourages a Russian intervention to stop Ukraine’s steady military modernization. convincing Moscow that a legal way out exists in the Donbas by reorienting Western pressure from Moscow to Kyiv.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Western Support to Ukraine Russian current tenseness is in direct reaction to continuous Western support of Ukraine forces fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions – collectively known as the Donbas. NATO’s support to Kyiv is channeled through the Comprehensive Assistance Package for Ukraine. Since 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea and destabilization in Eastern Ukraine NATO’s goal has been to increase capacity building and provide military training to allow Ukrainian forces to resist Russian-backed militias in the Donbas. The Biden administration has equipped Ukraine with arms and military equipment totaling $650 million in the last fiscal year alone. The U.K. signed a Memorandum of Implementation on naval contracts with Kyiv in 2021 while the U.S. signed a Strategic Defense Framework and a Charter on Strategic Partnership with Ukraine. 200 Canadian soldiers are deployed in Ukraine as part of Operation Unifier and Ottawa has provided $700 million worth of aid to Ukrainian forces since 2014. As part of broader efforts to augment its deterrence posture following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine NATO has increased its deployments in the Black Sea (naval and air patrols) and reinforced the Alliance’s forward presence in Eastern and Southern Europe. More recently France has declared it would send troops to Romania as part of NATO’s “Enhanced Advanced Presence” missions. A strengthening of NATO’s military posture can also be seen in the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe. Russia’s Grievances and Resolve All of this triggers great security concerns in Russia. Putin is suspicious of NATO’s defensive rhetoric notably because of NATO’s interventions in Kosovo and Libya and its post-Cold War Eastern European expansion. For Russia U.S. support to Ukraine equates to a de facto integration of Ukraine – short of the article 5 provision – in NATO. U.S.’ stated willingness to increase interoperability between Ukraine and NATO is unacceptable for Moscow for security and ideological reasons. Ukraine’s insistence on joining NATO and NATO’s firm support of its Open-Door policy (article 10) is at the core of Russian grievances against the West. There is no way the Kremlin will ever allow Ukraine to move forward with its ambition of joining NATO nor will NATO ever fight to help Ukraine do so. </source> [/INST] <claim>US military support causes Russian insecurity – prompts lashout</claim> <psg>Russian current tenseness is in direct reaction to continuous Western support of Ukraine forces The Biden administration has equipped Ukraine with arms and military equipment totaling $650 million in the last fiscal year alone . As part of broader efforts to augment its deterrence posture following the 2014 invasion of Ukraine NATO has increased its deployments in the Black Sea (naval and air patrols) and reinforced the Alliance’s forward presence in Eastern and Southern Europe All of this triggers great security concerns in Russia. Putin is suspicious of NATO’s defensive rhetoric For Russia U.S. support to Ukraine equates to a de facto integration of Ukraine</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> GT: You recently tweeted that 'anyone demanding the EU pumps Ukraine full of lethal weapons should read it carefully. It is not as simple as you think.' Could you please elaborate on the stance? Daly: My position will be similar on the situation in any conflict area - sending more arms into a war can only result in prolonging that war. It's not that I don't believe that Ukrainians have the right to defend themselves. They do. But the reality is that over the past period there has been a growing militarization in Ukraine. The EU throwing in more arms will not be sufficient to defeat the Russian army. It will only lead to the war being prolonged and more Ukrainians dying. And worryingly those arms are being distributed to people and organizations without any checks or balances. So god only knows where those weapons will end up and when in years to come they will come to be used in other situations. So it's a very dangerous tactic. I know some of the people in Europe who are calling for this believe that they are doing this out of the desire to protect the Ukrainian people. People would like to help innocent Ukrainians as I would. But sending more arms in is not going to do that. The only solution is a negotiated peace settlement. </source> [/INST] <claim>Sending arms to Ukraine only prolongs the war – bogs down Putin </claim> <psg>anyone demanding the EU pumps Ukraine full of lethal weapons should read it carefully. It is not as simple as you think sending more arms into a war can only result in prolonging that war. The EU throwing in more arms will not be sufficient to defeat the Russian army. It will only lead to the war being prolonged and more Ukrainians dying. And worryingly those arms are being distributed to people and organizations without any checks or balances. So god only knows where those weapons will end up and when in years to come they will come to be used in other situations.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Dangerous hubris Putin appears to have dramatically overestimated Russia’s ability to quickly smash Ukrainian resistance analysts said. None of Ukraine’s major cities have fallen defying even Western expectations. Unprecedented sanctions have torpedoed Russia’s national currency and its stock market and sent Russian citizens scrambling to join long lines at ATMs. Ukrainian resistance has proven much stiffer than seemingly anyone expected. Now Putin seems to have few good options to resolve the conflict without losing face analysts said. Simply backing down now could be perilous for him. The Kremlin strongman has spent two decades building a reputation as Russia’s all-powerful irreplaceable leader and racking up a string of swift military victories along the way. Russian forces have engaged in protracted brutal military campaigns in Syria and in the Russian region of Chechnya that killed thousands of civilians. Russian soldiers and leaders may balk at deploying similar tactics against Ukrainians who have strong historic and linguistic ties to Russians. But at the same time a humiliating climb-down in Ukraine could have implications for Putin’s future grip on power Kremlin-watchers said. Russia would be left saddled with devastating sanctions and cornered in political isolation with nothing to show for it. “If he throws in the towel and says ‘My bad we messed up ’ that takes the veneer off his image as Putin-the-mastermind ” said Joshua Tucker director of New York University’s Jordan Center for Advanced Study of Russia. The crisis in Ukraine is already creating fissures in Russian society. Over the weekend two of Russia’s richest and most loyal oligarchs openly called for peace in Ukraine a rare sign of defiance among the country’s ultra-wealthy elite. Over 6 400 people have been arrested in anti-war protests in dozens of cities around Russia according to OVD-Info an independent group that tracks the arrests. Putin seems for now to have placed himself in a strategic position with few good options to resolve the conflict. Russia has publicly demanded concessions including ceding the region of Crimea to Russia and the demilitarization of Ukraine. Yet as the assault has bogged down the possibility that Ukraine would concede such demands appears increasingly remote analysts said. Continuing with the assault will likewise carry steep costs for Russia. Western powers still have room to ratchet up the sanctions regime even further. And more casualties will only increase Russian domestic unrest over the conflict analysts said. Even a conventional military victory by Russia using overwhelming force which many experts believe Russia can still achieve would create the possibility of a grinding guerrilla war for the foreseeable future. Putin has also raised long-dormant anxieties about Russia’s nuclear capabilities by putting the country’s nuclear forces on “high alert ” prompting nerve-wracking conversations about the possibility of nuclear war that not long ago would have been considered outlandish. Such talk is prompting Western officials to look for ways to provide Putin with some kind of acceptable offramp. President Joe Biden’s White House says it doesn’t want to overreact to Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. But it remains unclear whether Putin would find any Western proposals for deescalation acceptable. Like the big rat he once chased down a corridor in Leningrad Putin may decide the best way out of a terrible situation is to ratchet up tensions even further. “The question becomes which is the bigger fear: The fear that he’ll look weak if he walks it back or the fear that the situation for Russia will get much worse if he steps it up? That’s what makes this a dangerous moment ” Tucker said. </source> [/INST] <claim>Continued war increases the likelihood of escalation</claim> <psg>Putin appears to have dramatically overestimated Russia’s ability to quickly smash Ukrainian resistance analysts said. Putin seems to have few good options to resolve the conflict without losing face Simply backing down now could be perilous for him. If he throws in the towel and says ‘My bad we messed up ’ that takes the veneer off his image as Putin-the-mastermind ” Putin seems for now to have placed himself in a strategic position with few good options to resolve the conflict. Continuing with the assault will likewise carry steep costs for Russia Even a conventional military victory by Russia using overwhelming force which many experts believe Russia can still achieve would create the possibility of a grinding guerrilla war for the foreseeable future. Putin may decide the best way out of a terrible situation is to ratchet up tensions even further The question becomes which is the bigger fear: The fear that he’ll look weak if he walks it back or the fear that the situation for Russia will get much worse if he steps it up?</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The substantially expanded and expedited Western arms shipments and increased intelligence support could prolong large-scale military action. NATO has also said that any Russian attack against the supply lines facilitating the flow of weapons to Ukraine will trigger an invocation of Article 5 of the NATO charter thus raising the specter of military action against Russia. Moscow which has already labeled the sweeping sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies a declaration of “economic war ” has warned that nations sending weapons to Ukraine “will be responsible for any consequences of such actions.” The weapons will surely aid Ukrainian forces in waging counterattacks against Moscow’s invasion but will not be sufficient to defeat Russia militarily. Should Moscow succeed in forcibly taking major Ukrainian cities or even in toppling the government the Western weapons are likely to be used in a protracted armed insurgency and war of attrition that may produce echoes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. </source> [/INST] <claim>More weapons escalates the conflict</claim> <psg>substantially expanded and expedited Western arms shipments and increased intelligence support could prolong large-scale military action. Moscow has warned that nations sending weapons to Ukraine “will be responsible for any consequences of such actions.” weapons will not be sufficient to defeat Russia militarily. the Western weapons are likely to be used in a protracted armed insurgency and war of attrition that may produce echoes of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Could Russia invade other countries? Russia has not stated any intentions to push beyond Ukraine but Moscow also previously said it would not invade Ukraine so a further invasion is certainly not impossible. Any further drive would be incredibly risky for Russia particularly if its forces enter a Nato state. Nato uses a system of collective security whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party. That means if Russia were to invade say Poland Lithuania Latvia or Estonia it would automatically be at war with the US UK and all 30 Nato members and while Russia’s forces are strong they would be dwarfed by Nato’s collective power. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia won’t go beyond Ukraine</claim> <psg>Russia has not stated any intentions to push beyond Ukraine Any further drive would be incredibly risky for Russia particularly if its forces enter a Nato state. That means if Russia were to invade say Poland Lithuania Latvia or Estonia it would automatically be at war with the US UK and all 30 Nato members and while Russia’s forces are strong they would be dwarfed by Nato’s collective power.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> What would be Russia’s next steps if NATO accommodates it in Eastern Ukraine? It is unlikely that Russia would keep expanding if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv not to mention other holds in Russia’s near-abroad. The maximum-pressure scenario – Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run not to mention the local resistance Russia would face. Furthermore Russia has high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine and Kyiv’s indigenous law excluding Russian minorities (as well as Ukrainian) directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities. This Russian emotional involvement favors Russian irredentism in Eastern Ukraine and militates against the idea that Russia contemplates expansionist aims. Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore Russian expansion is unlikely as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia won’t keep expanding – Ukraine’s culturally unique AND its economy can’t support another invasion</claim> <psg>? It is unlikely that Russia would keep expanding if the Ukrainian crisis were resolved on terms that Moscow could live with. First because Russia’s economy would endure massive costs to sustain the war effort just to hold Kyiv not to mention other holds in Russia’s near-abroad. Russia’s exclusion from the global economy – would make it near impossible for Russia to finance expansionist policies in the long run not to mention the local resistance Russia would face. Russia has high stakes in protecting the status of the Russian minority in Eastern Ukraine Ukrainization of Russian minority areas in Ukraine directly affects Russia’s identity as the protector of Russian minorities Ukraine’s ideational importance to Russia plays a significant part in motivating Russia’s revisionist policy towards Ukraine. Moscow ideational interests elsewhere in the post-Soviet sphere are not as salient as they are in Ukraine. Therefore Russian expansion is unlikely as not all land is equally valuable from an emotional (and security) standpoint.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Romney disagrees. Note that he does not argue against the proposition that present U.S. actions (massively escalating military support for Ukraine and getting closer to a “proxy war” while declining to push for a diplomatic settlement) make a nuclear response from Russia more likely. Instead he appears to argue that it doesn’t matter that this makes Putin more likely to use a nuclear weapon because the alternative would be “paying the cannibal to eat us last” and would mean that Putin can “invade and subjugate with near impunity.” Some may find this persuasive thinking a diplomatic settlement would reward Russian aggression and encourage it to invade countries in the future. But this narrative is false. As foreign relations expert Anatol Lieven explained in a recent Current Affairs interview it overlooks the crucial fact that Russia has already lost the war. Russia failed in its objective which was to topple and replace the Ukrainian government. Russia has not even secured full control of the Donbas. Russia has suffered immense losses of troops had its economy wrecked become a pariah state strengthened Ukraine as a nation strengthened NATO and shown its military to be a paper tiger that cannot even conquer territories within a few miles of its own border. This is a critically important fact to understand. A diplomatic settlement now would not result in a “victory” for Russia that encourages further invasions. Russia has proven that it is utterly and completely incapable of invasions. It cannot even conquer a poor country like Ukraine. It is not going to invade Finland. It is not going to invade the United States. Russia has shown that it is not in fact any kind of serious threat. Romney portrays Russia as a kind ravenous cannibal that if not stopped will devour the entire world. Since Russia cannot even devour the Donbas this is an utterly deranged fantasy. It is pure fearmongering. Once we understand that Russia has already suffered a defeat and has already been strongly disincentivized from pursuing future invasions it becomes clear how insane it would be at this point to take steps that could make Russia more likely to use nuclear weapons. With the aggression having failed to pay off what we need is to facilitate a deal between Ukraine and Russia that both parties can accept. Since Putin is likely secretly eager to find a way to end this calamity for his country without being completely humiliated or losing power such a deal (basic details of which have been outlined by Lieven and Chomsky) should be within reach. Or on the other hand we could push Putin as far as possible in order to maximally punish him knowing that at any point this irrational violent delusional man has a weapon in his back pocket that could lead to the end of the world. We would of course as Romney says be doing this in the name of “freedom ” even though it could result in the gruesome deaths of millions. They would be dead and Ukraine would be a radioactive wasteland but at least Putin would have been taught a lesson. </source> [/INST] <claim>Capacity – the Ukrainian invasion has already failed and Russia doesn’t have the capacity to expand further BUT pushing him too far causes irrational escalation</claim> <psg>Romney argue that it doesn’t matter that this makes Putin more likely to use a nuclear weapon because the alternative would be “paying the cannibal to eat us last” and would mean that Putin can “invade and subjugate with near impunity. this narrative is false Anatol Lieven explained in a recent Current Affairs interview it overlooks the crucial fact that Russia has already lost the war A diplomatic settlement now would not result in a “victory” for Russia that encourages further invasions. Russia has proven that it is utterly and completely incapable of invasions. It cannot even conquer a poor country like Ukraine. It is not going to invade Finland. It is not going to invade the United States it becomes clear how insane it would be at this point to take steps that could make Russia more likely to use nuclear weapons. With the aggression having failed to pay off what we need is to facilitate a deal between Ukraine and Russia that both parties can accept Putin is likely secretly eager to find a way to end this calamity for his country without being completely humiliated or losing power such a deal (basic details of which have been outlined by Lieven and Chomsky) should be within reach. on the other hand we could push Putin as far as possible in order to maximally punish him knowing that at any point this irrational violent delusional man has a weapon in his back pocket that could lead to the end of the world</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> On Feb. 16 2016 the secretary general of Lebanese Hizballah Hassan Nasrallah declared that “a missile on these ammonia plants [in Haifa] is equal to an atomic bomb.” This implicit threat to attack Israeli chemical plants with precision munitions demonstrates the paradox of precision: Weapons that allow traditional militaries to reduce collateral damage can be used by nonstate actors to target critical infrastructure and threaten civilians. </source> [/INST] <claim>Reducing the cost and increasing the abundance of precision-guided munitions causes it to fall into the hands of terrorists.</claim> <psg>precision munitions demonstrates the paradox of precision Weapons that allow traditional militaries to reduce collateral damage can be used by nonstate actors to target critical infrastructure and threaten civilians</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Nonstate actors are increasingly using precision weapons systems. The destructive effects of this trend are not theoretical. This is evident almost anywhere one looks in the Middle East. In Lebanon Hizballah is investing heavily in making its vast ballistic arsenal more sophisticated and precise including efforts to acquire the necessary manufacturing capability and know-how. In Yemen Houthi rebels have used armed drones to target Saudi oil infrastructure. The abundance of precise systems is not exclusively an outcome of Iranian-backed proliferation — the Islamic State has also used weaponized drones on multiple occasions in Iraq and Syria. </source> [/INST] <claim>They’re a game changer. Escalates global terrorism and Mexican cartel fighting and causes Middle East war.</claim> <psg>Nonstate actors are increasingly using precision weapons systems. The destructive effects are not theoretical This is evident in the Middle East Houthi rebels used drones to target oil infrastructure the Islamic State has used weaponized drones</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As nuclear-armed states seek to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in a new era of multipolar great-power competition rethinking hotlines should be at the top of their agenda. In many ways this is low-hanging fruit that could serve as the technical catalyst for expanded trust and dialogue. Indeed France as the new chair of the P5 Process has embraced the concept of “strategic risk reduction” and will make improving crisis communication technologies like hotlines a key priority for discussion among the United Nations Security Council’s permanent five members ahead of and beyond the planned Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty this August. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States federal government should establish a national defense hotline with [x].</claim> <psg>As nuclear-armed states seek to reduce the risk of nuclear conflict in a new era of multipolar great-power competitio rethinking hotlines should be at the top of their agenda this is low-hanging fruit that could serve as the technical catalyst for expanded trust and dialogue</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> .¶ Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when 'the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government' and 'legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down' both groups. In this instance the Hobbesian rhetoric of a 'war of all against all' is more than a clich??. In fact it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought 'for the purpose of war' (ibid. 98) and for which '[t]here is no hope of affixing blame' (ibid. 17). In short the 'reason for war was war' (ibid. 43). At first glance the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the 'war machine.' For according to Deleuze and Guattari armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the 'state apparatus???prior to its laws' (1987 352) and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the 'intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis' (1999 158) its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6¶ To begin with the novel's leitmotif of 'perpetual war' situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war because as the narrator reports it is fought with 'modern weaponry ' supported by 'backers on the sidelines in safe countries ' and 'sponsored by gun-and drug-runners' (Ondaajte 2000 43). In this scenario the rule of law has deteriorated into 'a belief in???revenge' (ibid. 56) and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions in Max Weber's famous words as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (2002 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me however that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the 'appearance of 'failed states' ' as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations intensifies 'tribal ethnic and religious conflict' and thus 'contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy' (1996 35). On the other situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence however overlooks that in a global context violence has become 'profoundly anti-Hobbesian' (Balibar 2001 xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as 'a structural condition that precedes institutions.' Instead he maintains 'we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional.' It 'arises from institutions as much as it arises against them' (ibid. xi). Thus in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice.¶ If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an 'inherently violent' event (Das 1998) it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence the narrator observes 'The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima' (Ondaatje 2002 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic as Nancy argues of 'anything that is properly to be called war' (2000 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism 'indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time' and can be rearticulated as no more than a 'regrettable' remnant of an earlier age (ibid. 128). In that Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the 'war on terror' employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation however two things are at stake. First what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power which lie at the heart of global wars.¶ Second Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is 'tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity' (2000 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or 'fault-line' wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations demographic changes and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach however the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence 'have come into their comparison' (Ondaatje 2000 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that 'has come into their comparison' and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand then the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming and therefore accounting for in Anil's words 'the unhistorical dead' (ibid 56). On the other hand read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For to revert to the symbolic language of 'primitivism and anarchy' and 'to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters ' as Kaldor observes (2001 113) designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence.¶ Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence however may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total singular present of perpetual uncertainty fear and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's 'dehistoricized' history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably 'natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims' (1999 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note however that according to Scott dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather it refers to a process of denaturalizing and thus de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity.¶ Anil's Ghost engages in this process of 'dehistoricizing' by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests the novel offers 'a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form' (2003 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother Gamini condemns as 'the last two hundred years of Western political writing' (Ondaatje 2000 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the 'white mythology' (1982 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity tinkered with translations of historical texts and 'approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills' (Ondaatje 2000 82) until 'the unprovable truth emerged' (ibid. 83). Now years after his fall from scientific grace Palipana lives the life of an ascetic following the 'strict principles of' a 'sixth-century sect of monks' (ibid. 84). To him history and nature have become one for 'all history was filled with sunlight every hollow was filled with rain' (ibid. 84). Yet Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's 'Acknowledgment' section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes 'the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention' (2003 50). Rather than effectively 'dehistorizing' the character of Palipana then Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956).¶ Cont ¶ For Hardt and Negri then the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war while positioning the United States as a global power which transforms war 'into the primary organizing principle of society' (2004 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war violence and mediation. Yet curiously enough Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law protecting its military from being subjected to international control allowing preemptive strikes and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid. 8) the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining 'power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' ' (2004 364) it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the 'production of subjectivity' through immaterial labour (2000 66). What this argument overlooks is that according to Agamben the state of exception constitutes an abject space or 'a zone of indistinction between outside and inside exclusion and inclusion' (1998 181) where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover the sovereign ??? albeit a nation sovereign power or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the 'originary activity' of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the 'production of bare life' (ibid. 83) of life that need not be accounted for as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception however also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. ¶ In 1940 Benjamin famously wrote 'the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight' (1968 257). Benjamin's statement as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay 'Interrogating Identity ' can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression violence and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed 'the state of emergency ' as Bhabha says 'is also always a state of emergence' (1994 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war.¶ First Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of 'the occult instability where the people dwell' (Fanon 1963 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call 'democratic violence' (2004 344). This kind of violence they argue belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally according to democratic principles of decision making democratic violence serves as a means of defending 'the accomplishments' of 'political and social transformation' (ibid. 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that 'the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war ' that is an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression.' This they conclude is 'a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude' (ibid. 67). In one quick stroke Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring.¶ Second while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity it also despite Benjamin's opinion draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges 'the transparency of social reality as a pre-given image of human knowledge' (Bhabha 1994 41). Here Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and more importantly call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence including torture and disappearances.¶ Third Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point however that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence a critical practice of post-colonial studies I suggest must reassess the term 'transformation' and concurrently the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of 'making history' (Balibar 2001 26). In other words if as Hannah Arendt argues there has been a historical 'reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right' (2002 25) it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How in other words does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war?¶ Fourth like Bhabha we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a 'unitary notion of history' generates a 'unitary ' and therefore extremely violent 'concept of man' (1994 42) I wish to caution alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism that what enables today's global civil war is that even 'its opponents treat it as a historical norm' (Benjamin 1968 257). What is at stake then in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects I believe contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me however that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation rupture and totalization. Instead such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly as I have argued in this paper it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.¶ </source> [/INST] <claim>Militarist ideology results in the permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to maintain a global economy of violence a process to which the peoples of the Global North will only respond with a disembodied indifference</claim> <psg>. the narrative's tendency to locate war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war On the one hand it resonates with the misleading notion of 'failed states' and thus 'contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy On the other situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as 'a structural condition that precedes institutions.' violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional.' It 'arises from institutions the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice The symbolic leveling of the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as cumulative time' and can be rearticulated as no more than a 'regrettable' remnant of an earlier age the 'war on terror' employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power which lie at the heart of global wars. the novel insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity it is the suffering of all war victims that 'has come into their comparison' and new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the normative imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. the North can detach itself and create the historical distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence.¶ anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress history into a total singular 'dehistoricized' history. it refers to a process of de-legitimizing narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. dehistoricizing history offers 'a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form white mythology extends violence into knowledge production so that the latter becomes complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war positioning the United States as a global power transforms war 'into the primary organizing principle of society' the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war violence and mediation the 'originary activity' of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the 'production of bare life' of life that need not be accounted for as is the case with the civilian casualties of war against Iraq. Benjamin famously wrote 'the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring. oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges 'the transparency of social reality as a pre-given image of human knowledge the violence of the political event risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence How does bare life attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war?¶ we need to take seriously the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. a 'unitary notion of history contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires critique that questions notions of history based on fragmentation Instead historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity it must read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding of the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The United States accomplished its goals in the Afghan war when a team of Navy SEALs stormed Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound and gave him a richly deserved bullet to the head. So why is the United States still there? America has clearly gotten its pound of flesh. There are now more Sunni Islamist militants than ever. Never-ending deployments place massive strains on personnel drain resources and divert funding needed for modernization so the United States remains competitive versus its peer adversaries. </source> [/INST] <claim>The 1ACs image of benign war-fighting is an age-old tactic enabling innocent domination on the periphery. By placing military benevolence on a pedestal the aff assigns hegemonic security priestly powers culminating in genocidal sacrifice on the periphery. </claim> <psg>The U S accomplished its goals when Navy SEALs stormed bin Laden’s Pakistani compound and gave him a bullet to the head So why is the U S still there? America has gotten its pound of flesh There are now more Sunni Islamist militants than ever Never-ending deployments place massive strains on personnel drain resources</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The Gramscian notion of hegemony which sought to explain societal acquiescence to a capitalist system that created and maintained vast economic inequalities held that the poor and working-class sectors of society adopt the dominant cultural group’s ‘values norms perceptions beliefs sentiments and prejudices’ (Lears 1985 569). Consider for a moment the role of the military in society with its own particular values norms perceptions beliefs and practices. In order to gain and maintain support or at least acquiescence for a large standing armed force and the different activities it takes on with associated opportunity costs those who do not necessarily have a stake in the well-being of this system must be somehow convinced that its health and viability is of critical importance to their own well-being. Society as a whole must be acculturated to adopt a particular worldview and set of cultural beliefs that will generate a certain level of acquiescence to whatever it is the military is doing at any time and in any place. In adopting a Gramscian view of hegemony we do not wish to imply that there is necessarily a ruling military class analogous to the ruling economic class of which Gramsci spoke. Rather we posit that hegemony – the ability to set agendas and define values and norms – has advanced militaristic goals as well as economic or class goals. Indeed the various sets of goals are intertwined and often compliment each other. The point here is that Gramsci’s broad notion of power is of use in analyses that go beyond class in a capitalist society. For example Flint (2006) notes that the Gramscian notion of power demonstrates how ‘geopolitical practices and ideas are disseminated and portrayed to wide audiences in order to justify them and make them appear “normal” while belittling alternative views’ (Flint 2006 28). Cresswell (1996) in his theorizations of placediscussed above employs Gramsci’s ideas in order to explain the role of place in constructing dominant ideologies. And Taylor (1999) adapts the Gramscian idea of hegemony from the scale of a particular society to the globe in order to explore the mechanisms by which the last three world hegemons (the Netherlands Great Britain and the United States) have each been able to construct and impose their own versions of ‘modernity’ on the rest of the world. Emphasizing that dominant worldviews do not take hold in a simple top-down manner Sharp (2000 31) points out that hegemony far from being constructed solely through political ideologies on the part of the elites of society is produced and maintained ‘more immediately through detailed scripting of some of the most ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday life.’ It is this very banality that makes militarism more than merely an elite ideology or a set of beliefs with which state institutions indoctrinate the less powerful sectors of society. This does not rule out the possibility of resistance to the dominant ideology. Just as Gramsci had to explain open revolts such as workers’ strikes and factory takeovers the application of cultural hegemony to militarism necessitates an explanation of activities such as war protests. In actuality maintaining hegemony does not require constant commitment from subordinates to the existing system. rather the dominant group carefully defines the acceptable range of resistance to these processes. As Lears (1985 569) points out most of the time the vast majority of people find it difficult perhaps impossible ‘to translate the outlook implicit in their experience into a conception of the world that will directly challenge the hegemonic culture.’ This explains why we may see protests to a particular event such as the Iraq War but not challenges to the overall role of the military in society (although it is the very nature of the military’s role in society that allows such wars to happen). Gramsci’s theories of common-sense power and cultural hegemony rest on his distinction between political society and civil society a view echoed by Agnew (1987) and Kirby (1993) in their theorization of place. Political society consists of the juridical or coercive institutions most notably the police and the military. Providing the necessary ‘direct domination’ or command political society assures the discipline of those members of society who do not consent to the imposed order willingly. Civil society on the other hand consists of institutions such as schools the media churches trade unions and political parties. In contrast to political society civil society corresponds with the actual function of ‘hegemony’. the diffusion of cultural values and norms that construct the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the masses to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group (Bellamy and Schecter 1993 118–119). The cultural hegemony of militarism as with class-based hegemony can be understood as the convergence of political and civil society in ‘perpetuating the existing order’ (Boggs 1976 17). One way in which the military sector achieves ascendancy within the state is to become an essential component of the economy. Compared to the cultural or ideological side of militarization the economic mechanisms of militarization are more tangible and readily quantified. Therefore although defense spending is often shrouded in secrecy researchers have been able to utilize secondary data in order to focus empirically on these economic processes making them well documented in geography. For instance Markusen et al. (1991 5) provide ‘a preliminary sketch of a theory of location for the defense industries ’ which the authors note have altered the US economy in fundamental ways contributing to the rapid development of certain regions and cities vis-à-vis others throughout the Cold War. The edited volume the Pentagon and the Cities (Kirby 1992) was compiled with an eye toward the end of the Cold War and what this geopolitical transition might mean for the many communities across the United States that had come to rely on defense spending for their economic survival. In addition at this time Crump (1993) looked at how the spatial distribution of Department of Defense services procurement lead to new patterns of regional development and economic inequalities (see Woodward 2004 for a comprehensive review of military economic geography). </source> [/INST] <claim>Hegemony is upheld through a militaristic ideology – restricts opposition by entrenching itself as key to the economy and national security </claim> <psg>Consider the role of the military in society with its own particular values norms perceptions beliefs and practices In order to gain and maintain support or acquiescence for a large standing armed force and the different activities it takes on who must be somehow convinced that its health and viability is of critical importance to their own well-being Society as a whole must be acculturated to adopt a particular worldview that will generate acquiescence to whatever it is the military is doing we posit that hegemony has advanced militaristic goals as well as economic or class goals Gramsci’s broad notion of power is of use in analyses that go beyond class in a capitalist society geopolitical practices and ideas are disseminated and portrayed to wide audiences in order to justify them and make them appear “normal hegemony far from being constructed solely through political ideologies on the part of the elites of society is produced and maintained ‘more immediately through detailed scripting of some of the most ordinary and mundane aspects of everyday life. It is this very banality that makes militarism more than merely an elite ideology the application of cultural hegemony to militarism necessitates an explanation of activities such as war protests In actuality maintaining hegemony does not require constant commitment from subordinates to the existing system. rather the dominant group carefully defines the acceptable range of resistance to these processes This explains why we may see protests to a particular event but not challenges to the overall role of the military in society Providing the necessary ‘direct domination’ or command political society assures the discipline of those members of society who do not consent to the imposed order willingly civil society corresponds with the actual function of ‘hegemony’. the diffusion of cultural values and norms that construct the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the masses to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group The cultural hegemony of militarism as with class-based hegemony can be understood as the convergence of political and civil society in ‘perpetuating the existing order One way in which the military sector achieves ascendancy within the state is to become an essential component of the economy Compared to the cultural or ideological side of militarization the economic mechanisms of militarization are more tangible the spatial distribution of Department of Defense services procurement lead to new patterns of regional development and economic inequalities</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Neoliberalism is a complex quickly metamorphosing doctrine with many objectives including especially a largely successful campaign to de-politicise the vast ‘underlying population’.34 As a consequence of this effort it has only been in the context of the run-up to intervention in Iraq in 2003 that the intellectual hegemony of US militarism has been questioned within the country since the last aftershocks of the Vietnam war era. Notably useful in this short moment of re-politicisation have been the contributions of Blum which offered a popular summary of US interventions and Kolko who presented a sophisticated critique of the pretentions of US power projection.35 Nevertheless as the ‘perpetual war’ era of the 21st century was consolidated in Afghanistan and Iraq such disavowals were gradually subordinated through a new crystallisation of US ‘conventional wisdom’ which ceased to view ongoing military campaigns as events beyond the ‘ordinary’. This unnoticed transmogrification was achieved through the constant ‘reframing’ of the geopolitical policies of the US as merely ‘necessary protective defensive’ measures as the ‘Pentagon propaganda machine’ worked assiduously with the mass media to de-legitimate opposition to these interventions and promote a numbing universal ‘patriotic’ discourse.36 Second Falk emphasised the attention the power elite has given to the avoidance of US war casualties using technologies that effectively shift the fatalities of war-fighting onto (largely) foreign non-combatants. After Vietnam great care was given to the maintenance of consent through popular disengagement from the realities of intervention. Then President Carter began the reconstruction of US military intervention capabilities with the Rapid Deployment Force. Such new capabilities allowed for lightning US intervention in Panama in 1989. In 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ – achieved through the rapid advance of overwhelming force – were thought to be the military tactics that would bring Iraq under US dominance before the American populace had an opportunity to react to events. In this instance as Falk emphasised Iraqi national resistance quickly formed and a prolonged battle ensued. ‘Fast intervention’ conducted with an array of high-tech weaponry is designed to assure relatively few US military personnel killed in action. Thus there is a constant substitution of capital for manpower in the field of battle for many reasons one being that US corpses quickly pierce the carefully constructed fog of intellectual hegemony deployed to ensure US citizen consent in the application of military force in distant Southern nations. Interventions then have been facilitated through new processes and procedures carefully constructed to create a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit the US state to ‘project power’ and intervene without broad societal resistance. Nonetheless prolonged engagements resulting from creative forms of asymmetric national resistance regularly erode and degrade US social consent requiring its constant reconstruction. This erosion of consent can be forestalled to a considerable degree thanks to a culturally well-entrenched allegiance to US militarism. Militarism entails both individual and societal deference to all things military – including the military definition of reality as Mills argued: ‘military power has become an ascendant end in itself…heightening the prestige and increasing the power of the military…tends to become a basis of national policy’.37 However US militarism has always ultimately been a civilian-dominated construct although since 1945 the civil–military relationship has frequently been ‘fractious combative and problematic’.38 Militarism is the societal belief that the use of force in international relations – as a preferred option – can achieve national objectives. Furthermore it is the dominance of military affairs in the construction of national priorities and policies. Militarism in the US guise does not mean that high-ranking military cadres precipitate episodes of ‘power projection’. Rather most frequently this role is filled by civilians – often in the face of opposition or scepticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Militarists believe in the ‘logic of violence’ although there is no logic to violence except its assurance of ‘blowback’. Militarism has its deepest roots in the south states of America where ‘valour’ and unquestioning ‘patriotism’ have long been held up as the highest of societal values. Today US military bases are spread throughout the southern states reflecting the abiding influence of generations of jingoistic Senators and Congressional Representatives. US militarism is embraced by an influential portion of the civilian population regardless of geography particularly through the institutional power of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW with 1.4 million members) the American Legion (2.4 million veteran members) and retired officer associations. Of equal importance with the end of national military service (in 1973) a multi-generational ‘caste’ of military families formed with the south states constituting its strongest representation.39 Thus the ideological hegemony needed to enable near-constant military interventions since the end of the Cold War is not structurally fragile. Neither is it unassailable. Regardless of the calamitous conditions arising from US interventions – including massive civilian casualties and displacement – a vociferous portion of the populace embodies unmitigated support for US military ‘power projection’. Another portion of the population – always risking the accusation of treasonous practices – embraces a counter-hegemonic position either as pacifists and/or because of their critique of the structural political economy of US military interventions. At any moment in time a vast proportion of the apolitical US populace has no strong commitment to either the permanent militarist faction or to those who hold an a priori position of opposition. Under conditions of prolonged military engagement this structurally uncommitted and easily deceived portion of the populace slowly and quietly withdraws its consent for interminable exercises in power projection. This is normally characterised as ‘war fatigue’ the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ or some other sweeping term adopted by mass media entities that interpret and communicate the results of (frequently manipulated) public opinions polls. Manufactured consent then can be challenged at crucial conjunctures. Nonetheless deeper structural and inertial forces tend – time and again – to reassert the intellectually hegemonic construct of US militarism. </source> [/INST] <claim>Reframing US policies as necessary and defensive perpetuates hegemony by presupposing the necessity of militarism for a secure world </claim> <psg>Neoliberalism is a complex quickly metamorphosing doctrine with many objectives including especially a largely successful campaign to de-politicise the vast ‘underlying population’ As a consequence it has only been in the context of the run-up to intervention in Iraq that the intellectual hegemony of US militarism has been questioned the ‘perpetual war’ era was subordinated through a new crystallisation of US ‘conventional wisdom’ which ceased to view ongoing military campaigns as events beyond the ‘ordinary This unnoticed transmogrification was achieved through the constant ‘reframing’ of the geopolitical policies of the US as merely ‘necessary protective defensive’ measures as the ‘Pentagon propaganda machine’ worked assiduously with the mass media to de-legitimate opposition Falk emphasised the attention the power elite has given to the avoidance of US war casualties there is a constant substitution of capital for manpower in the field of battle one being that US corpses quickly pierce the carefully constructed fog of intellectual hegemony deployed to ensure US citizen consent in the application of military force in distant Southern nations. Interventions then have been facilitated through new processes and procedures carefully constructed to create a sufficient degree of autonomy to permit the US state to ‘project power’ and intervene without broad societal resistanc prolonged engagements resulting from creative forms of asymmetric national resistance degrade US social consent Militarism entails both individual and societal deference to all things military – including the military definition of reality military power has become an ascendant end in itself…heightening the prestige and increasing the power of the military…tends to become a basis of national policy’ Militarism is the societal belief that the use of force in international relations can achieve national objectives it is the dominance of military affairs in the construction of national priorities and policies Militarists believe in the ‘logic of violence’ ideological hegemony needed to enable near-constant military interventions is not structurally fragile . Regardless of the calamitous conditions arising from US interventions – including massive civilian casualties and displacement – a vociferous portion of the populace embodies unmitigated support for US military ‘power projection’ Another portion embraces a counter-hegemonic position because of their critique of the structural political economy of US military interventions deeper structural forces tend to reassert the intellectually hegemonic construct of US militarism.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Contemporary theories of place provide a framework within which geographers can bridge society-wide processes such as state-building with local actions decisions and experiences. In this view places are widely conceptualized as networks of social relations rather than simply the local-scale settings or containers in which social relations occur (Agnew 1996. Massey 1994). This overview of place literature will look at the key aspects of place that we will subsequently connect to processes of militarization: place as a recursive and contingent process of social construction. the role of the production and maintenance of ideology. and the contestation of dominant ideologies and identities as a component of the social construction of place. The recursiveness of place which is central to contemporary usage of the concept stresses that as places are socially constructed they concurrently foment particular behaviors and attitudes which in turn reproduce the places. These processes vary between localities so that the general phenomena observable at the level of ‘mass society’ are experienced uniquely from place to place (Agnew 1987). Thus the unique and the general the structure and the agent are related in a network of interdependent localities (Agnew 1987). Historical contingency likewise ‘emphasizes institutional and individual practices as well as the structured features with which those practices are interwoven’ (Pred 1984 280) and further contributes the notion that places are constructed over time. While social relations (and the places they constitute) are dynamic and even sometimes fleeting new interactions and behaviors that appear in their place are not built on a ‘clean slate’ but instead on the remains of previous ones inevitably shapedby what came before (Pred 1984. Massey 1994). Finally the construction of place may often be the result of elite actions in pursuit of particular goals as Johnston (1991) posits but it is important to recognize that subaltern members of society also play a role – either by complying with elite agendas or by resisting them (Pile and Keith 1997. Thrift 2000). Place as a process is a ‘powerful force in the ongoing hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles ’ meaning that place reproduces the beliefs that have produced it and this occurs in such a way that the beliefs eventually appear self-evident and commonsense (Cresswell 1996 13. Kirby 1993). This idea provides the crucial link between place and ideology. As noted earlier while places may manifest as areas of resistance to the state they also play a crucial role in reproducing the geography of the state’s hegemony (Agnew 1987). In a militarized society this ‘geography of hegemony’ would unfold in a number of ways particularly in terms of the cultural manifestations of militarism: the adoption and visible signs of military culture and values and ensuing support for militaristic policies. Such activities give rise to a local sense of identity or sense of place which often – but not always – serve to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities (Agnew 1987. Pred 1984. Williams 1977). Places may also be constructed with the aim of resisting elite identities ideologies and objectives (Cresswell 1996. Kirby 1993. Pile and Keith 1997). In such cases rather than serving as the local tools of overarching structures the social relations and attitudes comprising localities may formulate in opposition to the policies of the state (Kirby 1993). Recent empirical work on the practices of memorialization and commemoration demonstrates how places may consist of competing forces: those which seek to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities and those which seek to contest them (Alderman and Dwyer 2004. Graham and Shirlow 2002. Johnson 2003. Schein 2006). Ideologies both dominant and marginalized are inscribed into the cultural landscape making this facet of place both a reflection of the human activities and ideals that have gone into constructing it and at the same time constitutive of them (Mitchell 2000. Schein 1997). Questions of power then are critical to gaining an understanding of how place based activities produce particular landscapes (Dowler et al. 2005). The complexity of place with its multiple facets and meanings is important to recognize. However Agnew’s three aspects of place may be seen as core ‘variables’ around which a research framework may be organized. Agnew (1987 1996) identified location which is a place’s role or function in the wider economy. locale which represents the primary institutions organizing social relations and identity in a place. and sense of place which refers to the sense of identity tied to a locality. A fourth dimension connectivity or linkages to other places and other scales should also be considered within a place-based research framework (Massey 1994). Agnew’s aspects of place will be revisited later in this article as we propose possible comparative research designs for the study of militarization. As discussed above several theories of place have set the foundation for discussing the construction of places within the political processes of state formation and maintenance. One set of processes involved is militarization. But what exactly is militarization accomplishing? These processes constituted in large part by the activities of people in everyday settings work to make militarism a taken-for-granted or ‘natural’ facet of many societies. Hence a useful concept for conceptualizing militarism is that of cultural hegemony which up to now has been used in research focusing on class relations within capitalist societies. Cultural hegemony as the following section will discuss is a term developed by Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci ca. 1930 in order to explain why the working class had internalized or adopted the capitalist values of the bourgeoisie – in effect reproducing a system that perpetuated their meager existence. However this term in concert with Gramsci’s theories of power can be readily adapted from an explanation of the adoption of capitalist values to an explanation of the adoption of militaristic values. </source> [/INST] <claim>Cultural hegemony reentrenches militarism by labeling a war-culture as key to local identities</claim> <psg> places are widely conceptualized as networks of social relations in which key aspects of place connect to processes of militarization: place as a recursive and contingent process of social construction. the role of the production and maintenance of ideology. and the contestation of dominant ideologies and identities as a component of the social construction of place. the construction of place may often be the result of elite actions in pursuit of particular goals Place as a process is a ‘powerful force in the ongoing hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles place reproduces the beliefs that have produced it This idea provides the crucial link between place and ideology. places play a crucial role in reproducing the geography of the state’s hegemony In a militarized society this ‘geography of hegemony’ would unfold in terms of the cultural manifestations of militarism the adoption and visible signs of military culture and values and ensuing support for militaristic policies Such activities give rise to a local sense of identity which often serve to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities ). Ideologies are inscribed into the cultural landscape making this facet of place both a reflection of the human activities and ideals that have gone into constructing it and at the same time constitutive of them The complexity of place is important to recognize ocation which is a place’s role or function in the wider economy represents the primary institutions organizing social relations and identity theories of place have set the foundation for discussing the construction of places within the political processes of state formation and maintenance One is militarization These processes work to make militarism a natural’ facet of many societies. a useful concept for conceptualizing militarism is that of cultural hegemony</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area the ‘“East” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid. p. 26). It represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid. p. 57) that the West must confront forcefully. Moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: Today bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror Islam exposed the Arab threat and the Muslim menace all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there (ibid. p. xv). This portrayal of the East as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of Orientalist literature. However as well as exaggerating the East’s distinctiveness the Orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. The second core characteristic of Orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from Western norms. Specifically the people are presented as backward or as Chaim Weizmann put it to Arthur Balfour ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid. p. 306). What is more unlike superior Europeans [they] Orientals are prone to irrationality inefficiency inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid. pp. 36–40 107 228 241). In dealing with them one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid. p. xv). Furthermore not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority Orientalism is committed to rectifying it. The East must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid. p. 37) while the West imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. The knowledge produced by Orientalism is therefore ‘never raw unmediated or simply objective’ (ibid. p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. For this reason Said brands Orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid. p. xxi) suggesting that even though their participation may be unconscious ‘the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power’ (ibid. p. 223). Having said this recognition of Orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. The third prominent feature of Orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid. p. 322). Said explains that over time Western writing about the Orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. Analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. Their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid. p. 52). Every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency for Area Studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid. p. 70). Some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: First is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid. p. xiii) whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples languages experiences and cultures all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid. p. xiv). Second is eternality: the Orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. Momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid. pp. 58 104 240). Third Orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the West. Prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid. pp. 162 216) and obsession with the ‘Oriental personality’ (ibid. p. 31). Fourth Orientalists have a great talent for combining ‘imperial vagueness and precise detail’ (ibid. p. 50). Therefore while indulging in the most shameless of generalisations Orientalists simultaneously bombard the reader with ‘sheer overpowering monumental description’ (ibid. p. 162). Fifth despite pretensions to expertise numerous Orientalists are remarkably underqualified to speak about the East and cannot even claim knowledge of the relevant languages (ibid. pp. 178 193). In developing the argument outlined above Said refers almost exclusively to representations of the Arab world. However as an intellectual model Orientalism lends itself to application well beyond its original field of study as a means of drawing attention to any area of scholarship in which the literature has become stuck in a monotonous cycle of reaffirmation. With this in mind this article employs Orientalism to critique Western discourse on Russian foreign policy. Orientalism and Russian foreign policy Orientalism and Russia are not unacquainted. In fact Russia (or the Soviet Union) features more than ten times in Orientalism. There is also a substantial secondary literature that explores Orientalism in the Russian context (e.g. Bolton 2009. David-Fox Holquist and Martin 2006. Khalid 2000). However for both Said and the vast majority of subsequent scholars Russia is significant not as an object of Orientalist modes of thought but as an origin. In particular the literature highlights Russia’s long imperial history its tendency to define its core culture in contradis-tinction to those of the Caucasus and Central Asia and its imposition of a standardised way of life upon the peoples of its empire. However just because a culture is itself an instigator of Orientalism does not mean that it is not also a recipient. This fact has been recognised by Iver Neumann. In Uses of the Other Neumann describes the historical construction of Russia as Europe’s Other. In particular he draws attention to representations of the country as a ‘barbarian at the gate’ (Neumann 1999 p. 77) acknowledges the popular stereotype of ‘an alleged Russian Volksgeist (“national character”) of sloth drunkenness and laziness’ (ibid. p. 104) and highlights the perception of Russia as ‘a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe’ (Anderson quoted in ibid. p. 78). In making this case Neumann cites Said and clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of his model to this context. However Russia is not the exclusive focus of his book and even when dealing with the subject Neumann’s concern is with long-standing cultural representations of the country and not contemporary portrayals of its position in international politics. Elsewhere some scholars have explored specific deficiencies in the Western political discourse about Russia (Gleason 1951. Lieven 2000. Malia 1999. Mikoyan 2006. Solzhenitsyn 1980). most recently studies have highlighted anti-Russian sentiment among US policymakers (Tsygankov 2009) and lack of balance in Western media coverage of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (English and Svyatets 2010). And yet as valuable as these contributions are they tend to frame their arguments in terms of Russophobia and do not recognise the interdisciplinary relevance of Orientalism. This article fills the gap in this literature by demonstrating how Said’s model can be employed to make sense of the clichés distortions and exaggerations that taint this discourse. The use of this alternative framework is a valuable addition not only because it highlights some heretofore un-noted deficiencies but also because it does so by drawing upon a more substantive and deep-rooted theory than the nebulous Russophobia. As such rather than simply describing the weaknesses the Orientalist model is able to employ its sophisticated understanding of the process of Othering to offer a clear and credible account of their emergence. Moreover Said’s depiction of how the discourse about a region can come to be dominated by a partisan and self-perpetuating orthodoxy provides a valuable explanation for the pervasiveness and durability of the unfortunate representation of Russian foreign policy that is detailed here. Each of these considerations provides significant scope for further research thus encouraging the opening up of this subject area to much-needed intellectual rejuvenation. At this point I should make clear that it is not my intention to suggest that all Western accounts of Russian foreign policy are Orientalist. there are many fine studies that do not fit the model. However as the following paragraphs reveal there is a sizeable mass of literature that unmistakably displays the characteristic symptoms of Orientalism. With regard to the first trait – the exaggeration of difference – there is a striking propensity to portray Russian foreign policy as markedly different from that of Western states. Although probably of older origin this perception was powerfully reinforced by the stark dividing lines of the Cold War and by Moscow’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify its international strategy. Despite the collapse of communism this image of Russia as an Other which pursues a qualitatively different mode of behaviour remains prominent in Western scholarship. It might be noted that all branches of Area Studies are prone to stress countries’ dissimilarities while downplaying their commonalities since this represents much of the field’s unique selling point. However be this as it may there is certainly a tendency for Russia’s mode of engagement in international affairs to be presented as unusual. To be specific scholars regularly present Russian foreign policy as puzzling unpredictable and divergent from the Western norm. Indeed the country’s behaviour is considered to be so exceptional and difficult to define that standard analytical models are not thought to apply (Arias-King King de Arias and Arias de la Canal 2008. Kubicek 1999 pp. 547–548. Legvold 2007a pp. 10–11). Bobo Lo one of the best-known Western experts on the subject clearly highlights this conception beginning his popular textbook with the observation that Russia’s external activities reflect ‘the perversity of human nature’ and ‘far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism ... have been liberally streaked with irrationality’ (Lo 2002 p. 1). Moreover in accordance with the Orientalist model this image of inscrutable foreignness is persistently reaffirmed through shared language use. Most notable in this regard is the literature’s compulsive repetition of Churchill’s claim that Russia’s actions are a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ (Arias-King King de Arias and Arias de la Canal 2008 p. 118. Donaldson and Nogee 2009 p. 65. Joyce 1984 p. 134. Lo 2002 p. 1. March 2006 p. 88. Rubinstein 1989 p. 12). Another popular means of expressing the same idea is the medical metaphor whereby Russia is presented as ‘genetically different’ (Wesson 1974 p. 3) exhibiting allergic reactions (Lo 2008 p. 258) and afflicted by various ailments including Borderline Personality Disorder (Arias-King King de Arias and Arias de la Canal 2008). Meanwhile others contribute to this sense of exoticism deviance and distance via clichés about bears (Garnett 1997 p. 61. Menon 1995) chess (Goldman 2008 pp. 92 154–155) and nesting dolls (Legvold 2009 pp. 42–43). Furthermore as Said predicts as well as being presented as somehow more extraordinary and incomprehensible than the behaviour of any other large complex state Russian foreign policy is portrayed as significantly more dangerous. Despite its ‘syndrome of backwardness’ (Snyder 1994 p. 181) Russia continues to represent a serious potential threat to international stability (Kubicek 1999 pp. 567–568. Pipes 1997. Snyder 1994 p. 197) and is thus a popular subject for Western polemic (Baker and Glasser 2005. Lucas 2008). Turning to the second tenet of Orientalism – the assumption of Western superiority – there is also clear evidence that Russia’s mode of engagement in international politics is routinely presented as inferior to that of Western countries. In a manner that contributes to the image of Russian deviationism (though contradicts the illusion of mysterious unpredictability) a substantial values gap is proposed to exist between Russian and Western strategic cultures (Forsberg 2004 pp. 261–263. Mankoff 2010 p. 134. March 2006 p. 93). In essence while the West is considered to have largely transcended Hobbesian modes of thought Russian foreign policy remains ‘nakedly realist’ (March 2006 p. 92) fixated with security sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest. This is an entirely legitimate observation yet what is dubious is the disparaging suggestion that this approach is un-European (ibid. p. 93) anachronistic (Lo 2008 p. 176) or even so backward as to be rooted in a different historical era (Vihavainen 2009 pp. 53–54). What is more not only is Russia’s strategy deemed outdated but its attempts to implement it are also seen as substandard since its policymaking is habitually cast as chaotic error prone and even feckless (Garnett 1998 pp. 67–70. Legvold 2007a pp. 7–10. Lo 2008 p. 141. Simes 2007 p. 36). Again there may be some truth to this especially with regard to the early 1990s yet so embedded has this image become that even successful (from the Russian perspective) undertakings – such as the use of energy as a means of economic and political leverage and military intervention in Georgia – are instinctively portrayed as fundamental failures (Baev 2008 pp. 128–129. Sestanovich 2008 pp. 25–26. Vendil Pallin and Westerlund 2009). Furthermore as the Orientalist model suggests as well as being convinced of the waywardness of Russia’s approach Western scholars are committed to rectifying it. The issue of how its pupil was ‘lost’ in the 1990s continues to be debated (Columbus 2001. Eyal 2009. Simes 2007) thus assuming that Russia was ever someone’s to lose and academics presumptuously dictate how the country can be returned to the ‘right’ path (Council on Foreign Relations 2006). While nominally independent such scholarship clearly shares and serves the interests of Western power. Finally traces of Orientalism are detectable in the intellectual models employed in the study of this subject. Although the number of publications in this area is large accounts of Russian foreign policy when not essentially heavyweight descriptions (e.g. Donaldson and Nogee 2009. Kennedy-Pipe 1998. Rangsimaporn 2009) are remarkably repetitive and unimaginative. Testimony to this fact is provided by the surprising number of similarities to be found in the analyses if not the ultimate expectations of liberal (e.g. Legvold 2007b) and conservative (e.g. Pipes 1996) commentators. Rather than undertaking innovative research into how findings from other disciplines can be applied to this context or drawing new cross-national comparisons scholars habitually reiterate a core set of convictions which on the basis of use rather than truth has become the standard narrative. Employing simplifications and unsubstantiated claims that would not be tolerated with regard to Western states this basic approach does little to enhance our understanding of Russian foreign policy. At core the orthodox discourse takes the view that there is a specifically Russian mindset or pattern of behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts. While Western states are assumed to respond rationally to incentives and constraints Russian policy is guided by some primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national character by the weight of geography and history. This predisposition naturally inclines the country towards expansionism militarism and autocracy (Brzezinski 1984. Galeotti 1995 pp. 3–24. Lo 2003 pp. 72–83. Pipes 1996. Snyder 1994 p. 179). Moreover so enduring is this assumed inclination that it is deemed to apply across the fault lines of Russian and Soviet history. In consequence there is an uncommon tendency to explain Russia’s current foreign policy by drawing upon historical precedent (Bunce 1993. Joyce 1984. Lederer 1962. Legvold 2007b and 2009. Lo 2008 pp. 17–37. Vihavainen 2009). For example Russia is said still to possess a collective ‘Mongol complex’ as the result of the subjugation of Russian lands from the 13th to 15th centuries (Lo 2008 pp. 18–19. Vihavainen 2009). This phenomenon apparently helps account for today’s ambivalent national identity and troubled relations with both East and West. In explaining why no respected scholar would account for modern British policies in such a way Timo Vihavainen states bluntly that ‘England had changed while Russia had not’ (2009 pp. 18–19). Encouraged by this view that Russia is trapped in the past all manner of modern phenomena are labelled atavism and dubious parallels are drawn between modern and historical figures such as between Vladimir Putin and Peter the Great Stolypin and Stalin (Lo 2003 pp. 6 133–134. McDonald 2007 pp. 182–183. Murawiec 2000). Of course there is nothing wrong with historical comparison per se. it is a widely used and valuable analytical technique. However it should be employed when genuinely merited and not simply as a matter of convention. </source> [/INST] <claim>The Russian threat paradigm is grounded in racial and ideological dogma that works to maintain the imperial nature of western power – their descriptions aren’t neutral but a byproduct of underlying militaristic epistemology </claim> <psg>As a consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area the ‘“East has always signified danger and threat’ It represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ that the West must confront forcefully This portrayal of the East as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of Orientalist literature the Orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. unlike superior Europeans [they] are prone to irrationality inefficiency inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority Orientalism is committed to rectifying it. The knowledge produced by Orientalism is therefore ‘never raw unmediated or simply objective’ but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. ‘the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power’ Their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ Orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the West the literature highlights Russia’s long imperial history its tendency to define its core culture in contradis-tinction to those of the Caucasus and Central Asia and its imposition of a standardised way of life upon However just because a culture is itself an instigator of Orientalism does not mean that it is not also a recipient Neumann describes the historical construction of Russia as Europe’s Other. studies have highlighted anti-Russian sentiment among US policymakers lack of balance in Western media coverage of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war they tend to frame their arguments in terms of Russophobia the discourse about a region can come to be dominated by a partisan and self-perpetuating orthodoxy provides a valuable explanation for the pervasiveness and durability of the unfortunate representation of Russian foreign policy there is a striking propensity to portray Russian foreign policy as markedly different from that of Western states. this perception was powerfully reinforced by the stark dividing lines of the Cold War and by Moscow’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify its international strategy this image of Russia as an Other remains prominent in Western scholarship scholars present Russian foreign policy as puzzling unpredictable and divergent from the Western norm. Despite its ‘syndrome of backwardness’ Russia continues to represent a serious potential threat to international stability and is thus a popular subject for Western polemic Turning to the second tenet of Orientalism the assumption of Western superiority there is clear evidence that Russia’s mode of engagement in international politics is presented as inferior to that of Western countries a substantial values gap is proposed to exist between Russian and Western strategic cultures while the West is considered to have largely transcended Hobbesian modes of thought Russian foreign policy remains ‘nakedly realist’ fixated with security sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest its attempts to implement it are also seen as substandard since its policymaking is habitually cast as chaotic error prone and feckless academics presumptuously dictate how the country can be returned to the ‘right’ path such scholarship clearly shares and serves the interests of Western power. the orthodox discourse takes the view that there is a specifically Russian mindset or pattern of behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts While Western states are assumed to respond rationally to incentives and constraints Russian policy is guided by some primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national character by the weight of geography and history. This predisposition naturally inclines the country towards expansionism militarism and autocracy In consequence there is an uncommon tendency to explain Russia’s current foreign policy by drawing upon historical precedent Russia is said still to possess a collective ‘Mongol complex’ Encouraged by this view that Russia is trapped in the past all manner of modern phenomena are labelled atavism and dubious parallels are drawn between modern and historical figures </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> There are numerous think tanks both in the United States and Russia which are deeply concerned about the state of Russian-American relations. Places like the Moscow Carnegie Centre or the Brookings Institute in Washington DC are regular go-to places for the media when seeking expert opinion and analysis. However these centers have had a decided slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral relations to the Russians with the explanations ranging from the fairly simple to the rather mystically esoteric. “If America did not exist Russia would have to invent it. In a sense it already has: first as a dream then as a nightmare. No other country looms so large in the Russian psyche. To Kremlin ideologists the very concept of Russia’s sovereignty depends on being free of America’s influence. Anti-Americanism has long been a staple of Vladimir Putin but it has undergone an important shift. Gone are the days when the Kremlin craved recognition and lashed out at the West for not recognizing Russia as one of its own. Now it neither pretends nor aspires to be like the West. Instead it wants to exorcise all traces of American influence.”2 It is not difficult to find this Freudian popcorn political psychology today when it comes to ‘analyzing’ Russian positions. It portrays the United States as the victim of a global oedipal complex when it comes to Russia: first Putin desperately craves daddy’s attention only to then defiantly and recklessly reject him petulantly trying to run away from home. It is important to remark how most countries around the world would actually find it dangerously myopic and unhealthy to base its own foreign policy on earning the ‘approval’ of another country. With ease the far more standard approach to foreign policy formulation is to determine a country’s own national interests within its local security dilemma and craft an independent and fierce strategy that can best achieve its optimal goals. That normal process ironically is often described in America as a ‘shift’ away from craving attention to exorcising American demons. In reality there is no shift: Russia has always been about Russia as it expects America to be about America France to be about France Nigeria to be about Nigeria so forth and so on. What Russia usually finds so irksome is that when it does what everyone else does in terms of exercising global power it is judged as psychologically unstable or deficient. What the American media outlets and think tank personalities fail to recognize is how much of this judgment is coming not from explicitly observable behavior or direct quotes from Russian actors but is placed upon Russia by the so called experts themselves as they push a decidedly one-sided interpretation. Russia is not supposed to aspire to be a copy of the West nor should it be allowing particular American influence over its policies. This is not said as anti-Americanism but rather as simple logic: America would never strive to copy another country and it most certainly would not allow another country to force-influence its foreign policy. So why should Russia? It is this very simple and straightforward question that seems to never be asked by what are otherwise august media institutions and impressive political think tanks in the West. Sometimes this tendency can reach near farcical levels. When Alexei Pushkov chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign-relations committee received so much media attention here when he spoke about ridding Russia of dependence on America and even fining cinemas that showed too many foreign films Western experts needed to recognize the absurd for absurdity. But they did not. Failure to do so is perplexing given Western analysis always laments the strengthening of Putin’s own presidential power system and decries how little power sits within the legislative or judiciary branches of Russian government. Thus it is nonsensical to highlight parliamentarians as having real impact. But this happens often in America with no sense of diplomatic irony. There also tends to be a failure to focus Russian analysis through the looking glass of reciprocity. What this means is that current American thinking emphasizes how untrustworthy Moscow decision-makers are while completely ignoring the same Russian criticism lobbed back at Washington. President Putin openly and publicly discusses his lack of trust in American power and in the specific policy decisions emanating from the White House. It is this skepticism that supposedly forces his own lack of desire to engage the United States. There are simply too few voices at present in the West trying to analyze this mindset as a legitimate position. As far as can be determined the only reason this is not analyzed more seriously is because the competing alternative – that Putin is untrustworthy and Moscow is the cause of all communication breakdown – is simply accepted as a de facto axiom. In short if the United States does not trust Russia it is because of how Russia behaves on the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If Russia does not trust the United States that is simply Russian posturing and a case of political transference wanting to blame its own selfmade problems on someone else so that it can avoid any accountability. The problem is how readily this is unquestioningly accepted and how few so-called Russian experts are willing to step forward and shine a light on such intellectual superficiality. Perhaps one of the worst examples of this is the over-reliance on ‘insider knowledge’ without actually vetting the source’s objectivity. The recent exit of Alexander Sytnik as a senior fellow from the Russian Institute for Strategic Research is a prime example. Upon his exit early in 2015 Reshetnikov unleashed a torrent of information that while interesting really does not amount to more than just gossip and hearsay. Worse American media and political analysts adopted it almost wholly as fact rather than as a possibly compromised source motivated to talk badly about Russia: “The Russian analyst’s scathing remarks about the country’s leadership and about the community of government experts confirm that the concept of Russian supremacy has a strong hold on the Russian leadership. These supremacist views are not limited to the post-Soviet space where ‘only ethnic Russians are capable of creating statehood.’ The West is also seen as decadent and somewhat spiritually inferior to the Russians. The spread of such views in Russia especially among the country’s leaders precludes easy and quick solutions to the Ukrainian crisis but rather suggests a relatively lengthy period of tensions between Russia and the West even if Russian strongman Vladimir Putin were for some reason to step down.”3 (Italics mine) The tendency is to use personal opinion as confirmation of fact when it should be recognized as biased material. The only confirmation is the affirming of preconceived ideas and a particular agenda that undermines any new attitudinal environment between Russia and the United States. As a consequence it is easy to find ‘research’ proclaiming Russian goals that have never been publicly disclosed or addressing Putin objectives that have never been formally issued. This is not to say that Russia is incapable of having ulterior motives or secret agendas. Truly every country to one degree or another has them. The criticism here is the propensity in the Russian analytical sphere to assume such agendas and then cherry picking information to affirm the assumption. In pure methodological terms selection bias is rife within the community that analyzes Russia leaving those analyses decidedly weak. This bias is only more pronounced when you leave academically-oriented think tanks/news monitors behind and observe within the corridors of American power. Traditionally the focus has been on a decidedly anti-Russian fervor coming from the Republican Party. However this analysis would argue that except for a very brief and ultimately dashed Obama ‘reset ’ Russian-American relations within Washington DC has always been dominated in both parties by a remarkably typical Republican mindset. That mindset sets a fairly stark characterization: Russia is an aggressive and untrustworthy dictatorship that is an innate contradiction to American values. As such it will inevitably always be a threat to U.S. interests and global security. 4 By all indicators Russia is a threat not just to itself and its immediate neighbors but to the entire world masking its own domestic failings and instabilities with an aggressive foreign policy that will never acquiesce to a more peaceful and cooperative global community.5 Indeed in an American political world that likes to specialize in ambiguous statements and plausible deniability it is rather remarkable how freely the American Congress seems to deride Russia: John Boehner: “It is increasingly evident that Russia is intent on expanding its boundaries and power through hostile acts.” Ted Poe: “The Russian bear is coming out of its cave because it got its feelings hurt because of the fall of the Soviet Union and now it is trying to regain its territories.” Chris Smith: accused a “repressive Russian regime” of “coddling dictators” around the globe from Central Asia to Syria to Cuba and Venezuela. Trent Franks: After the conclusion of an arms deal between Russia and Venezuela President Putin was called a “thugocrat” engaged in “dangerous alliances.”6 Keep in mind all of the above statements were uttered before the 2014 crisis in Ukraine even broke out. So before the U.S. Congress received what is has subsequently considered undeniable and irrefutable proof of Russian aggression in Ukraine it was already quite prepared to view Russia solely as a corrupt kleptocracy willfully abusing human rights powered by an irrational and paranoid hatred of the United States as the sole driver of its foreign policy. </source> [/INST] <claim>Their use of think tanks as a way of predicting Russian behavior guarantees error replication </claim> <psg>There are numerous think tanks which are deeply concerned about the state of Russian-American relations the Brookings Institute in Washington DC are regular go-to places for the media when seeking expert opinion and analysis. However these centers have had a decided slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral relations to the Russians with the explanations ranging from the fairly simple to the rather mystically esoteric. It is not difficult to find this Freudian popcorn political psychology today when it comes to ‘analyzing’ Russian positions. It portrays the United States as the victim of a global oedipal complex when it comes to Russia: first Putin desperately craves daddy’s attention only to then defiantly and recklessly reject him petulantly trying to run away from home. What Russia usually finds so irksome is that when it does what everyone else does in terms of exercising global power it is judged as psychologically unstable or deficient. What the American media outlets and think tank personalities fail to recognize is how much of this judgment is coming not from explicitly observable behavior or direct quotes from Russian actors but is placed upon Russia by the so called experts themselves as they push a decidedly one-sided interpretation. current American thinking emphasizes how untrustworthy Moscow decision-makers are while completely ignoring the same Russian criticism lobbed back at Washington. In short if the United States does not trust Russia it is because of how Russia behaves on the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If Russia does not trust the United States that is simply Russian posturing and a case of political transference wanting to blame its own selfmade problems on someone else so that it can avoid any accountability. The problem is how readily this is unquestioningly accepted Perhaps one of the worst examples of this is the over-reliance on ‘insider knowledge’ without actually vetting the source’s objectivity. The tendency is to use personal opinion as confirmation of fact when it should be recognized as biased material. The only confirmation is the affirming of preconceived ideas and a particular agenda that undermines any new attitudinal environment between Russia and the United States. As a consequence it is easy to find ‘research’ proclaiming Russian goals that have never been publicly disclosed or addressing Putin objectives that have never been formally issued. This is not to say that Russia is incapable of having ulterior motives or secret agendas. pure methodological terms selection bias is rife within the community that analyzes Russia leaving those analyses decidedly weak. This bias is only more pronounced when you leave academically-oriented think tanks/news monitors behind and observe within the corridors of American power That mindset sets a fairly stark characterization: Russia is an aggressive and untrustworthy dictatorship that is an innate contradiction to American values. As such it will inevitably always be a threat to U.S. interests and global security Indeed in an American political world that likes to specialize in ambiguous statements and plausible deniability it is rather remarkable how freely the American Congress seems to deride Russia: John Boehner: “It is increasingly evident that Russia is intent on expanding its boundaries and power through hostile acts.” Ted Poe: “The Russian bear is coming out of its cave because it got its feelings hurt because of the fall of the Soviet Union and now it is trying to regain its territories.” Keep in mind all of the above statements were uttered before the 2014 crisis in Ukraine even broke out. So before the U.S. Congress received what is has subsequently considered undeniable and irrefutable proof of Russian aggression in Ukraine it was already quite prepared to view Russia solely as a corrupt kleptocracy willfully abusing human rights powered by an irrational and paranoid hatred of the United States as the sole driver of its foreign policy.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war but --numerous local wars took place --terrorism has spread all over the world undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc but escalated and continued extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people manifested in mass misery poverty unemployment homelessness starvation and malnutrition epidemics and poor health conditions exploitation and oppression racial and other discrimination physical terror organised injustice disguised forms of violence the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens women youth ethnic or religious minorities etc. and last but not least in the degradation of human environment which means that --the “war against Nature” i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance wasteful management of natural resources and large-scale pollution of our environment is still going on causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns which tend to generate social as well as international tensions thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though of course necessarily - demilitarisation but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence of the causes of “invisible wars” of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation a progressive democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation by non-violent conflict management and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus peace requires indeed a new demilitarised and democratic world order which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However no ecological balance can be ensured unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games” in which one can gain at the expense of others but instead the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate in which everybody must suffer later or sooner directly or indirectly losses. Therefore the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life” i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation requirements of changes in development patterns and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary financial and debt crises are cyclical we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society which is multidimensional in nature involving not only economic but also socio-psychological behavioural cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded election-oriented selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world paves the way for the final last catastrophe. One cannot doubt of course that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation transformation of socio-economic systems democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations conflict management and cooperation institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies codification of human rights and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned the end of cold war etc. to mention only a few. Nevertheless the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich privileged wellfed well-educated on the one hand and the poor deprived starving sick and uneducated on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between on the one hand continuation of visible and “invisible wars” as long as this is possible at all and on the other transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more which is to be faced not in the distant future by the next generations but in the coming years because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment. </source> [/INST] <claim>Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable </claim> <psg>human society can survive only in a lasting real peace arms race and militarisation have escalated many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor manifested in mass misery poverty unemployment homelessness starvation epidemics and poor health conditions exploitation and oppression racial discrimination organised injustice and in the degradation of human environment the “war against Nature and large-scale pollution of our environment Behind “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns which tend to generate social as well as international tensions paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars The prerequisites of a lasting peace involve not only demilitarisation but also a and elimination of the roots of violence of the causes of “invisible wars” of the structural and institutional bases of inequalities exploitation and oppression Peace requires a process of emancipation peace cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars no ecological balance can be ensured unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced the question is not about “sustainability of development” but about the “sustainability of human life” i.e. survival of mankind we live in an almost permanent crisis The narrow-minded election-oriented selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth paves the way for the final last catastrophe Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated Earth can no longer afford to have two parts: the rich privileged on the one hand and the poor deprived on the other</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The war on terror unleashed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack has led to almost two decades of unchecked militarism. We are spending more money on our military than at any time in history. Endless wars in Afghanistan Iraq Yemen Syria and elsewhere are still raging more wars are threatened against Iran and beyond costing the US trillions of dollars and creating humanitarian disasters. Treaties to control nuclear arms are unraveling at the same time that conflicts with the major powers of Russia and China are heating up. </source> [/INST] <claim>Militarism makes environmental destruction inevitable</claim> <psg>The war on terror led to decades of unchecked militarism. We spend more money on military than at any time in history. Endless wars in Afghanistan Iraq Yemen Syria and elsewhere are raging more wars are threatened against Iran and beyond costing the US trillions of dollars and creating disasters. Treaties to control nuclear arms are unraveling Russia and China are heating up.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these critiques. Revealingly these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’ rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments calling for desecuritization. For example Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation (Booth 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the means should be consistent with the ends sought. see Booth 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth 2007: 429–431) and he even embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory he responds ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ (Booth 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing and that it can be used for progressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’ more or less reducible to the decision to use force to establish his claim. He is quite comfortable with the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented them. By contrast the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagree with Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that in conditions of militarism war can begin to serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration of social relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations subjectivities and identities to the pursuit of war thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-political discipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’ including militarily Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence. Responding to critiques of securitization in their cosmopolitan approach Burke Lee-Koo and McDonald are more sensitive to these dangers admitting that the use of force can entrench conflict and thus impair the longer term pursuit of global security (Burke et al. 2014: 19–21). In response they argue that the ultimate aim of security practice should always be nonviolence ‘a gradual but determined demilitarisation of global politics’ in which force is permissible under strict conditions but always regrettable – ‘a pacifism of ends rather than means’ (Burke et al. 2016: 74). They place their confidence in a set of detailed principles restricting the use of force in different circumstances which they hope will help to avoid these risks (Burke et al. 2014: 71–97 119–145). Again however the ambition for nonviolence rests on the thin basis of an aspiration for ‘demilitarization’ something that they in fact derive from the critique of securitization rather than an understanding of militarism as ideology. As I have explained above what characterizes militarism is not violence with a lack of a true justification but an ideological desire for war and military activity. Militarism is therefore fully compatible with a credible justification for violence and may even draw strength from it. Burke Lee-Koo and McDonald’s criteria for the use of force may well be stricter than available alternatives therefore but this is still no guarantee against militarism. Even if they succeeded in preventing some wars they would still not ensure that the remaining apparently justified wars did not indulge in and encourage militarism. Cosmopolitan theories therefore do not disrupt the ideological factors making war desirable. rather they risk supplementing them with additional justifications. A more effective critical intervention against cosmopolitan security is therefore to highlight the dangers of militarism as ideology rather than simply to call for demilitarization. Conclusion What the above arguments stress is the importance of embracing a critical concept of militarism one premised on the explicit ambition to disrupt its ideological effects. With this in mind it is worth considering why most critical security studies scholars prefer to adopt the term ‘militarization’ rather than ‘militarism’. ‘Militarization’ in this usage seems to imply the process of making something a military concern. In this way it is similar to Shaw’s account in which militarization implies an increase in the penetration of social relations in general by military relations – or in other words the process by which more and more things are made military concerns. For Shaw the concept of militarism functions as a measure of this penetration. But this is not the same as a critical concept of militarism in which the specific kind of penetration being analysed is an ideological penetration and in which the intention is to disrupt this penetration through critique. Like Shaw critical security studies has also understood militarism as a measure (of ‘militarization’) rather than as a critical concept with the result that its analytic and political potential has been blunted when engaging in the critique of violence. However this may also be a reflection of an underlying tendency in critical security studies itself. For we could argue that neither security nor securitization are critical concepts in the sense intended by ideology critique. Instead they are more like measures in that they measure either how secure something is or how securitized an issue has become. One consequence of this which is particularly problematic for scholars seeking desecuritization is that these concepts therefore also actively participate in the process they seek to critique: they name things as ‘security’ issues even when the argument is that these issues should not be security issues at all. This proliferation of security concerns encouraged as much by scholarship as by practitioners results in the ‘crowding out’ of other frameworks that may more accurately reflect the underlying dynamics – concepts such as war (Barkawi 2011) or neoliberalism (Montesinos Coleman and Rosenow 2016) – and that may be more appropriate for critical ethico-political interventions into phenomena that critical security studies interprets as security or securitization. My final suggestion is that militarism is yet another concept that risks being obscured in critical security studies analysis by this tendency to measure rather than critique. By contrast I have shown above how a more critical concept of militarism as ideology can offer a superior starting point for an analysis of the shortcomings of various justifications for the use of force including those encountered in critical security studies. Militarism can help us to think more precisely about the circumstances in which the use of violence to achieve political objectives (such as ‘security’) can descend into a more generalized and intractable desire for war and military activity. My hope is that from such an understanding we might also better equip ourselves to intervene in this process and resist it. </source> [/INST] <claim>Beginning with a widened structural criticism of militarism is a pre-requisite to effective critical ethico-political interventions – voting aff crowds out critical readings of militarism </claim> <psg>The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization do not yet offer a full account of militarism in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these critiques. Revealingly these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’ rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments calling for desecuritization Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory he responds ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing and that it can be used for progressive ends setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’ including militarily Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence. Burke Lee-Koo and McDonald place their confidence in a set of detailed principles restricting the use of force in different circumstances which they hope will help to avoid these risks Again however the ambition for nonviolence rests on the thin basis of an aspiration for ‘demilitarization’ something that they in fact derive from the critique of securitization rather than an understanding of militarism as ideology what characterizes militarism is not violence with a lack of a true justification but an ideological desire for war and military activity. Militarism is therefore fully compatible with a credible justification for violence and may even draw strength from it Cosmopolitan theories therefore do not disrupt the ideological factors making war desirable. rather they risk supplementing them with additional justifications. A more effective critical intervention against cosmopolitan security is therefore to highlight the dangers of militarism as ideology rather than simply to call for demilitarization What the above arguments stress is the importance of embracing a critical concept of militarism one premised on the explicit ambition to disrupt its ideological effects For Shaw the concept of militarism functions as a measure of this penetration. But this is not the same as a critical concept of militarism in which the specific kind of penetration being analysed is an ideological penetration and in which the intention is to disrupt this penetration through critique Like Shaw critical security studies has also understood militarism as a measure (of ‘militarization’) rather than as a critical concept with the result that its analytic and political potential has been blunted when engaging in the critique of violence. neither security nor securitization are critical concepts in the sense intended by ideology critique. Instead they are more like measures in that they measure either how secure something is or how securitized an issue has become. One consequence of this which is particularly problematic for scholars seeking desecuritization is that these concepts therefore also actively participate in the process they seek to critique: they name things as ‘security’ issues even when the argument is that these issues should not be security issues at all. This proliferation of security concerns encouraged as much by scholarship as by practitioners results in the ‘crowding out’ of other frameworks that may more accurately reflect the underlying dynamics – concepts such as war or neoliberalism and that may be more appropriate for critical ethico-political interventions into phenomena that critical security studies interprets as security or securitization. My final suggestion is that militarism is yet another concept that risks being obscured in critical security studies analysis by this tendency to measure rather than critique. By contrast I have shown above how a more critical concept of militarism as ideology can offer a superior starting point for an analysis of the shortcomings of various justifications for the use of force including those encountered in critical security studies. Militarism can help us to think more precisely about the circumstances in which the use of violence to achieve political objectives (such as ‘security’) can descend into a more generalized and intractable desire for war and military activity. My hope is that from such an understanding we might also better equip ourselves to intervene in this process and resist it.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The very notion of restraint in war— common to all positions along the full continuum in varying degrees— puts the burden of proof on going to war and on how the fighting is done. These are the activities in need of justification. The moral presumption should be to peace positive peace rather than the pervasive presumption of warism and negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking for the fore- seeable future because it is warism that blocks evolution toward more pacifistic societies. Only occasionally will individuals back into the most absolute form of pacifism. the cultural predisposition to warism confines most of us to a narrow range of options toward the war- realist end of the scale. This brings us full circle and we end this consideration of a moral continuum on the morality of war and peace where we began confronting warism. The normative lenses of warism the spectacles through which we in modern culture tend to see and interpret all that happens turn out to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have is a hammer everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. Analogously if the only vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons then every conflict invites military intervention and it is hard to resist war- ring. Unless we envision a wider value perspective than the warist we will not see the nonviolent options before us. But to see more widely we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders. Peace education is a small struggling but growing segment of contemporary education. The dominant presumption of warism has made it difficult for those committed to peace education to develop and establish it as a legitimate discipline devoid of the image of mere anti- militarist propaganda. Some scholars call themselves peace educators while many within the traditional disciplines are reluctant to be so labeled. they may be sympathetic with genuine peace research and teaching but afraid of the stigma that goes with the label. Those scholars interested in applying their professional training and skills to peace issues face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address warism just as they have had to address racism sexism ageism classism homophobia and other forms of domination.4 There is increasing academic interest in what scholars call “institutional violence”— social structures like racism sexism and poverty that involve constraints that injure and violate. systems that have entrapping coercive effects. Institutional forms of violence tend to be more covert than overt. nonetheless pacifists— peacemakers—of various sorts tend to work toward the recognition and abolition of these forms of oppression as the natural manifestation of their commitment to positive peace. Such work involves recovery of lost or neglected history consideration of a full range of options beyond traditional social constraints holding the forms of domination in place and serious systematic and legitimized study of conditions constituting positive peace. Preparing for war in an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from preparing for genuine positive peace in an effort to en- courage cooperation and preclude a resort to war. Unless such issues are entertained routinely across all educational levels— including the recognition of how the various forms of domination are entangled in and reinforced by warism— the presumption of warism will continue to drive us toward war realism and prevent progress toward an evolving positive peace.5 Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely but then racial integration in public schools abolition of slavery women voting and holding public office the end of apartheid in South Africa and the Iron Curtain in Europe the election of an African American as U.S. president all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they became realities. People imagine work for and sacrifice for important goals even if they never are achieved. To the wonder of us all unlikely goals are sometimes reached. Martin Luther King Jr. believed that “the arc of history bends toward justice.” He knew th </source> [/INST] <claim>The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider</claim> <psg>These are activities in need of justification. The moral presumption should be to positive peace rather than the pervasive presumption of negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking because warism blocks evolution toward more pacifistic societies The normative lenses of warism the spectacles through which we see and interpret all that happens turn out to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have is a hammer everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. if the only vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons then it is hard to resist war Unless we envision a wider perspective than the warist we will not see nonviolent options we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders Peace education is small but growing The dominant presumption of warism has made it difficult for peace education to develop as a legitimate discipline scholars interested in applying their professional skills to peace face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address warism just as they have had to address racism sexism ageism classism homophobia and other forms of domination. war in an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from genuine positive peace Unless such issues are entertained routinely across all educational levels the presumption of warism will continue to drive us toward war and prevent progress toward positive peace Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely but then racial integration in public schools abolition of slavery women voting the end of apartheid in South Africa the election of an African American as U.S. president all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they became realities. People imagine work for important goals even if they never are achieved unlikely goals are sometimes reached the arc of history bends toward justice.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The analysis of the ATT advanced here suggests instead however that it is precisely the turn to law the supposed compatibility between military preponderance and human rights protection and the failure to move beyond direct use of weapons that helps legitimise (particular forms of) war. Critical legal studies scholars advocate “a form of law-politics to develop humanitarian principles into a concrete normative agenda:” 154 and yet this is exactly what humanitarian disarmers have been trying to do with the ATT and previous arms transfer control regimes. It is important to recognize “that some degree of complicity in previous social structures is inherent in social change.” 155 Price argues that scholars should not underplay the morally progressive significance of “practices that at once contain elements of progressive change … yet at the same time are predicated on or produce the conditions of possibility for other forms of exclusion hierarchy inequality repression or violence.” 156 However the widespread emphasis on the progressive if imperfect character of the ATT in scholarship and policy has failed to interrogate the justificatory claims around moral responsibility that so pervaded its negotiation. These claims contribute to obscuring a significant scale of human rights violations and the wider systems of war preparation that arms transfers are a part of. Further such claims are part of what sceptical southern states are responding to and resisting thus making wider normative change more difficult. The ATT negotiation process shored up liberal states’ actions whilst invoking their benevolence and assuming them to be distinct from illicit or irresponsible actors. The supposed effectiveness of normative change is muted by the existence of regimes that claim already to exceed the standards of the ATT. This may not be the ideological glorification of war that we tend to equate with the concept of militarism but the ATT signals the contemporary mobilisation of legitimacy for liberal war-making and war-preparation nonetheless. </source> [/INST] <claim>Reject the perm’s imperfect progressivism – the claim that legal solutions are compatible with the alt only religitimizes militarism by obscuring moral responsibility and other broader systemic violence. </claim> <psg>The analysis advanced here suggests instead however that it is precisely the turn to law the supposed compatibility between military preponderance and human rights protection and the failure to move beyond direct use of weapons that helps legitimise war. Critical legal studies scholars advocate “a form of law-politics to develop humanitarian principles into a concrete normative agenda and yet this is exactly what humanitarian disarmers have been trying to do with arms transfer control regimes. some degree of complicity in previous social structures is inherent in social change scholars should not underplay the morally progressive significance of “practices that at once contain elements of progressive change … yet at the same time are predicated on or produce the conditions of possibility for other forms of exclusion hierarchy inequality repression or violence However the widespread emphasis on the progressive if imperfect character of the ATT in scholarship and policy has failed to interrogate the justificatory claims around moral responsibility that so pervaded its negotiation. These claims contribute to obscuring a significant scale of human rights violations and the wider systems of war preparation that arms transfers are a part of. such claims are part of what sceptical southern states are responding to and resisting thus making wider normative change more difficult. The ATT negotiation process shored up liberal states’ actions whilst invoking their benevolence and assuming them to be distinct from illicit or irresponsible actors. The supposed effectiveness of normative change is muted by the existence of regimes that signals the contemporary mobilisation of legitimacy for liberal war-making and war-preparation</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Developments in the cybersecurity operations of both NATO and the EU have paralleled the growth of cybersecurity as a major policy concern to the United States and other national governments. The digital revolution has also changed the basic environment in which governments operate necessitating i n c r e a s i n g l e v e l s o f c r o s s - b o r d e r interdependence and connectivity. European countries have responded to the need to increase coordination and cooperation through new initiatives at the national level and under the auspices of NATO and the EU. Nevertheless the relationship between national capabilities and sovereignty and the authority of these two international organizations remains unsettled. The efforts of NATO and the EU to mainstream cybersecurity into existing activities have thus far proven insufficient to fully address the growing cyber threat landscape. NATO’s Development of Cross-border Cyber Defense Policy and Coordination NATO forecasted today’s cyber threat environment in 2010: “Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent more organized and more costly […]. they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity security and stability.”6 NATO faces a cyber threat landscape that abounds with hackers hacktivists nation-states and criminals. NATO itself has been targeted directly by Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia.7 Furthermore the recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that Russian cyber attack capabilities are very real.8 NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect businesses in America on a daily basis ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO’s systems to those of a more sophisticated targeted nature. Despite preventive measures cyber criminals around the world continue to gain access to these networks including those that are classified.9 In all the current threat environment embodies much more significant risks than those first exemplified by the Russian cyber attacks on Estonia in 2007 which initially prompted NATO to address the dangers of cyber warfare. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in cyber security. </claim> <psg>Developments in the cybersecurity operations of both NATO and the EU have paralleled the growth of cybersecurity as a major policy concern to the United States and other national governments. European countries have responded to the need to increase coordination and cooperation through new initiatives at the national level and under the auspices of NATO and the EU The efforts of NATO and the EU to mainstream cybersecurity into existing activities have thus far proven insufficient to fully address the growing cyber threat landscape. Cyber attacks are becoming more frequent more organized and more costly […]. they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity security and stability NATO itself has been targeted directly by Russian hackers seeking information on its defensive posture against Russia.7 Furthermore the recent attack by Russia on the Ukrainian power grid underscores the fact that Russian cyber attack capabilities are very real NATO also faces the same types of cyber breaches that affect businesses in America on a daily basis ranging from random criminal acts to infiltrate NATO’s systems to those of a more sophisticated targeted nature</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. NATO allies must remain on high alert. The changed nature of military conflict changes the defensive mission of NATO which faces capable opponents in cyberspace and raises the question of how to create accountability when a hostile state fails to observe globally agreed norms. The set of action for NATO for the next five years evolves around how to impose costs and how to deny benefits against malicious actors in cyberspace. What the war in Ukraine says about cyber power is yet not entirely cleared from the fog of war. Many aspects remain uncertain but given the unpredictability of the Putin regime the risk of an escalation in hostile cyber exchanges between Russia and NATO states remains high. What is clear is that as of February 24 2022 we live in a different world in which the European and global security orders have been shattered. This brief first explores the challenge that cyber threats pose to NATO allies and how the rapidly evolving cyber-threat landscape can alter the international security environment. Secondly it looks at developments in cyber defense policy within NATO. Finally the brief analyzes how NATO needs to adapt to address cyber challenges studying how allies align their sovereign interests capabilities and cyber doctrines with NATO operational requirements and strategic ambitions. NATO is set to issue strategic documents in 2022 that will guide the next decade of its military planning. This will certainly require more transatlantic consultation on political-military matters with an emphasis on cyber security and cyber defense. Cyber Challenge to World and NATO Allies: Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years while the world has kept turning amid the omnipresent pandemic and now war in Ukraine. States non-state actors and criminal groups compete and are increasingly weaponizing sensitive information and infiltrating other countries’ networks to steal data seed misinformation or disrupt critical infrastructure. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States needs to increase cyber efforts with NATO to improve NATO’s and their own cyber security </claim> <psg>Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years ranging from ransomware and espionage to politically motivated cyberattacks and sophisticated malware used in the war in Ukraine. What the war in Ukraine says about cyber power is yet not entirely cleared from the fog of war. Many aspects remain uncertain but given the unpredictability of the Putin regime the risk of an escalation in hostile cyber exchanges between Russia and NATO states remains high. What is clear is that as of February 24 2022 we live in a different world in which the European and global security orders have been shattered. NATO is set to issue strategic documents in 2022 that will guide the next decade of its military planning. This will certainly require more transatlantic consultation on political-military matters with an emphasis on cyber security and cyber defense. : Malicious cyber activity has increased substantially over the past years while the world has kept turning amid the omnipresent pandemic and criminal groups compete and are increasingly weaponizing sensitive information and infiltrating other countries’ networks to steal data seed misinformation or disrupt critical infrastructure</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack illustrated the vulnerability of America’s critical infrastructure to a security breach. Fuel shortages and rising prices got people’s attention. Data breaches have more than doubled over the past decade. Recent cyberattacks have exploited the “trusted supplier” status of SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange among other companies and raised concerns at the highest levels of government and the private sector. The stakes are only getting higher as the internet of things makes everything more connected and we all become more dependent on 5G-enabled technologies. What’s being done to prevent cyberattacks — and is it enough? Last month President Joe Biden issued an executive order to begin developing mandatory baseline security requirements for government agencies and the companies that do business with them. The order states that the federal government must collaborate with the private sector and with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop and implement a zero-trust model that “eliminates implicit trust in any one element node or service and instead requires continuous verification” from multiple sources. </source> [/INST] <claim> The past attacks on US cyber space will continue to happen without strong cyber security </claim> <psg>The Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack illustrated the vulnerability of America’s critical infrastructure to a security breach. Fuel shortages and rising prices got people’s attention. Data breaches have more than doubled over the past decade. Recent cyberattacks have exploited the “trusted supplier” status of SolarWinds and Microsoft Exchange among other companies and raised concerns at the highest levels of government and the private sector. The stakes are only getting higher as the internet of things makes everything more connected and we all become more dependent on 5G-enabled technologies. What’s being done to prevent cyberattacks — and is it enough?</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Our network of cyber experts have a less-than-rosy take on the United States' ability to fend off cyber attacks. Most of them said the U.S. is either just as vulnerable to cyberattacks or even more vulnerable today than it was five years ago. That assessment from a group of experts polled by The Cybersecurity 202 reflects a half-decade during which government and industry have supercharged their efforts to defend against devastating hacks from foreign governments and criminals — but the bad guys have upped their game even more most experts say. ‘[We’re] less vulnerable against the threats of five years ago. But I see no evidence that the threat has stood still and in fact it is likely that it has grown at a faster rate than our defenses ” said Herb Lin senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at Stanford University. “We become evermore vulnerable with each passing day ” warned Lauren Zabierek executive director of the Cyber Project at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. “I don't know where the bottom is.” The breakdown About 43 percent of respondents to our Network experts poll said the United States is more vulnerable to cyberattacks now. About 38 percent said we’re just as vulnerable as we were five years ago. Just 19 percent of experts said the United States is less vulnerable in cyberspace than five years ago. The sobering results come as cyber executives and analysts are convening in San Francisco for the RSA Conference the largest annual industry-focused cybersecurity gathering which is being held in person for the first time since the start of the coronavirus pandemic. The cyber industry has fared extremely well during the past half-decade — nearly doubling in value according to some estimates — but it has also struggled to keep up with the dizzying pace of attacks. More targets: One key problem according to experts who said the United States is more vulnerable now: The nation has become more reliant on technology during the past five years — significantly increasing the targets that hackers can aim at. And that technology is often being built without security foremost in mind. “Cybersecurity is improving constantly but the complexity of our digital society may be outpacing our efforts to keep up ” Mandiant Threat Intelligence chief John Hultquist said. Cyber and tech investor Niloofar Razi Howe: “We are more vulnerable because of the dizzying pace we are adopting technology engaging in tech transformation and adding devices without prioritizing security.”One particularly rich target has been a vast new array of Internet-connected devices such as refrigerators thermostats and cameras. These devices commonly called the “Internet of things” or “IoT” are notorious for relying on weak or default passwords and being difficult to update with software patches — making them easy pickings for hackers.“Many of these technologies have shortchanged their cybersecurity expenditures creating ever-increasing liabilities for everyone ” said Sascha Meinrath founding director of X-Lab a think tank at Penn State focusing on the intersection of technologies and public policy.“As the cyber-strategist Biggie Smalls would have said ‘More IoT More Problems ’ ” quipped Peter Singer a fellow at the New America think tank. (Singer said the United States is equally vulnerable compared to five years ago). Many experts blamed the United States’ ongoing vulnerability to hacking on the increased brazenness of U.S. adversaries especially Russia. Norma Krayem a cyber policy expert at Van Scoyoc Associates: “Russia's use of cyber tools against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated to the world that it can fully disrupt key aspects of critical infrastructure. </source> [/INST] <claim>U.S. cyber- security is currently weak against attacks</claim> <psg>Our network of cyber experts have a less-than-rosy take on the United States' ability to fend off cyber attacks a half-decade during which government and industry have supercharged their efforts to defend against devastating hacks from foreign governments and criminals — but the bad guys have upped their game even more I see no evidence that the threat has stood still and in fact it is likely that it has grown at a faster rate than our defenses ” said Herb Lin senior research scholar for cyber policy and security at Stanford University About 43 percent of respondents said the United States is more vulnerable to cyberattacks now The sobering results come as cyber executives and analysts are convening in San Francisco for the RSA Conference the largest annual industry-focused cybersecurity gathering : “Cybersecurity is improving constantly but the complexity of our digital society may be outpacing our efforts to keep up ” Mandiant Threat Intelligence chief John Hultquist said One particularly rich target has been a vast new array of Internet-connected devices such as refrigerators thermostats and cameras. These devices are notorious for relying on weak or default passwords and being difficult to update with software patches — making them easy pickings for hackers. ). Many experts blamed the United States’ ongoing vulnerability to hacking on the increased brazenness of U.S. adversaries especially Russia. Norma Krayem a cyber policy expert at Van Scoyoc Associates: “Russia's use of cyber tools against Ukraine has clearly demonstrated to the world that it can fully disrupt key aspects of critical infrastructure</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> General Paul Nakasone – Commander U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) and Director National Security Agency (NSA) – asserts that “traditional military deterrence is binary in regard to conflict and a deterrence model…does not comport to cyberspace where much of the nefarious cyber activity plays out non-stop in an ambiguous strategic gray zone.” While this article is in agreement with the “futility of totally deterring adversaries from operating in cyberspace and instead actively disrupting those activities before they can inflict damage ” it takes the position of respectfully disagreeing that traditional deterrence is binary and the rules of traditional deterrence do not hold in cyberspace. Deterrence centered around domain denial is neither desirable nor sustainable. Hindering access to cyberspace is not consistent with the enduring American values of individual liberty free expression and free markets. This encumbered access also runs counter to the U.S. national interest of protecting and promoting internet freedom to support the free flow of information that enhances international trade and commerce fosters innovation and strengthens both national and international security. and the universal right (global norm) of unfettered free access to and peaceful use of cyberspace for all. Restricting access to cyberspace is also not practical considering the cost to operate in cyberspace is modest the barriers to entry low and the ease of operating negligible. Deterrence the “prevention of action by either the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits ” is more complicated and nuanced than a simple binary response of yes or no. Deterrence can create a delay or pause for transitory maneuvering space to mitigate the effects of the threat action or better yet take preemptive or preventive measures to disrupt (neutralize) the threat action. Deterrence like warfighting (war) involves universal and immutable “human nature” that does not change over time or across nationality demographic culture geography and domain. Rational actors choose to act or not to act based on fundamental “fear honor and interest (Thucydides)” and are deterred to act or not to act by real or perceived “capability intent and credibility (deterrent triad).” Additionally as Henry Kissinger once noted “deterrence is a product of capability intent and credibility and not a sum…if any one of them is zero deterrence fails.” Washington accordingly must do more and do better to ensure each factor succeeds as an aggregate deterrent triad for increased integrated deterrence decreased strategic risk greater strategic alignment and lesser likelihood of conflict across all the interconnected and contested domains. Deterrence works best when it is clear coherent uniform and complementary across the fluid competition continuum (steady state to crisis to conflict). expansive instruments of national power (diplomatic information military economic financial intelligence and law enforcement – DIMEFIL). and interconnected and contested domains (physical and nonphysical) for strategic consistency operational agility and tactical flexibility. Last year in an article titled “In Space No One Can Hear You Bluff ” this author made the policy case for a more active space deterrence to better manage the growing threats to the vulnerable U.S. high-value space assets. This article makes the same policy case now for a more active cyber deterrence to better address the exigent factors of time space and force in cyberspace. An attack in cyberspace can come from anyone occur anywhere and happen anytime with no warning to react and no opportunity to respond – an increasing real risk as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine persists and President Putin becomes more impatient and desperate for victory while becoming at risk of dangerously perceiving a shift in U.S. policy from conflict containment (vertical and horizontal) to conflict escalation or worse regime change. </source> [/INST] <claim>Simple U.S. deterrence does not work </claim> <psg>General Paul Nakasone – Commander U.S. Cyber Command (USCC) and Director National Security Agency (NSA) – asserts that “traditional military deterrence is binary in regard to conflict and a deterrence model…does not comport to cyberspace where much of the nefarious cyber activity plays out non-stop in an ambiguous strategic gray zone.” . Deterrence centered around domain denial is neither desirable nor sustainable. Hindering access to cyberspace is not consistent with the enduring American values of individual liberty free expression and free markets. This encumbered access also runs counter to the U.S. national interest of protecting and promoting internet freedom to support the free flow of information that enhances international trade and commerce fosters innovation and strengthens both national and international security. and the universal right (global norm) of unfettered free access to and peaceful use of cyberspace for all . Deterrence can create a delay or pause for transitory maneuvering space to mitigate the effects of the threat action or better yet take preemptive or preventive measures to disrupt (neutralize) the threat action Washington accordingly must do more and do better to ensure each factor succeeds as an aggregate deterrent triad for increased integrated deterrence decreased strategic risk greater strategic alignment and lesser likelihood of conflict across all the interconnected and contested domains. An attack in cyberspace can come from anyone occur anywhere and happen anytime with no warning to react and no opportunity to respond – an increasing real risk as the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine persists and President Putin becomes more impatient and desperate for victory while becoming at risk of dangerously perceiving a shift in U.S. policy from conflict containment to conflict escalation or worse regime change.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> To keep pace with the rapidly changing threat landscape and maintain robust cyber defences NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan which were endorsed by Allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. The 2014 policy established that cyber defence is part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace set out the further development of NATO’s and Allies’ capabilities and intensified NATO’s cooperation with industry. At the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw Allies reaffirmed NATO’s defensive mandate and recognised cyberspace as a domain of operations in which NATO must defend itself as effectively as it does in the air on land and at sea. As most crises and conflicts today have a cyber dimension treating cyberspace as a domain enables NATO to better protect and conduct its operations and missions. At the Warsaw Summit Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures as a matter of priority. Together with the continuous adaptation of NATO’s cyber defence capabilities this will reinforce the cyber defence and overall resilience of the Alliance. At the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels Allies endorsed a new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy which supports NATO’s three core tasks of collective defence crisis management and cooperative security as well as its overall deterrence and defence posture. NATO’s defensive mandate was reaffirmed and Allies committed to employing the full range of capabilities to actively deter defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats at all times. Responses need to be continuous and draw on elements of the entire NATO toolbox that include political diplomatic and military tools. Allies also recognised that the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might in certain circumstances be considered as an armed attack. The nature of cyberspace requires a comprehensive approach through unity of effort at the political military and technical levels. The 2021 policy and its corresponding action plan will drive forward activities across these three levels. Developing the NATO cyber defence capability The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) based at SHAPE in Mons Belgium protects NATO’s own networks by providing centralised and round-the-clock cyber defence support. This capability evolves on a continual basis and maintains pace with the rapidly changing threat and technology environment. NATO has also established a Cyberspace Operations Centre in Mons Belgium. The Centre supports military commanders with situational awareness to inform the Alliance’s operations and missions. It also coordinates NATO’s operational activity in cyberspace ensuring freedom to act in this domain and making operations more resilient to cyber threats. To facilitate an Alliance-wide common approach to cyber defence capability development NATO also defines targets for Allied countries’ implementation of national cyber defence capabilities via the NATO Defence Planning Process. NATO helps Allies to enhance their national cyber defences by facilitating information-sharing exchange of best practices and by conducting cyber defence exercises to develop national expertise . </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States should join forces with NATO to increase their own cyber security they promised to </claim> <psg>NATO adopted an enhanced policy and action plan which were endorsed by Allies at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales. The 2014 policy established that cyber defence is part of the Alliance’s core task of collective defence confirmed that international law applies in cyberspace set out the further development of NATO’s and Allies’ capabilities and intensified NATO’s cooperation with industry At the Warsaw Summit Allies also pledged to strengthen and enhance the cyber defences of national networks and infrastructures as a matter of priority. NATO helps Allies to enhance their national cyber defences by facilitating information-sharing exchange of best practices and by conducting cyber defence exercises to develop national expertise</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Despite a considerable arsenal of sophisticated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities American political and military systems still struggle at times with inconsistent strategic communications and a dogged credibility gap. The new deterrent framework in cyberspace must therefore focus more on communicating clear intent and building enduring credibility through redlines deterrent language and cross-domain options to impose further costs deny added benefits encourage greater restraints and control more the narratives. Declaratory redlines make clear the unwanted risks costs and consequences of specific actions. They are an important way to influence an adversary’s risk perception and rational calculus lower the likelihood of misunderstanding and encourage restraint. They also outline the conditions of and willingness to inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage or destruction. U.S. policymakers should therefore “privately” reinforce to strategic competitors (and potential adversaries) the deterrent public statements contained therein the 2018 National Cyber Strategy (NCS) 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (INSSG) 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and (anticipated) forthcoming National Security Strategy (NSS). U.S. law enforcement officials should likewise continue to “publicly” warn cyber criminals of egregious illicit cyber acts. In doing so they should make it clear to both state and non-state threat actors that any cyber attack or cyber act that threatens U.S. national security interests U.S. economic prosperity and U.S. political stability is unacceptable and will be met with severe and disproportionate consequences for them. If they attack or act they should not expect a proportionate response. They should expect prompt and devastating force that will cause retaliatory damages much greater than what they intended to inflict. This clear warning should have the effect of causing malicious cyber actors to think twice before acting and consider that the real costs may be much greater than any intended benefits.For cyber powers like China and Russia it should be made unequivocally clear that any cyber attack on critical military space systems – missile warning command and control of nuclear forces and positioning navigation and timing – is an act of war and will be dealt with accordingly. Doing so interlocks the 2020 National Space Policy with the 2018 NCS both of which acknowledge the imperative of and calls for improvements to space cybersecurity. Like any other increasingly digitized and networked critical infrastructure space-based and ground-based space systems and their communication links are vulnerable to cyber attacks. </source> [/INST] <claim>Passing the AFF would provide the U.S. with tools to better protect their cyber space</claim> <psg>Despite a considerable arsenal of sophisticated offensive and defensive cyber capabilities American political and military systems still struggle at times with inconsistent strategic communications and a dogged credibility gap. . U.S. policymakers should therefore “privately” reinforce to strategic competitors U.S. law enforcement officials should likewise continue to “publicly” warn cyber criminals of egregious illicit cyber acts. In doing so they should make it clear to both state and non-state threat actors that any cyber attack or cyber act that threatens U.S. national security interests U.S. economic prosperity and U.S. political stability is unacceptable and will be met with severe and disproportionate consequences for them. If they attack or act they should not expect a proportionate response. They should expect prompt and devastating force that will cause retaliatory damages much greater than what they intended to inflict. This clear warning should have the effect of causing malicious cyber actors to think twice before acting and consider that the real costs may be much greater than any intended benefits.For cyber powers like China and Russia it should be made unequivocally clear that any cyber attack on is an act of war and will be dealt with accordingly</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Another set of threats comes in the form of belligerent state actors that seek to steal sensitive data for espionage. In December 2020 Russian intelligence services infiltrated the digital systems run by US tech firm SolarWinds and inserted malware into its code. During the company’s next software update the virus was inadvertently spread to about 18 000 clients including large corporations the Pentagon the State Department Homeland Security the Treasury and other US government agencies. The hack went undetected for months before the victims discovered vast amounts of their data had been stolen.5There are also politically motivated cyberattacks mandated by states that interfere in democratic processes and political discourse. In September 2020 the internal email system of Norway’s parliament was hacked.6  Ine Eriksen Søreide the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway underlined the significance of the attack by calling it an important cyber incident that affected the “most important democratic institution” of the country.7  Norwegian authorities later identified Russia as the actor responsible for the attack marking the first time that Norwegian authorities had made a political attribution to such an attack.Since the beginning of this year Ukraine’s government has been hit by a series of cyberattacks that defaced government websites and wiped out the data on some government computers. In mid-January hackers defaced about 70 Ukrainian websites including the Ministries of Foreign Affairs Defense Energy Education and Science as well as the State Emergency Service and the Ministry of Digital Transformation whose e-governance portal gives the Ukrainian public digital access to dozens of government services. The hackers replaced the home pages of about a dozen sites with a threatening message: “be afraid and expect worse.” After a couple of days however most of the sites were restored.8  The international hacktivist collective Anonymous has declared “cyberwar” against Russia’s government claiming credit for several cyber incidents including distributed denial of service attacks that took down Russian government websites and Russia Today the state-backed news service.9Around the globe aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. The most worrying type of cyberattack is sophisticated malware designed by states or state-backed actors that act as “time bombs” in the critical cyber networks of target countries such as the energy telecom and transportation sectors. Around the globe aging critical infrastructure has long been vulnerable to attack. In 2020 the UK’s National Cyber Security Centre issued a warning of Russian attacks on millions of routers firewalls and devices used by infrastructure operators and government agencies.10On the day of the Russian invasion ViaSat a provider of high-speed satellite broadband services was hacked along with one of its satellites Ka-Sat whose users included Ukraine’s armed forces police and intelligence service. Destructive wiper malware attacks by Russia against Ukraine included WhisperGate discovered in January by Microsoft in Ukraine’s networks that “provide critical executive branch or emergency response functions”. </source> [/INST] <claim>A strong cyber security front helps secure U.S. from further Russian attacks</claim> <psg>In December 2020 Russian intelligence services infiltrated the digital systems run by US tech firm SolarWinds and inserted malware into its code. During the company’s next software update the virus was inadvertently spread to about 18 000 clients including large corporations the Pentagon the State Department Homeland Security the Treasury and other US government agencies. The hack went undetected for months before the victims discovered vast amounts of their data had been stolen . In September 2020 the internal email system of Norway’s parliament was hacked  Norwegian authorities later identified Russia as the actor responsible for the attack On the day of the Russian invasion ViaSat a provider of high-speed satellite broadband services was hacked along with one of its satellites Ka-Sat whose users included Ukraine’s armed forces police and intelligence service. Destructive wiper malware attacks by Russia against Ukraine included WhisperGate discovered in January by Microsoft in Ukraine’s networks that “provide critical executive branch or emergency response functions”.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Nonetheless Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” — the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russian Attacks could go nuclear</claim> <psg>Nonetheless Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> With the Georgia Senate runoff elections set for Jan. 5 2021 a nationwide survey conducted post-election could provide insights about voter perceptions of fairness in the U.S. election and trust in democratic institutions. Researchers from a university consortium of Northwestern Harvard Northeastern and Rutgers surveyed more than 24 000 individuals across the nation between Nov. 3 and 30. The survey found that overall 38% of Americans lack confidence in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election. That number is especially high among Republicans (64%) and Trump voters (69%) compared to Democrats (11%) and Biden voters (8%). “This level of distrust is not surprising given political rhetoric but it certainly is concerning. Elections are the foundation of our democracy and loss of faith in the process could undermine the new administration’s legitimacy and ability to get things done ” said James Druckman the Payson S. Wild Professor of political science in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern and associate director of the University’s Institute for Policy Research. The survey showed large partisan gaps of over 40 percentage points in public concern about mail-in fraud (85% of Republicans and 38% of Democrats) inaccurate or biased vote counts (84% of Republicans and 44% of Democrats) and illegal votes from non-citizens (81% of Republicans and 34% of Democrats). To better understand the reasons why some Americans distrust the election process respondents were asked about their level of concern regarding voter suppression intimidation inaccurate or biased counts and interference. The problem most people found troubling was voter suppression (making it harder for certain groups to vote) with over two-thirds of respondents (67%) saying they were somewhat or very concerned about it. Voter intimidation was a concern for 62% of respondents while inaccurate or biased vote counts concerned 60% of Americans. Foreign country interference was a concern for 59% mail-in ballot fraud for 57% and illegal votes from non-citizens was a concern for 52%. “These numbers create a puzzle for the current Senate elections in Georgia ” said Druckman. “For some the concerns may de-mobilize but for others it may be a mobilizing factor to get your vote in especially to combat concerns about suppression and intimidation.” The three most polarizing election process issues with partisan gaps of over 40 percentage points had been heavily promoted by President Trump and received attention by right wing media. These included mail-in fraud (reported as somewhat or very concerning for 85% of Republicans but only 38% of Democrats) inaccurate or biased vote counting (a concern for 84% of Republicans and 44% of Democrats) and illegal votes from non-citizens (a concern for 81% of Republicans and 34% of Democrats). Partisan differences were lowest with regard to foreign interference in the election (60% Republicans and 63% Democrats) voter intimidation (60% Republicans and 67% Democrats) and voter suppression (63% or Republicans and 73% of Democrats). “The results make clear that we have a long way to go to restore faith in our electoral process ” Druckman said. </source> [/INST] <claim>Many Americans lack trust in their election process</claim> <psg>. Researchers from a university consortium of Northwestern Harvard Northeastern and Rutgers surveyed more than 24 000 individuals across the nation between Nov. 3 and 30. The survey found that overall 38% of Americans lack confidence in the fairness of the 2020 presidential election. That number is especially high among Republicans (64%) and Trump voters (69%) compared to Democrats (11%) and Biden voters (8%). “This level of distrust is not surprising given political rhetoric but it certainly is concerning. Elections are the foundation of our democracy and loss of faith in the process could undermine the new administration’s legitimacy and ability to get things done ” said James Druckman the Payson S. Wild Professor of political science in the Weinberg College of Arts and Sciences at Northwestern and associate director of the University’s Institute for Policy Research To better understand the reasons why some Americans distrust the election process respondents were asked about their level of concern regarding voter suppression intimidation inaccurate or biased counts and interference. . Voter intimidation was a concern for 62% of respondents . Foreign country interference was a concern for 59% mail-in ballot fraud for 57% Partisan differences were lowest with regard to foreign interference in the election (60% Republicans and 63% Democrats) voter intimidation (60% Republicans and 67% Democrats) and voter suppression (63% or Republicans and 73% of Democrats). “The results make clear that we have a long way to go to restore faith in our electoral process ” Druckman said.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As lawmakers state elections officials and social media executives work to limit intervention in the 2020 elections by Russia and other foreign operatives an unsettling truth is emerging. Vladimir Putin may already be succeeding. The troubling disclosures of Russian meddling in the 2016 campaign – 'sweeping and systematic ' special counsel Robert Mueller concluded in his report on the matter – have policymakers on guard for what intelligence officials say is a continuing campaign by Russia to influence American elections. But even if voting machines in all jurisdictions are secured against hacking and social media sites are scrubbed of fake stories posted by Russian bots the damage may already have been done experts warn as Americans' faith in the credibility of the nation's elections falters.'This is Vladimir Putin's game plan – sow distrust discord disillusionment and division ' Sen. Richard Blumenthal Democrat of Connecticut says about the Russian leader. 'It's his playbook for all Western democracies – not just us but Europe and around the world. We're open societies we're vulnerable to disinformation and he regards himself as superior because he controls the press ' adds Blumenthal one of the authors of bipartisan legislation meant to improve election security. 'There's a real danger to such distrust in the integrity of our election system that has lasting damage ' he warns. Allegations of uncounted – or wrongly counted – ballots voter suppression and other grievances tend to emerge in every election. Most famously in recent history the 2000 presidential race was effectively determined by the Supreme Court. But the events of the past few years – including frequent comments by President Donald Trump questioning the integrity of a race he won – have aggravated the distrust pollsters and analysts say. An NPR/Marist poll before last year's midterms found that nearly 2 in 4 voters do not believe elections are fair and well over half said they did not think all votes would be counted in November 2018. That compared with a 2016 Gallup poll that found nearly two-thirds of Americans were confident in the vote count.Marist polling over decades shows that public faith in many institutions has plummeted says Lee Miringoff director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion. For example Miringoff says in 1990 62 percent of Americans said the media provided fair and accurate coverage of campaigns with 37 percent disagreeing. Now the numbers are virtually flipped with an April Marist poll showing that 63 percent of Americans don't trust the media for fair and accurate campaign reporting with 37 percent saying they do trust the media. The diminished trust in institutions is worrisome Miringoff says since it is those very institutions that inform the public of possible election meddling and handle the consequences of a disputed election. </source> [/INST] <claim>The U.S. weak cyber security and constant attacks from Russia is the cause for growing election distrust</claim> <psg>As lawmakers state elections officials and social media executives work to limit intervention in the 2020 elections by Russia and other foreign operatives an unsettling truth is emerging. Vladimir Putin may already be succeeding. The troubling disclosures of Russian meddling in the 2016 campaign – 'sweeping and systematic have policymakers on guard for what intelligence officials say is a continuing campaign by Russia to influence American elections. But even if voting machines in all jurisdictions are secured against hacking and social media sites are scrubbed of fake stories posted by Russian bots the damage may already have been done experts warn as Americans' faith in the credibility of the nation's elections falters. An NPR/Marist poll before last year's midterms found that nearly 2 in 4 voters do not believe elections are fair and well over half said they did not think all votes would be counted in November 2018. That compared with a 2016 Gallup poll that found nearly two-thirds of Americans were confident in the vote count.Marist polling over decades shows that public faith in many institutions has plummeted says Lee Miringoff director of the Marist Institute for Public Opinion with an April Marist poll showing that 63 percent of Americans don't trust the media for fair and accurate campaign reporting with 37 percent saying they do trust the media. The diminished trust in institutions is worrisome Miringoff says since it is those very institutions that inform the public of possible election meddling and handle the consequences of a disputed election.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> With ethnic and racial minority populations in the United States rising there is a growing population of voices that remain unaccounted for. Though current legislation has been implemented to ensure fair and impartial voting access there is too much leeway given to state governments in the voting system’s execution. As a result restrictions in the election system have resulted in systematic discrimination toward minority populations making them ineligible to vote. Voter ID laws have underlying racial biases and prevent minorities from engaging in active democratic participation. These requirements compel an individual to present his or her ID in order to cast a ballot on Election Day. Obtaining an ID can be costly and requires an individual’s birth certificate which may be burdensome. Proponents advocate for the law under the guise of preventing voter fraud and ensuring that only voter-eligible citizens partake in elections. however individuals who lack government-issued identification are more likely to be younger less educated and impoverished and—most notably—nonwhite. An example of the inherent discrimination of voter ID laws can be found in the implementation of Georgia’s “exact match” system. This program requires an individual’s voting status to be suspended if the name on their driver’s license or Social Security records does not exactly match the name they inputted on their voter registration form. Of the 51 000 individuals that this law affected in 2018 80 percent of them were African American. There is evidence that the “exact match” law played a role in the 2018 Georgia gubernatorial election as African American candidate Stacey Abrams lost by approximately 55 000 votes. It is also far more difficult for members of minority communities to be able to locate polling places on Election Day. Only 5 percent of white survey respondents reported that they had trouble finding polling locations compared to 15 percent of African American and 14 percent of Hispanic respondents. When deciding where to place a polling station election officials are required to assign each precinct a designated station based on factors such as population accessibility and location recognizability. locations may be changed at the officials’ discretion. Minorities have a lower voter turnout compared to whites and in many cases this has resulted in discriminatory polling place distributions. Disparities in polling places can also be the result of a change in the majority of election officials. </source> [/INST] <claim>POC voter turnout is already low election fraud is another way to stop them from voting</claim> <psg>With ethnic and racial minority populations in the United States rising there is a growing population of voices that remain unaccounted for. Though current legislation has been implemented to ensure fair and impartial voting access there is too much leeway given to state governments in the voting system’s execution. As a result restrictions in the election system have resulted in systematic discrimination toward minority populations Minorities have a lower voter turnout compared to whites and in many cases this has resulted in discriminatory polling place distributions. Disparities in polling places can also be the result of a change in the majority of election officials</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Russia’s propaganda and disinformation apparatus is extraordinarily complex. Some outlets are fully state-run some are merely state-funded and others are operated at arm’s length by Putin-linked oligarchs. The system churns out conspiracy theories and whataboutism to aid Moscow’s objectives. From the start of the all-out invasion on February 24 Russian disinformation has thumped on a series of narratives: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) posed a security risk to the Russian Federation. that Ukraine was run by neo-Nazis. that Ukraine is responsible for slaughtering civilians on its own territory. Those narratives have unfortunately been somewhat effective in discouraging a unified response from NATO. They’ve influenced millions of Westerners and found purchase with far-right and Russophilic politicians the world over. The most visible Western response to date has been the collective taking offline of Russia Today or RT the state-run television network. Yet trying to ban Russian media is a mug’s game. Any outlets forbidden by law or suspended by the social media giants would simply jump to the Russian-founded social media platform Telegram which abhors regulation. Rather than playing whack-a-mole outlet by outlet Ukraine’s allies would be better off exposing how these disinformation networks work. Many of these social media pages self-styled think tanks blogs and media outlets are designed to look fully independent and authentic. Efforts by Twitter Alphabet and Meta to expose them as disinformation have been inconsistent. Berlin-based Moscow-run video aggregator Ruptly is “state-affiliated media ” according to Twitter but “state-controlled media” per Facebook. its“transparency” feature notes that the outlet’s page administrators are in three EU countries but doesn’t name them. Some smaller but perhaps more effective outlets — such as the French-language Donbass Insider which has used manipulative practices to spread Kremlin disinformation on its Facebook page — carry no disclaimer at all. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia’s cyber attacks have been planted false information in the media</claim> <psg>Russia’s propaganda and disinformation apparatus is extraordinarily complex. Some outlets are fully state-run some are merely state-funded and others are operated at arm’s length by Putin-linked oligarchs. The system churns out conspiracy theories and whataboutism to aid Moscow’s objectives Russian disinformation has thumped on a series of narratives: that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) posed a security risk to the Russian Federation. that Ukraine was run by neo-Nazis. that Ukraine is responsible for slaughtering civilians on its own territory. The most visible Western response to date has been the collective taking offline of Russia Today or RT the state-run television network . Many of these social media pages self-styled think tanks blogs and media outlets are designed to look fully independent and authentic. Efforts by Twitter Alphabet and Meta to expose them as disinformation have been inconsistent. Some smaller but perhaps more effective outlets has used manipulative practices to spread Kremlin disinformation on its Facebook page — carry no disclaimer at all.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> OVER THE PAST few years online disinformation has taken evolutionary leaps forward with the Internet Research Agency pumping out artificial outrage on social media and hackers leaking documents—both real and fabricated—to suit their narrative. More recently Eastern Europe has faced a broad campaign that takes fake news ops to yet another level: hacking legitimate news sites to plant fake stories then hurriedly amplifying them on social media before they’re taken down. On Wednesday security firm FireEye released a report on a disinformation-focused group it’s calling Ghostwriter. The propagandists have created and disseminated disinformation since at least March 2017 with a focus on undermining NATO and the US troops in Poland and the Baltics. they’ve posted fake content on everything from social media to pro-Russian news websites. In some cases FireEye says Ghostwriter has deployed a bolder tactic: hacking the content management systems of news websites to post their own stories. They then disseminate their literal fake news with spoofed emails social media and even op-eds the propagandists write on other sites that accept user-generated content. That hacking campaign targeting media sites from Poland to Lithuania has spread false stories about US military aggression NATO soldiers spreading coronavirus NATO planning a full-on invasion of Belarus and more. “They’re spreading these stories that NATO is a danger that they resent the locals that they’re infected that they’re car thieves ” says John Hultquist director of intelligence at FireEye. “And they’re pushing these stories out with a variety of means the most interesting of which is hacking local media websites and planting them. These fictional stories are suddenly bona fide by the sites that they’re on and then they go in and spread the link to the story.”FireEye itself did not conduct incident response analyses on these incidents and concedes that it doesn't know exactly how the hackers are stealing credentials that give them access to the content management systems that allow posting and altering news stories. Nor does it know who is behind the string of website compromises or for that matter the larger disinformation campaign that the fake stories are a part of. </source> [/INST] <claim>Hackers have broken into real news sites and planted stories </claim> <psg>OVER THE PAST few years online disinformation has taken evolutionary leaps forward Eastern Europe has faced a broad campaign that takes fake news ops to yet another level: hacking legitimate news sites to plant fake stories then hurriedly amplifying them on social media before they’re taken down. security firm FireEye released a report on a disinformation-focused group it’s calling Ghostwriter. The propagandists have created and disseminated disinformation since at least March 2017 with a focus on undermining NATO and the US troops in Poland and the Baltics. they’ve posted fake content on everything from social media to pro-Russian news websites hacking the content management systems of news websites to post their own stories. They then disseminate their literal fake news That hacking campaign has spread false stories about US military aggression NATO soldiers spreading coronavirus NATO planning a full-on invasion of Belarus and more.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> But the company’s analysts have found that the news site compromises and the online accounts used to spread links to those fabricated stories as well as the more traditional creation of fake news on social media blogs and websites with an anti-US and anti-NATO bent all tie back to a distinct set of personas indicating one unified disinformation effort. FireEye’s Hultquist points out that the campaign doesn’t seem financially motivated indicating a political or state backer and notes that the focus on driving a wedge between NATO and citizens of Eastern Europe hints at possible Russian involvement. Nor would it be the first time that Russian hackers planted fake news stories. in 2017 US intelligence agencies concluded that Russian hackers breached Qatar’s state news agency and planted a fake news story designed to embarrass the country’s leader and cause a rift with the US though US intelligence never confirmed the Kremlin’s involvement.'We can’t concretely tie it to Russia at this time but it’s certainly in line with their interests ' Hultquist says of the Ghostwriter campaign. 'It wouldn’t be a surprise to me if this is where the evidence leads us.' Much of the disinformation has focused on Lithuania as DefenseOne reported late last year. In June 2018 for instance the English-language Baltic-focused news site the Baltic Course published a story claiming that a US Stryker armored vehicle had collided with a Lithuanian child on a bicycle killing the child 'on the spot.' The same day the Baltic Course posted a notice to the site that 'hackers posted this news about the deceased child which is FAKE!!! We thank our vigilant Lithuanian readers who reported on our Facebook page about fake new on site. We strengthened security measures.'A few months later the Lithuanian news site Kas Vyksta Kaune published a story stating that 'NATO plans to invade Belarus ' showing a map of how NATO forces in Polish and Baltic countries would enter the neighboring country. Kas Vyksta Kaune later acknowledged that the story was fake and planted by hackers. Someone had used a former employee’s credentials to gain access to the CMS. Then in September of last year another fake story was posted to the site about German NATO soldiers desecrating a Jewish cemetery including what FireEye describes as a photoshopped image of a military vehicle with a German flag visible behind the cemetery. More recently the fake stories have attempted to exploit fears of Covid-19. One story posted to both Kas Vyksta Kaune and the English-language Baltic Times in January claimed that the first Covid-19 case in Lithuania was a US soldier who was hospitalized in critical condition but only after he 'visited public places and participated in city events with child and youth participation ' according to the Baltic Times version of the story. In April and May of this year the focus turned toward Poland: A fake story was posted across several Polish news sites in which a US official disparaged local Polish forces as disorganized and incompetent. This time the campaign went even beyond news sites. A fake letter from a Polish military official was posted to the Polish Military Academy website calling on the Polish military to cease military exercises with the US decrying the US 'occupation' of Poland and calling the exercises an 'obvious provocation' of Russia. The Polish government quickly called out the letter as fake. FireEye's finding that all of those operations to plant fake news were carried out by a single group comes on the heels of a report from The New York Times that Russia's military intelligence agency the GRU has been coordinating the publication of disinformation on sites like InfoRos OneWorld.press and GlobalResearch.ca. US intelligence officials speaking to the Times said that disinformation campaign which included false reports that Covid-19 originated in the US was specifically the work of the GRU's 'psychological warfare unit ' known as Unit 54777.Given the GRU's role in meddling in the 2016 presidential election including its hack-and-leak operations against the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton Campaign any GRU role in more recent disinformation raises fears that it may be targeting the 2020 election as well. While FireEye has made no such claims that the Ghostwriter news site compromises were the work of the GRU Hultquist argues that the incidents in Poland and the Baltics should nonetheless serve as a warning. Even if false stories are spotted quickly and taken down they could have a significant temporary effect on public opinion he warns. </source> [/INST] <claim>Fake news is driving a false wedge between countries </claim> <psg>FireEye’s Hultquist points out that the campaign doesn’t seem financially motivated indicating a political or state backer and notes that the focus on driving a wedge between NATO and citizens of Eastern Europe hints at possible Russian involvement. Nor would it be the first time that Russian hackers planted fake news stories. in 2017 US intelligence agencies concluded that Russian hackers breached Qatar’s state news agency and planted a fake news story designed to embarrass the country’s leader and cause a rift with the US another fake story was posted to the site about German NATO soldiers desecrating a Jewish cemetery including what FireEye describes as a photoshopped image of a military vehicle with a German flag visible behind the cemetery. fake news were carried out by a single group comes on the heels of a report from The New York Times that Russia's military intelligence agency the GRU has been coordinating the publication of disinformation on sites . US intelligence officials speaking to the Times said that disinformation campaign which included false reports that Covid-19 originated in the US was specifically the work of the GRU's 'psychological warfare unit ' Given the GRU's role in meddling in the 2016 presidential election including its hack-and-leak operations against the Democratic National Committee and the Clinton Campaign any GRU role in more recent disinformation raises fears that it may be targeting the 2020 election as well. Hultquist argues that the incidents in Poland and the Baltics should nonetheless serve as a warning. Even if false stories are spotted quickly and taken down they could have a significant temporary effect on public opinion he warns.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In these days of pandemic protests economic recession and angst among the world’s population a recently issued report shows that consumers continue to shift away from traditional media sources for their news and are moving more towards social media and messaging services to find the news. Long gone are the days of people getting most of their news from a local TV station their local newspaper or the national newscast from one of the networks. Over 15 years ago we already saw the substantial decay of Americans using traditional news sources and instead the Internet becoming a major source of news particularly for the 18 to 34 year old demographic. This data comes from a study done for Carnegie Corporation in 2005. A research group I led at the time was responsible for the study. Carnegie Corporation is a major U.S. charitable foundation with a significant interest in journalism and news. As newspapers have fallen dramatically in usage and the national newscasts have dropped in ratings the swing to new sources of information has accelerated considerably. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University has recently issued a report on the state of digital news around the world. One of the very notable facts coming out from the study is the heavy use of Instagram for news which could soon possibly overtake Twitter. Instagram news consumers were 11% of the social media population. Twitter was statistically tied at 12%. Just as we found in 2005 for Carnegie Corporation the shift away from traditional news media sources is being led by the younger generation in this case people under 25 years old. Two-thirds of that age cohort said they use Instagram for gathering news information. The same age group reported that they were two times more likely to look at news on social media apps. Facebook leads with 36% of social media consumers using the social media giant for consuming news. YouTube had 21% of social media users looking at news on the popular video site. WhatsApp had 16% of consumers in that group and 12% used Twitter. Facebook owns both Instagram and WhatsApp. In this time of political and social upheavals it is interesting to note that the Reuters study (conducted by YouGov a research agency) only found 14% of people in the US trusted news on social media compared to 22% in regard to news gathered from search engines. Also as further evidence of the power of social media in driving news to consumers social media as a news source saw ongoing growth with news consumers unlike platforms such as all online sources combined TV and print. When thinking about what we know about the news and where we get our news I reflect back on Will Rogers’ famous quote: “All I know is just what I read in the papers and that's an alibi for my ignorance.” </source> [/INST] <claim>More Americans are turning to social media for their news</claim> <psg>In these days of pandemic protests economic recession and angst among the world’s population a recently issued report shows that consumers continue to shift away from traditional media sources for their news and are moving more towards social media and messaging services to find the news. As newspapers have fallen dramatically in usage and the national newscasts have dropped in ratings the swing to new sources of information has accelerated considerably. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism at Oxford University has recently issued a report on the state of digital news around the world. %. Just as we found in 2005 for Carnegie Corporation the shift away from traditional news media sources is being led by the younger generation in this case people under 25 years old. . In this time of political and social upheavals it is interesting to note that the Reuters study (conducted by YouGov a research agency) only found 14% of people in the US trusted news on social media</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> But there’s another political regime a historical one that may portend an even more dire future for the U.S.: the Weimar Republic. The situation in Germany in the 1920s and early 1930s was of course sui generis. in particular the country had experienced staggering traumas – defeat in war internal revolution and hyperinflation – while the country’s commitment to liberal democracy was weakly rooted in its culture. But as I read a history of the doomed republic this past summer I tallied no fewer than five unnerving parallels with the current U.S. situation. First in both cases a charismatic leader was able to unify right-wing extremists around a political program to seize the state. Second a bald falsehood about how enemies inside the polity had betrayed the country – for the Nazis the “stab in the back ” and for Trumpists the Big Lie – was a vital psychological tool for radicalizing and mobilizing followers. Third conventional conservatives believed they could control and channel the charismatic leader and rising extremism but were ultimately routed by the forces they helped unleash. Fourth ideological opponents of this rising extremism squabbled among themselves. they didn’t take the threat seriously enough even though it was growing in plain sight. and they focused on marginal issues that were too often red meat for the extremists. (Today think toppling statues.)To my mind though the fifth parallel is the most disconcerting: the propagation of a “hardline security doctrine.” Here I’ve been influenced by the research of Jonathan Leader Maynard a young English scholar who is emerging as one of the world’s most brilliant thinkers on the links between ideology extremism and violence. In a forthcoming book  Ideology and Mass Killing  Dr. Leader Maynard argues that extremist right-wing ideologies generally don’t arise from explicit efforts to forge an authoritarian society but from the radicalization of a society’s existing understandings of how it can stay safe and secure in the face of alleged threats.Hardline conceptions of security are “radicalized versions of familiar claims about threat self-defence punishment war and duty ” he writes. They are the foundation on which regimes organize campaigns of violent persecution and terror. People he calls “hardliners” believe the world contains many “dangerous enemies that frequently operate in and through purported ‘civilian’ groups.” Hardliners increasingly dominate Trumpist circles now.Dr. Leader Maynard then makes a complementary argument: Once a hardline doctrine is widely accepted within a political movement it becomes an “infrastructure” of ideas and incentives that can pressure even those who don’t really accept the doctrine into following its dictates. Fear of “true believers” shifts the behaviour of the movement’s moderates toward extremism. Sure enough the experts I recently consulted all spoke about how fear of crossing Mr. Trump’s base – including fear for their families’ physical safety – was forcing otherwise sensible Republicans to fall into line.The rapid propagation of hardline security doctrines through a society Dr. Leader Maynard says typically occurs in times of political and economic crisis. Even in the Weimar Republic the vote for the National Socialists was closely correlated with the unemployment rate. The Nazis were in trouble (with their share of the vote falling and the party beset by internal disputes) as late as 1927 before the German economy started to contract. Then of course the Depression hit. The United States today is in the midst of crisis – caused by the pandemic obviously – but it could experience far worse before long: perhaps a war with Russia Iran or China or a financial crisis when economic bubbles caused by excessive liquidity burst. </source> [/INST] <claim>The impact is american facism war and economic collapse</claim> <psg>there’s another political regime that may portend an even more dire future for the U.S.: the Weimar Republic. I tallied no fewer than five unnerving parallels with the current U.S. situation. First in both cases a charismatic leader was able to unify right-wing extremists around a political program to seize the state. Second a bald falsehood about how enemies inside the polity had betrayed the country was a vital psychological tool for radicalizing and mobilizing followers. Third conventional conservatives believed they could control and channel the charismatic leader and rising extremism but were ultimately routed Fourth ideological opponents of this rising extremism squabbled among themselves. they didn’t take the threat seriously enough the fifth parallel is the most disconcerting: the propagation of a “hardline security doctrine.” extremist right-wing ideologies generally don’t arise from explicit efforts to forge an authoritarian society but from the radicalization of a society’s existing understandings of how it can stay safe and secure in the face of alleged threats.Hardline conceptions of security are “radicalized versions of familiar claims about threat self-defence punishment war and duty . They are the foundation on which regimes organize campaigns of violent persecution and terror. Fear of “true believers” shifts the behaviour of the movement’s moderates toward extremism Sure enough the experts I recently consulted all spoke about how fear of crossing Mr. Trump’s base – including fear for their families’ physical safety – was forcing otherwise sensible Republicans to fall into line. The United States today is in the midst of crisis – caused by the pandemic obviously – but it could experience far worse before long: perhaps a war with Russia Iran or China or a financial crisis when economic bubbles caused by excessive liquidity burst.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Should we expect to see an increase in Russian cyber attacks against the United States and other countries providing support to Ukraine as the crisis draws on? If so what kinds of attacks would you predict we’ll see and do you think potential targets – particularly private companies – are sufficiently prepared? Since the earliest days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has been issuing prominent warnings about the potential for an increase in Russian attacks against U.S. companies. They launched a campaign called “Shields Up” to provide warning and guidance to companies regarding potential Russian threats. Interestingly in the private sector what we noticed around the time of the Russian invasion was a decrease in attacks that cybersecurity professionals generally attributed to Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated hacking organizations particularly regarding ransomware. Last fall ransomware attacks appeared to be at their highest with attacks against private companies happening on a routine basis although many of the attacks were not existential for the company involved or didn’t compromise major systems. (Anecdotally in October 2021 multiple forensic companies I work with reported that they were at capacity for ransomware attacks and were unable to take on additional clients.) But by the time of the invasion ransomware attacks had significantly dropped off and those of us who work in the private cybersecurity sector remarked quietly among ourselves that it was disconcertingly quiet. It is unclear – at least based on publicly available information – whether this is related to Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated hackers focusing their efforts on the war in Ukraine or if there has been some other type of disruption in their operations perhaps due to efforts by the U.S. government to address ransomware gangs. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia will not increase aggression when AFF passed</claim> <psg>Should we expect to see an increase in Russian cyber attacks against the United States and other countries providing support to Ukraine as the crisis draws on? Interestingly in the private sector what we noticed around the time of the Russian invasion was a decrease in attacks that cybersecurity professionals generally attributed to Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated hacking organizations particularly regarding ransomware. whether this is related to Russian state-sponsored and state-affiliated hackers focusing their efforts on the war in Ukraine or if there has been some other type of disruption in their operations perhaps due to efforts by the U.S. government to address ransomware gangs.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> To be sure a ripple of smaller cyberattacks ricocheted through the websites of Ukrainian banks and government agencies just before the invasion and larger attacks may still be in store for the besieged country of 43 million people. But the general consensus among the nearly 20 experts who spoke with CNN for this story is that while Russia is well positioned to launch catastrophic cyberattacks on the US it is not likely to do so. 'We do need to consider this possibility as a low probability but high-impact scenario ' said Paul Prudhomme the head of threat intelligence advisory at the cybersecurity firm IntSights. The prospects for a grand-scale cyberattack in America are low experts say. For one Putin understands that his country's cyber capabilities though formidable are outmatched by those of the United States which is generally thought to be the most sophisticated player in the domain. The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency told CNN it hasn't yet received any credible cyber threats resulting from the conflict in Ukraine but it emphasized that the energy sector has been bolstering its defenses in recent years and is on high alert as it urgently prepares for any attempted breach. Experts say Russia's ability to conduct an impactful cyberattack in the US shouldn't be underestimated.' </source> [/INST] <claim>A sweeping Russian cyber attack is unlikely</claim> <psg>But the general consensus among the nearly 20 experts who spoke with CNN for this story is that while Russia is well positioned to launch catastrophic cyberattacks on the US it is not likely to do so. The prospects for a grand-scale cyberattack in America are low experts say. For one Putin understands that his country's cyber capabilities though formidable are outmatched by those of the United States which is generally thought to be the most sophisticated player in the domain. CNN it hasn't yet received any credible cyber threats resulting from the conflict in Ukraine but it emphasized that the energy sector has been bolstering its defenses in recent years and is on high alert as it urgently prepares for any attempted breach.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> How serious are the potential threats to critical infrastructure in the United States from hostile cyber operations and do you anticipate Russia targeting U.S. critical infrastructure? There have been efforts across multiple administrations to raise awareness of cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure to share threat information with companies that own or operate critical infrastructure and to improve private-public partnerships to further harden and protect these companies. Most recently on March 15 2022 the President signed into law the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (within the Consolidated Appropriations Act) which will require entities determined to be critical infrastructure to report substantial cyber incidents within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours to CISA. But it’s unlikely that it will have an impact any time soon – the statute allows the CISA director until September 2025 to establish implementing regulations. And because passage of the bill was strongly criticized by the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation there could be significant interagency fighting about the scope and content of the proposed rulemaking. Perhaps more importantly in June 2021 after the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attacks President Biden warned Putin that 16 critical infrastructure sectors should be off-limits from cyberattacks. Although it is not clear what the Biden administration has planned or specifically warned in the event of a critical infrastructure attack attributed to Russia the presidential notice clearly raises the stakes for Russia: Putin must certainly expect that such attacks will have a significant response from the United States. In that warning however the administration took pains to differentiate between “destructive” hacks and “conventional digital espionage operations carried out by intelligence agencies worldwide.” In March of this year Deputy National Security Advisor Anne Neuberger issued a public warning that the U.S. government is observing “threat intelligence that the Russian government is exploring options for potential cyberattacks on critical infrastructure in the United States.” One can imagine that what the U.S. is observing is Russia conducting the very espionage activities that the U.S. was careful to distinguish as not off limits but whether the Kremlin decides to exploit any vulnerabilities it has found or accesses it has established is what matters. Regardless of President Biden’s warning Putin certainly understands that there is a big difference between hacking private email accounts of administration officials and dumping the emails for an embarrassment campaign compared to an attack that impacts water electricity or communications systems in the United States. Russia will always want the option to disable the critical infrastructure in the United States – much the same way other countries proactively seek to understand weaknesses in their adversaries’ defenses. But I would be surprised if Putin were to take action against U.S. critical infrastructure because of the potential for it to result in significant escalation whether of the conflict in Ukraine or more generally. So despite the necessary focus on preparing for critical infrastructure cyber attacks I would be more concerned about attacks on private companies or further disinformation campaigns. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia will not attack because of current threats from the U.S </claim> <psg>How serious are the potential threats to critical infrastructure in the United States from hostile cyber operations . Most recently on March 15 2022 the President signed into law the Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (within the Consolidated Appropriations Act) which will require entities determined to be critical infrastructure to report substantial cyber incidents within 72 hours and ransomware payments within 24 hours to CISA. . Perhaps more importantly in June 2021 after the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attacks President Biden warned Putin that 16 critical infrastructure sectors should be off-limits from cyberattacks. the presidential notice clearly raises the stakes for Russia: Putin must certainly expect that such attacks will have a significant response from the United States . Regardless of President Biden’s warning Putin certainly understands that there is a big difference between hacking private email accounts of administration officials and dumping the emails for an embarrassment campaign compared to an attack that impacts water electricity or communications systems in the United States. Russia will always want the option to disable the critical infrastructure in the United States – much the same way other countries proactively seek to understand weaknesses in their adversaries’ defenses. But I would be surprised if Putin were to take action against U.S. critical infrastructure because of the potential for it to result in significant escalation</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> When is a cyberattack an act of war? I called Tess Bridgeman co-editor in chief of the website Just Security and a former attorney in the Obama White House who is an expert on war powers and international law. 'If a cyberattack causes significant death destruction or injury of the same sort that you would see from a more traditional attack using kinetic means like bullets or missiles you know then you would call it a 'use of force' in international law ' she said. A cyberattack that targeted a dam or air traffic control towers might rise to this level but the government would try very hard to avoid responding to a cyberattack with a military attack she said. The attacks on the US to date have fallen short of the threshold to justify a military response. As the government seeks countermeasures to respond Bridgeman said there's a good chance they won't be publicly known.'It may appear that the US is sitting by idly but I would be highly doubtful that that's the case ' she said arguing that defensive actions might be more effective at de-escalating the standoff. 'It's setting the example for what responsible state behavior looks like.'The threat of a military response is always there for the worst cyberattacks should they cost American lives. 'Our policy our declared policy is if it's a big enough attack on us and it hurts us we will use the conventional weapons response ' Richard Clarke who was a top adviser to President George W. Bush on cybersecurity told CNN's Michael Smerconish shortly after the war in Ukraine began. </source> [/INST] <claim>2) A large scale cyber attack is the only way America would engage in conflict</claim> <psg>When is a cyberattack an act of war? 'If a cyberattack causes significant death destruction or injury of the same sort that you would see from a more traditional attack using kinetic means like bullets or missiles then you would call it a 'use of force' in international law ' A cyberattack that targeted a dam or air traffic control towers might rise to this level but the government would try very hard to avoid responding to a cyberattack with a military attack .'It may appear that the US is sitting by idly but I would be highly doubtful that that's the case ' she said arguing that defensive actions might be more effective at de-escalating the standoff. 'It's setting the example for what responsible state behavior looks like.'The threat of a military response is always there for the worst cyberattacks should they cost American lives. 'Our policy our declared policy is if it's a big enough attack on us and it hurts us we will use the conventional weapons response ' Richard Clarke who was a top adviser to President George W. Bush on cybersecurity</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Most of these attacks are meant to be part of espionage campaigns or to be meddlesome rather than deadly. Clarke argued that Russian attacks on US industries could be more devastating than attacks on the government itself. He said the government doesn't really know what would happen if the Amazon Google and Microsoft cloud systems went offline for instance. 'I can tell you if those clouds go down the United States stops working our economy stops working the phones stop working -- we will find ourselves pretty soon in the dark ages if the internet goes down ' said Clarke. It's not clear that Russia would want to provoke the US specifically in a such a devastating way or how the US would respond. While its cyberattacks in Ukraine since the war began have been less severe than some expected according to a report by Lyngass Russia has targeted internet infrastructure in parts of the country. There has been concern that cyberattacks in Ukraine could spill over to nearby countries that are in NATO and could lead the organization to invoke Article 5 of its charter -- the principle that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. Could a cyberattack trigger Article 5? A cyberattack could absolutely trigger Article 5. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made this clear in February just after Russia's invasion. 'An attack on one will be regarded as an attack on all ' Stoltenberg said at a news conference when asked about a potential Russian cyberattack. But he added that NATO would be very careful in assessing an attack and would make sure a cyberattack on Ukraine -- shutting off electricity say -- that accidentally spilled over into Poland or Romania is not construed as an attack on those countries. He also said it's intentionally unclear what kind of cyberattack would rise to the level of invoking Article 5. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia will not attack the US over cyber security concerns </claim> <psg>Most of these attacks are meant to be part of espionage campaigns or to be meddlesome rather than deadly. Clarke argued that Russian attacks on US industries could be more devastating than attacks on the government itself. He said the government doesn't really know what would happen if the Amazon Google and Microsoft cloud systems went offline for instance . It's not clear that Russia would want to provoke the US specifically in a such a devastating way Could a cyberattack trigger Article 5? that NATO would be very careful in assessing an attack and would make sure a cyberattack on Ukraine -- shutting off electricity say -- that accidentally spilled over into Poland or Romania is not construed as an attack on those countries. He also said it's intentionally unclear what kind of cyberattack would rise to the level of invoking Article 5.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> To remedy the risk of conflict stemming from ambiguity in cyberspace Brake recommends a series of preventive and mitigating policy recommendations including: Congress should pass legislation that facilitates real-time information sharing within and between the private and public sectors. The White House should issue warnings to adversaries of the potential consequences of violating cyberspace norms such as “adjustments to network traffic criminal sanctions diplomatic condemnation and U.S. Treasury actions.” Congress should create a Department of State Bureau of Internet and Cyberspace Affairs which would demonstrate that the United States gives as much weight to diplomatic policy options as it does military ones. It should also make the National Security Agency director a Senate-confirmed position eligible for civilians. Missions other than intelligence should be shifted to other appropriate entities including U.S. Cyber Command and the combatant commands. “When possible and appropriate defense officials should highlight U.S. involvement in offensive cyber operations against states terrorist groups and other illicit actors to fortify the credibility of U.S. retaliatory capacity among potential adversaries.” </source> [/INST] <claim>Miscalculations causing conflicts in cyber security is extremely unrealistic </claim> <psg>To remedy the risk of conflict stemming from ambiguity in cyberspace Brake recommends a series of preventive and mitigating policy recommendations including: Congress should pass legislation that facilitates real-time information sharing within and between the private and public sectors. The White House should issue warnings to adversaries of the potential consequences of violating cyberspace norms Congress should create a Department of State Bureau of Internet and Cyberspace Affairs . It should also make the National Security Agency director a Senate-confirmed position eligible for civilians. Missions other than intelligence should be shifted to other appropriate entities including U.S. Cyber Command and the combatant commands. “When possible and appropriate defense officials should highlight U.S. involvement in offensive cyber operations against states terrorist groups and other illicit actors to fortify the credibility of U.S. retaliatory capacity among potential adversaries.”</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> After a six-year wait new emphasis on supply chain security arose first with the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security a bill signed by then-President Barack Obama. This strategy emphasized that earlier efforts were still important but that there needed to be a new focus on cybersecurity in the supply chain. Later work in 2012 and 2015 continued to expand on the concept of physical and cyber supply chain security. Such guidance included 'NIST IR 7622: Notional Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems ' and 'NIST SP 800-161: Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.' NIST IR 7622 offers some suggested guidelines and '... repeatable and commercially reasonable supply chain assurance methods ... and visibility throughout the supply chain.' NIST SP 800-161 covers the concepts from NIST IR 7622 but it includes more specific guidance for U.S. federal agencies to follow to identify assess and mitigate information and communications technology (ICT) supply chain risks. In parallel with the release of NIST SP 800-161 the Utilities Telecom Council published cybersecurity supply chain guidance specifically for electric utilities in its document 'Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management for Utilities -- Roadmap for Implementation.' This report offered ideas and approaches for electric utilities to organize and approach cyber suppliers and minimize cybersecurity risks. This emphasis on supply chain cybersecurity is not unique to the U.S. The European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) published its own overview of ICT supply chain risks in August 2015. ENISA's summary of the concern is well-stated: Governments corporations organizations and consumers are increasingly reliant on ICT products and services and thus on the supply chains that deliver them. As a result of this reliance threats to supply chains have attracted more attention including the threat of intentional tampering during development distribution or operations or the threat of substitution with counterfeit (including cloned or overproduced) components before or during delivery and attacks against the economy through the supply chain. </source> [/INST] <claim>Supply chain security is already improving to stop future attacks</claim> <psg>After a six-year wait new emphasis on supply chain security arose first with the U.S. National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security a bill signed by then-President Barack Obama. This strategy emphasized that earlier efforts were still important but that there needed to be a new focus on cybersecurity in the supply chain. Later work in 2012 and 2015 continued to expand on the concept of physical and cyber supply chain security the Utilities Telecom Council published cybersecurity supply chain guidance specifically for electric utilities in its document 'Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management for Utilities -- Roadmap for Implementation.' This report offered ideas and approaches for electric utilities to organize and approach cyber suppliers and minimize cybersecurity risks. Governments corporations organizations and consumers are increasingly reliant on ICT products and services and thus on the supply chains that deliver them. As a result of this reliance threats to supply chains have attracted more attention including the threat of intentional tampering during development </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> In the relatively short and rapidly evolving history of cyber conflict perhaps nothing has been established with greater certainty and more widely accepted than the idea that Russia has significant cyber capabilities and isn’t afraid to use them—especially on Ukraine. In 2015 Russian government hackers breached the Ukrainian power grid leading to widespread outages. In 2017 Russia deployed the notorious NotPetya malware via Ukrainian accounting software and the virus quickly spread across the globe costing businesses billions of dollars in damage and disruption. In the months that followed the NotPetya attacks many people speculated that Ukraine served as a sort of “testing ground” for Russia’s cyberwar capabilities and that those capabilities were only growing in their sophistication and reach. As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components—the United States Department of Homeland Security even issued a warning to businesses to be on high alert for Russian cyberattacks as did the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre. What is surprising is that—so far at least—the devastating Russian cyberattacks everyone has been expecting have yet to materialize. There’s no guarantee of course that a large-scale cyberattack on Ukraine’s electrical grid or global banks or anything else isn’t just around the corner. Russia has proven time and again that it has few compunctions about targeting critical infrastructure and causing considerable collateral damage through acts of cyber aggression. But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve ready to deploy if needed. Instead it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years in favor of developing less expensive less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia does not care about US cyber security only Ukraine’s</claim> <psg>In the relatively short and rapidly evolving history of cyber conflict perhaps nothing has been established with greater certainty and more widely accepted than the idea that Russia has significant cyber capabilities and isn’t afraid to use them—especially on Ukraine. In 2015 Russian government hackers breached the Ukrainian power grid leading to widespread outages. In 2017 Russia deployed the notorious NotPetya malware via Ukrainian accounting software and the virus quickly spread across the globe costing businesses billions of dollars in damage and disruption As tensions escalated between Russia and Ukraine many people were expecting the conflict to have significant cyber components—the United States Department of Homeland Security even issued a warning to businesses to be on high alert for Russian cyberattacks as did the U.K.’s National Cyber Security Centre. What is surprising is that—so far at least—the devastating Russian cyberattacks everyone has been expecting have yet to materialize. But as the invasion continues with few signs of any sophisticated cyber conflict it seems less and less likely that Russia has significant cyber capabilities in reserve ready to deploy if needed. Instead it begins to look like Russia’s much vaunted cyber capabilities have been neglected in recent years in favor of developing less expensive less effective cyber weapons that cause less widespread damage and are considerably easier to contain and defend against.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Alongside Nato’s multilateral efforts to tackle the cyberthreat individual allies are boosting their own cyber systems. We saw for example how some nations not least the UK successfully used cyber within the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State (IS). It was able to suppress IS propaganda disrupt their recruitment of foreign fighters and degrade their ability to co-ordinate attacks. By strengthening their cyberdefence capabilities improving their legal and institutional frameworks and increasing resources—both people and money—devoted to confronting cyberthreats allies have reduced the vulnerability of their networks and infrastructures. As a result we are tackling increasingly complex cyberthreats faster and more efficiently and we are all more aware of—and resilient to—attacks. This was demonstrated last October when authorities in the Netherlands with the help of British experts foiled an attack by Russia on the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague. We must remain vigilant and prepared for whatever lies ahead of us in cyberspace. For this we must work ever more closely together and leverage our unique network of allies partner countries and organisations. </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO only supports cyber security concerns for the Allies</claim> <psg>Alongside Nato’s multilateral efforts to tackle the cyberthreat individual allies are boosting their own cyber systems. We saw for example how some nations not least the UK successfully used cyber . By strengthening their cyberdefence capabilities improving their legal and institutional frameworks and increasing resources—both people and money—devoted to confronting cyberthreats allies have reduced the vulnerability of their networks and infrastructures. . For this we must work ever more closely together and leverage our unique network of allies partner countries and organisations</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> President Biden has made cybersecurity a critical element of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration at all levels of government. To advance the President’s commitment and to reflect that enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity resilience is a top priority for DHS Secretary Mayorkas issued a call for action dedicated to cybersecurity in his first month in office. This call for action focused on tackling the immediate threat of ransomware and on building a more robust and diverse workforce. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States cyber security goals only support the nation</claim> <psg>President Biden has made cybersecurity a critical element of the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission a top priority for the Biden-Harris Administration at all levels of government. to reflect that enhancing the nation’s cybersecurity resilience is a top priority for DHS Secretary Mayorkas issued a call for action dedicated to cybersecurity in his first month in office</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> But what I want to emphasize today is that we’re not doing all this alone. We learned important lessons from 9/11 and the ongoing fight against terrorism and we’ve applied those lessons to everything else we do. Just as we expanded our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to many more cities after 9/11 we’ve now set up Cyber Task Forces in all of our 56 FBI Field Offices across the country so if you ever call for help you’re going to get a whole team with specialized expertise to help you and with jurisdiction to go after any cyber bad actor. That’s at every FBI field office. The biggest difference between the model we built to fight terrorism and the way we battle cyber threats is the importance of the private sector. Private networks whether they belong to a pipeline operator some other kind of victim or an Internet service provider are most often the place we confront adversaries. We share information with the private sector whenever we can through one-on-one outreach though cyber threat bulletins and through our many partnerships like with the 627 Fortune-1000 companies who belong to DSAC our Domestic Security Alliance Council and the more-than-70 000 professionals in our InfraGard program—all of whom are focused on protecting critical U.S. infrastructure. We may not always be able to tell you how we know what we know but we can get you what you need to protect yourself. Russia will not attack over cyber security efforts by NATO </source> [/INST] <claim>The American private cyber sector is currently being supported by the FBI</claim> <psg>We learned important lessons from 9/11 and the ongoing fight against terrorism and we’ve applied those lessons to everything else we do. Just as we expanded our Joint Terrorism Task Forces to many more cities after 9/11 we’ve now set up Cyber Task Forces in all of our 56 FBI Field Offices across the country so if you ever call for help you’re going to get a whole team with specialized expertise to help you and with jurisdiction to go after any cyber bad actor. . Private networks whether they belong to a pipeline operator some other kind of victim or an Internet service provider are most often the place we confront adversaries. We share information with the private sector whenever we can through one-on-one outreach though cyber threat bulletins and through our many partnerships </psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The lingering threat of offensive cyber operations is one of Putin’s very last cards — together with nukes. There is no rational reason that Putin's Russia would play this without some reasonable prospect of geopolitical gain. The use of cyber capabilities exposes techniques and programs to potential enemies and opens up the attacker to countermeasures. A failure would add to the disastrous debacle of Russia’s joint conventional military operations and leave the country with very little to demonstrate its supposed superpower status beyond weapons of mass destruction. Russia has reached an operational stalemate in its invasion of Ukraine but unleashing its advanced cyber capabilities at this stage against Western targets will not win the war. Such attacks will only increase the support for Ukraine without bringing Russia any tangible battlefield advantage. It would also open the Kremlin to counter-attack by Western cyber agencies. </source> [/INST] <claim>No nuke war over cyber security </claim> <psg>The lingering threat of offensive cyber operations is one of Putin’s very last cards — together with nukes. There is no rational reason that Putin's Russia would play this without some reasonable prospect of geopolitical gain. . A failure would add to the disastrous debacle of Russia’s joint conventional military operations and leave the country with very little to demonstrate its supposed superpower status beyond weapons of mass destruction. Russia has reached an operational stalemate in its invasion of Ukraine but unleashing its advanced cyber capabilities at this stage against Western targets will not win the war. Such attacks will only increase the support for Ukraine without bringing Russia any tangible battlefield advantage. It would also open the Kremlin to counter-attack by Western cyber agencies.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> President Joe Biden has been presented with a menu of options for the U.S. to carry out massive cyberattacks designed to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain its military operations in Ukraine four people familiar with the deliberations tell NBC News. Two U.S. intelligence officials one Western intelligence official and another person briefed on the matter say no final decisions have been made but they say U.S. intelligence and military cyber warriors are proposing the use of American cyberweapons on a scale never before contemplated. Among the options: disrupting internet connectivity across Russia shutting off electric power and tampering with railroad switches to hamper Russia’s ability to resupply its forces three of the sources said. “You could do everything from slow the trains down to have them fall off the tracks ” one person briefed on the matter said. The sources said the options presented include pre-emptive responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine irrespective of whether Russian launches its own cyberattacks on the U.S. in retaliation for sanctions. They said most of the potential cyberattacks under consideration are designed to disrupt but not destroy and therefore fall short of an act of war by the United States against Russia. They say the idea is to harm networks not people. Officials are debating the legal authorities under which the attacks would take place — whether they would be covert action or clandestine military activity. Either way the U.S. would not publicly acknowledge carrying out the operations the sources say. U.S. Cyber Command the National Security Agency the CIA and other agencies would have a role to play in the operations the sources said. “Our response will be harsh and measured but not so severe as to encourage Putin to take more drastic steps ” one U.S. official said. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States can protect itself against growing Russian attacks</claim> <psg>President Joe Biden has been presented with a menu of options for the U.S. to carry out massive cyberattacks designed to disrupt Russia’s ability to sustain its military operations in Ukraine say U.S. intelligence and military cyber warriors are proposing the use of American cyberweapons on a scale never before contemplated. Among the options: disrupting internet connectivity across Russia shutting off electric power and tampering with railroad switches to hamper Russia’s ability to resupply its forces “You could do everything from slow the trains down to have them fall off the tracks ” They said most of the potential cyberattacks under consideration are designed to disrupt but not destroy and therefore fall short of an act of war by the United States against Russia. They say the idea is to harm networks not people. U.S. Cyber Command the National Security Agency the CIA and other agencies would have a role to play in the operations “Our response will be harsh and measured but not so severe as to encourage Putin to take more drastic steps ”</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Unlike the European Union the US has no single federal law regulating cybersecurity and privacy. Several states have their own cybersecurity and data breach notification laws. This poses a considerable challenge for organizations conducting business across all 50 states and worldwide This page summarizes the compliance requirements for US cybersecurity laws and federal cybersecurity laws. </source> [/INST] <claim>The U.S. has to most lax cyber regulations </claim> <psg>Unlike the European Union the US has no single federal law regulating cybersecurity and privacy. Several states have their own cybersecurity and data breach notification laws</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> We need accelerated regulatory reform in the spirit of antitrust legislation. We need to contain the expansion of big tech and their ability to extract data from people on abusive terms. We need a reinvented knowledge and data commons and we need to innovate collaborative publicly funded forms of artificial intelligence for the common good. This is not a job for grassroots movements alone. To burn down digital colonialism we need governments municipalities regions cooperatives collective forms of social innovation and collaboration. We need everyone to become aware of what’s at stake so we can take back our public infrastructure and build our own sustainable platforms for the future. </source> [/INST] <claim> Which means better chance of fighting digital imperialism under US cyber control </claim> <psg>We need to contain the expansion of big tech and their ability to extract data from people on abusive terms. We need a reinvented knowledge and data commons and we need to innovate collaborative publicly funded forms of artificial intelligence for the common good. To burn down digital colonialism we need governments municipalities regions cooperatives collective forms of social innovation and collaboration. We need everyone to become aware of what’s at stake so we can take back our public infrastructure and build our own sustainable platforms for the future.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> The worst countries for internet censorship: North Korea and China (11/11) – No map of online censorship would be complete without these two at the top of the list. There isn’t anything either of them doesn’t heavily censor thanks to their iron grip over the entire internet. Users are unable to use western social media watch porn or use torrents or VPNs*. And all of the political media published in the country is heavily censored and influenced by the government. Both also shut down messaging apps from abroad forcing residents to use ones that have been made (and are likely controlled) within the country e.g. WeChat in China. Not only does WeChat have no form of end-to-end encryption the app also has backdoors that enable third parties to access messages. Iran (10/11): Iran blocks VPNs (only government-approved ones are permitted which renders them almost useless) but doesn’t completely ban torrenting. Pornography is also banned and social media is under increasing restrictions. Twitter Facebook and YouTube are all blocked with increasing pressures to block other popular social media sites. Many messaging apps are also banned with authorities pushing domestic apps and services as an alternative. Political media is heavily censored. Belarus Qatar Syria Thailand Turkmenistan and the UAE (8/11): Turkmenistan Belarus and the UAE all featured in our “worst countries” breakdown in 2020. But this year they are joined by Qatar Syria and Thailand. All of these countries ban pornography have heavily censored political media restrict social media (bans have also been seen in Turkmenistan) and restrict the use of VPNs. Thailand saw the biggest increase in censorship including the introduction of an online porn ban which saw 190 adult websites being taken down. This included Pornhub (which featured as one of the top 20 most visited websites in the country in 2019). </source> [/INST] <claim>Any country alternative is worse because they are more regulated than the United States</claim> <psg>The worst countries for internet censorship: North Korea and China Users are unable to use western social media watch porn or use torrents or VPNs*. And all of the political media published in the country is heavily censored and influenced by the government. Both also shut down messaging apps from abroad forcing residents to use ones that have been made (and are likely controlled) within the country e.g. WeChat in China. Not only does WeChat have no form of end-to-end encryption the app also has backdoors that enable third parties to access messages. Iran blocks VPNs (only government-approved ones are permitted which renders them almost useless) Pornography is also banned and social media is under increasing restrictions. Twitter Facebook and YouTube are all blocked with increasing pressures to block other popular social media sites. Political media is heavily censored. Belarus Qatar Syria Thailand Turkmenistan and the UAE . All of these countries ban pornography have heavily censored political media restrict social media (bans have also been seen in Turkmenistan) and restrict the use of VPNs</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> 18 countries have banned or shut down torrenting sites. A number have also introduced measures but aren’t blocking websites as of yet (Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia). As they aren’t blocking torrenting sites these haven’t been scored as having “sites blocked” and are instead scored as being “restricted.”While torrenting websites are often blocked in Spain (hence why it is classed as having shut down torrenting sites) rules do permit torrenting for personal use (downloading to view but not to upload or distribute). Ukraine restricts online pornography while Belarus and Turkey ban/block the content entirely. Political media is restricted in 12 countries. As we have already seen Greece joined this list this year as did Hungary and Kosovo. Two countries heavily censor political media – Belarus and Turkey. No European countries block or ban social media but five do restrict it. These are Belarus Montenegro Spain Turkey and Ukraine. Turkey restricts the use of VPNs while Belarus bans them entirely. </source> [/INST] <claim>European countries are no better </claim> <psg>18 countries have banned or shut down torrenting sites. A number have also introduced measures but aren’t blocking websites as of yet (Bulgaria Croatia Cyprus the Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Poland Slovakia and Slovenia). As they aren’t blocking torrenting sites these haven’t been scored as having “sites blocked” and are instead scored as being “restricted.” Ukraine restricts online pornography while Belarus and Turkey ban/block the content entirely. Political media is restricted in 12 countries. As we have already seen Greece joined this list this year as did Hungary and Kosovo. Two countries heavily censor political media – Belarus and Turkey. No European countries block or ban social media but five do restrict it. These are Belarus Montenegro Spain Turkey and Ukraine. Turkey restricts the use of VPNs while Belarus bans them entirely.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> (Moscow) – Russia has significantly expanded laws and regulations tightening control over internet infrastructure online content and the privacy of communications Human Rights Watch said today. If carried out to their full restrictive potential the new measures will severely undermine the ability of people in Russia to exercise their human rights online including freedom of expression and freedom of access to information. Russian authorities’ approach to the internet rests on two pillars: control and increasing isolation from the World Wide Web ” said Hugh Williamson Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “The government has built up an entire arsenal of tools to reign over information internet users and communications networks.” New laws and regulations adopted in the past two years expanded the authorities’ already significant capacity to filter and block internet content automatically no longer depending on providers’ cooperation to implement the block. The 2019 “sovereign internet” law requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment that allows authorities to circumvent providers and automatically block content the government has banned and reroute internet traffic themselves. 2018 law introduces fines for search engines providing access to proxy services such as virtual private networks (VPNs) that allow a user access to banned content or provide instructions for gaining access to such content. Regulations adopted in 2019 require VPNs and search engine operators to promptly block access to the websites on the list maintained by the federal government’s informational system which includes a regularly updated list of officially banned sites. </source> [/INST] <claim>The alternative country like Russia is worse</claim> <psg>Russia has significantly expanded laws and regulations tightening control over internet infrastructure online content and the privacy of communications . If carried out to their full restrictive potential the new measures will severely undermine the ability of people in Russia to exercise their human rights online including freedom of expression and freedom of access to information. Russian authorities’ approach to the internet rests on two pillars: control and increasing isolation from the World Wide Web ” New laws and regulations adopted in the past two years expanded the authorities’ already significant capacity to filter and block internet content automatically no longer depending on providers’ cooperation to implement the block. The 2019 “sovereign internet” law requires internet service providers (ISPs) to install equipment that allows authorities to circumvent providers and automatically block content the government has banned and reroute internet traffic themselves.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Our allies and partners are a tremendous source of strength and a unique American advantage and our collective approach to cyber threat information sharing defense and mitigation helps hold countries like China to account. Working collectively enhances and increases information sharing including cyber threat intelligence and network defense information with public and private stakeholders and expand diplomatic engagement to strengthen our collective cyber resilience and security cooperation. Today’s announcement builds on the progress made from the President’s first foreign trip. From the G7 and EU commitments around ransomware to NATO adopting a new cyber defense policy for the first time in seven years the President is putting forward a common cyber approach with our allies and laying down clear expectations and markers on how responsible nations behave in cyberspace. </source> [/INST] <claim>The U.S. only works with allies and partnership in cybersecurity </claim> <psg>Our allies and partners are a tremendous source of strength and a unique American advantage and our collective approach to cyber threat information sharing defense and mitigation helps hold countries like China to account. Working collectively enhances and increases information sharing including cyber threat intelligence and network defense information with public and private stakeholders and expand diplomatic engagement to strengthen our collective cyber resilience and security cooperation the President is putting forward a common cyber approach with our allies and laying down clear expectations and markers on how responsible nations behave in cyberspace.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> “Although NATO has done what it needs to do in order to maintain some significant capability of defense the system as a whole really hasn't lived with the prospect of a military or cyber attack on its territory in a credible way ” Daalder said. Ukraine was admitted to NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) last week Cyberscoop's Suzanne Smalley reports of the NATO-accredited military research institution. NATO Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg said in January that CCDCOE's cyber experts “had been exchanging information with their Ukrainian counterparts 'on the current malicious cyber activities' that Ukraine was experiencing in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion ” per Smalley. But another potential setback for NATO is that it has not taken steps to acquire offensive cyber capabilities and is dependent on member states that boast them. “We need to add into our plans the way we fight offensive cyber capability because you better believe Russia is going to use it on us ... But what NATO is good at is being a defensive alliance and sometimes they're slow to pick up on we have to also be capable of offensive action ” retired former NATO supreme commander and retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove told The Early. </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO is already on the verge of collapse with or without the AFF</claim> <psg>“Although NATO has done what it needs to do in order to maintain some significant capability of defense the system as a whole really hasn't lived with the prospect of a military or cyber attack on its territory in a credible way ” Daalder said. NATO Sec. Gen. Jens Stoltenberg said in January that CCDCOE's cyber experts “had been exchanging information with their Ukrainian counterparts 'on the current malicious cyber activities' that Ukraine was experiencing in the lead-up to Russia’s invasion ” per Smalley. But another potential setback for NATO is that it has not taken steps to acquire offensive cyber capabilities and is dependent on member states that boast them. But what NATO is good at is being a defensive alliance and sometimes they're slow to pick up on we have to also be capable of offensive action ” retired former NATO supreme commander and retired U.S. Air Force Gen. Philip Breedlove told The Early.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and in the event of an emergency provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response. The cyber exercise Baltic Ghost originated from a series of cyber defense workshops in 2013 and should be expanded to include all NATO battlegroups in the Baltics and Poland. Currently it is facilitated by the United States European Command with the objective to develop and sustain cyber partnerships between Estonia Latvia Lithuania on one end and the Maryland Michigan and Pennsylvania Army National Guards on the other end. Building on the success of Baltic Ghost regular cyber exercises should take place in multinational NATO battlegroups led by the United Kingdom Canada Germany and the United States in Estonia Latvia Lithuania and Poland. Future exercises should regularly support NATO enhanced forward presence forces and train participants to respond to aggression in a contested degraded and denied cyberspace environment. </source> [/INST] <claim>Even if NATO is stretched co-op with U.S. would stop collapse</claim> <psg>More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and in the event of an emergency provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response. . Currently it is facilitated by the United States European Command with the objective to develop and sustain cyber partnerships between Estonia Latvia Lithuania on one end and the Maryland Michigan and Pennsylvania Army National Guards on the other end. regular cyber exercises should take place in multinational NATO battlegroups led by the United Kingdom Canada Germany and the United States in Estonia Latvia Lithuania and Poland.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. China currently ranks second or perhaps even first in the world in gross domestic product (although 78th in per capita GDP) and the fear is that China will acquire military prowess commensurate with its wealth and feel impelled to carry out undesirable military adventures. However even if it continues to rise China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐​style ambitions of extensive conquest and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country and in particular to the regime in charge. Indeed there is a danger of making China into a threat by treating it as such and by engaging in so‐​called balancing efforts against it. Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance ” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption environmental devastation slowing growth a rapidly aging population enormous overproduction increasing debt and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong. At a time when it should be liberalizing its economy Xi Jinping’s China increasingly restricts speech and privileges control by the antiquated and kleptocratic Communist Party over economic growth. And entrenched elites are well placed to block reform. </source> [/INST] <claim>China is not a real threat</claim> <psg>Policymakers increasingly view China’s rapidly growing wealth as a threat. However even if it continues to rise China does not present much of a security threat to the United States. China does not harbor Hitler‐​style ambitions of extensive conquest and the Chinese government depends on the world economy for development and the consequent acquiescence of the Chinese people. Armed conflict would be extremely—even overwhelmingly—costly to the country . Rather than rising to anything that could be conceived to be “dominance ” China could decline into substantial economic stagnation. It faces many problems including endemic (and perhaps intractable) corruption environmental devastation slowing growth a rapidly aging population enormous overproduction increasing debt and restive minorities in its west and in Hong Kong</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a challenge for the United States with a massive defense budget Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into government service. But for many U.S. allies tech-savvy public servants will have long fled for the private sector nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academia before reaching ministerial positions. To its credit the U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support allies. This means building up law enforcement intelligence and military operational and investigative capability. But even with successful capacity-building programs many nations could in a crisis end up in the same place the United States is—with good options stuck on the shelf while political leaders and their electorates lack a critical mass of informed voters to trust understand and act on expert findings. </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO co-op with U.S. would not allow a strain</claim> <psg>For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a challenge for the United States with a massive defense budget Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into government service. To its credit the U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support allies. This means building up law enforcement intelligence and military operational and investigative capability</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> A NATO bank would better equip the alliance to manage the financial challenges of conflict. By not taking into account how to finance the alliance NATO has not adequately prepared itself for a military conflict. NATO does military planning for all sorts of contingencies but it does not plan for how to finance these efforts in the event of a conflict. Yet underlying any significant military effort are questions of economic and financial capacity. Military conflict and competition put great economic strain on a nation or power stressing national budgets and often causing painful and unpopular economic choices. Yet as the NATO alliance has developed and solidified over the past 70 years it has not organized itself to grapple with these fundamental questions: Who will finance the alliance? How will that be done? While the United States has traditionally stepped in many of NATO’s European members also possess immense financial resources and standing. The alliance does not need to rely solely on the dollar. it can now also rely on the euro as well as the pound. The burden of financing the alliance should not be an American responsibility or fall on the shoulders of select member states but rather be considered a shared responsibility. </source> [/INST] <claim>If anything is going to strain NATO its financing not U.S. co-op on cyber security</claim> <psg>By not taking into account how to finance the alliance NATO has not adequately prepared itself for a military conflict. NATO does military planning for all sorts of contingencies but it does not plan for how to finance these efforts in the event of a conflict. Military conflict and competition put great economic strain on a nation or power stressing national budgets and often causing painful and unpopular economic choices. Yet as the NATO alliance has developed and solidified over the past 70 years it has not organized itself to grapple with these fundamental questions: Who will finance the alliance? How will that be done? . The burden of financing the alliance should not be an American responsibility or fall on the shoulders of select member states but rather be considered a shared responsibility.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> If Russia's goal in meddling in U.S. elections has been to undermine trust in the democratic process it has already won — and the U.S. isn't even starting to take the sort of steps that might reverse that outcome. Why it matters: Free fair and trusted elections are the cornerstone of the U.S.'s claim to moral authority. We're only beginning to fathom how badly Vladimir Putin has wounded the American system. The big picture: While the U.S. government and industry has focused on defending against cybersecurity threats to election processes and voting machines Russia has exploited our political divisions — and a U.S. president uninterested in stopping it — to sow doubt in American fundamentals. In the 2016 election Russian information operations modeled on previous interference in nations like Ukraine and the Baltic states hacked the Democratic candidate's campaign and relied on professional manipulators gullible Americans and bots to spread propaganda. The operations and Russia's responsibility for them have been widely confirmed by U.S. intelligence and exhaustively documented by the Republican-led Senate Intelligence Committee and the Mueller investigation. 'The goal was to mess with us so that no matter who becomes president the United States is harder to govern and that over the long run democracy becomes harder to sustain ' media scholar Siva Vaidhyanathan told NPR. There were many calls for a 9/11-style response to the 2016 attack but President Trump has viewed efforts to investigate and defend against Russia's threat as direct challenges to the legitimacy of his own election win. After 2016 Democrats argued that Putin succeeded in helping Trump to the White House. Republicans argued in turn that Democrats who continued to talk about Russian interference were themselves helping Putin by undermining trust in elections. The winner all around? Putin. Whether the Russian operations actually swayed votes doesn't matter. That Americans are fighting over the question does. What they're saying: A C-SPAN/Ipsos survey last October found that barely half of Americans believe the 2020 elections would be conducted openly and fairly. It's not all Putin's fault. The reasons for the distrust go beyond Russia's interference: Many Democrats feel that manipulative redistricting and the Electoral College dilute the impact of their votes particularly those of urban and minority voters. The last two times Republicans took the White House from Democrats in 2016 and 2000 they did so while losing the popular vote. Republicans meanwhile have long argued that Democrats frequently engage in voter fraud though actual evidence of such crimes remains slim to nonexistent. What's next: It may be too late to try to protect trust in U.S. elections and time to start thinking about rebuilding it from the ground up. That might be an impossible project for a Trump administration that has shown little interest in it — and that large parts of the electorate blame for the problem. It would be a tough undertaking too for a potential new Democratic administration in 2021 which would inevitably be blamed by unhappy Trump voters for a range of misbehavior real or imagined. The bottom line: Russia set off an information bomb in 2016 that cannot be un-exploded. Putin's master strategy has been effective and it's extremely difficult to counter. </source> [/INST] <claim>Despite a demographic shift the US must preserve democracy by strengthening its efforts against cyber threats – this restores trust in the election process</claim> <psg>If Russia's goal in meddling in U.S. elections has been to undermine trust in the democratic process it has already won Free fair and trusted elections are the cornerstone of the U.S.'s claim to moral authority While the U.S. government and industry has focused on defending against cybersecurity threats to election processes and voting machines Russia has exploited our political divisions Russian information operations modeled on previous interference in nations like Ukraine and the Baltic states hacked the Democratic candidate's campaign and relied on professional manipulators gullible Americans and bots to spread propaganda 'The goal was to mess with us so that no matter who becomes president the United States is harder to govern and that over the long run democracy becomes harder to sustain After 2016 Democrats argued that Putin succeeded in helping Trump to the White House. Republicans argued in turn that Democrats who continued to talk about Russian interference were themselves helping Putin by undermining trust in elections Russia set off an information bomb in 2016 that cannot be un-exploded. Putin's master strategy has been effective and it's extremely difficult to counter</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> From its opening moments the conflict in Ukraine has involved a nuclear dimension. On Feb. 24 Russian President Vladimir Putin ominously warned of “consequences you have never seen” if other countries tried to get involved in Ukraine — an implied nuclear threat. Several days later Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces would be put on a “special combat readiness” status. More recently Dmitry Medvedev a senior Russian official warned that if Finland and Sweden join NATO “there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic.” So far the Biden administration has attempted to dismiss Russia’s announcement as irresponsible saber-rattling. But as Putin continues issuing nuclear threats policymakers are likely to feel growing pressure to respond. In particular they may be tempted to find ways to signal to Russia to deter the use of nuclear weapons. One way this might be done is through cyber operations. In fact some cyber experts are already calling for the United States to consider cyber attacks for signaling purposes. For example writing in the Washington Post Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to consider a cyber “shock-and-awe demonstration” in response to a major Russian cyber attack against the West. They claim that such a response which could include disrupting the Internet throughout Russia would signal U.S. resolve and help prevent further escalation that they fear “could result in nuclear war.” However conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would paradoxically increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons which may include responses to cyber attacks. Russia has reinforced this message during the war in Ukraine. In early March a hacking group affiliated with Anonymous claimed that it had shut down the control center of Russia’s space agency. While denying that the attack took place Russia nevertheless warned that a cyber attack against its satellites would be a justification for war. The Biden administration should clearly communicate that cyber operations for nuclear signaling are out of bounds just as it declared restraint in other aspects of this conflict like the deployment of American troops to Ukraine. How Cyberspace Is Creating Nuclear Risks Policymakers and academics are attuned to the cyber risks to nuclear command and control. The practitioner community has largely focused on U.S. vulnerabilities and how to mitigate them. Scholars in turn worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. The problem is that civilian leaders in particular distinct from the military are inclined to see cyber attacks as effective signaling tools. Cyber operations could have nuclear implications especially because modern nuclear command and control systems like those in Russia and the United States are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command control and communications systems which include early warning information collection and communications capabilities alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use). </source> [/INST] <claim>Cyberattacks should be considered acts of war as they can result in mis/use of nuclear weapons. NATO cooperation will aid in deterrence</claim> <psg>Putin announced that Russia’s nuclear forces would be put on a “special combat readiness” status. More recently Dmitry Medvedev a senior Russian official warned that if Finland and Sweden join NATO “there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic.” Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap call on the Biden administration to consider a cyber “shock-and-awe demonstration” in response to a major Russian cyber attack against the West. They claim that such a response which could include disrupting the Internet throughout Russia would signal U.S. resolve and help prevent further escalation that they fear “could result in nuclear war.” However conducting cyber operations to signal deterrence would paradoxically increase risks of escalation. This risk is not just hypothetical especially in light of Russia’s updated declaratory policy for the first use of nuclear weapons which may include responses to cyber attacks Scholars in turn worry about how cyber operations could have unintended escalatory consequences. But less attention has been paid to another likely scenario: the use of cyber operations for signaling purposes (operations with visible effects that aim to convey a message to another state) in a nuclear context. The ambiguity of cyber operations can sometimes be useful for signaling — but the same ambiguity can be dangerous during a nuclear crisis. Cyber operations could have nuclear implications especially because modern nuclear command and control systems like those in Russia and the United States are becoming increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure. Nuclear command control and communications systems which include early warning information collection and communications capabilities alert decision-makers to impending nuclear strikes and also enable leaders to control decisions about nuclear use (or non-use</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Trolls and the Propagation of Fake News Trolls in this context are humans who hold accounts on social media platforms more or less for one purpose: To generate comments that argue with people insult and name-call other users and public figures try to undermine the credibility of ideas they don’t like and to intimidate individuals who post those ideas. And they support and advocate for fake news stories that they’re ideologically aligned with. They’re often pretty nasty in their comments. And that gets other normal users to be nasty too. The Russian Internet Research Agency—the one that produced a lot of fake news to try to affect the US election—has been supporting trolls for years. They had their own agents create social media accounts long before the campaign season who made their social media profiles look like typical Americans: They chose American names put photos and descriptions of themselves (and their fake families) online and they liked things and joined discussion groups. They issued innocuous messages for a time. They made friends and followers. They more or less infiltrated American social media space and lay low until election season. Then they rolled out the nastiness supported fake news and fostered disbelief in real news stories. This is all very well documented in Congressional investigations and indictments handed down by Robert Mueller’s investigation into possible 2016 election improprieties by Russia [1]. Not all trolls are Russian plants. We have our own home-grown variety too [2]. We know less about them since what they do isn’t illegal and they haven’t been formally investigated. </source> [/INST] <claim>Algorithms are overloaded with fake information. The Russian Internet Research Agency has planted trolls who promote fake news since the 2016 election</claim> <psg>Trolls support and advocate for fake news stories that they’re ideologically aligned with. They’re often pretty nasty in their comments. And that gets other normal users to be nasty too. The Russian Internet Research Agency—the one that produced a lot of fake news to try to affect the US election—has been supporting trolls for years They had their own agents create social media accounts long before the campaign season who made their social media profiles look like typical Americans: Then they rolled out the nastiness supported fake news and fostered disbelief in real news stories. This is all very well documented in Congressional investigations and indictments handed down by Robert Mueller’s investigation into possible 2016 election improprieties by Russia</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance timidity or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned but distinct priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement as it should be for any democratic institution are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing buttressed by deep cooperation on operations intelligence sharing defense planning and interoperability create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right. Third these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor not evidence of its ineptitude. In the case of military support for Ukraine policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from condemning Kremlin aggression and standing up for Kyiv politically to reaffirming its open-door policy with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs for the Ukrainian military. And while it won’t find a consensus to fight it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded. Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies and Putin advances further into Ukraine expectations for NATO assistance will be raised decisions about how to respond will become more difficult and consensus will be more elusive. Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty. </source> [/INST] <claim>NATO has no issues reaching consensus and promotes democracy within itself</claim> <psg>Unanimity on every issue is impossible let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement as it should be for any democratic institution are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO playing straight into Russian propaganda Second a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing buttressed by deep cooperation on operations intelligence sharing defense planning and interoperability create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built While NATO does much by consensus the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor not evidence of its ineptitude.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> As President Biden intensifies sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine experts warn that cyberattacks against public and private targets in the United States are a possibility. The Department of Homeland Security this week warned U.S. organizations to be prepaBCred for a cyberattack though DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas said there is no “specific credible cyber threat” against the U.S. homeland. Officials in the U.K. issued a similar warning. Government and banking sites in Ukraine are believed to have already been hit by Russian digital attacks. Exactly what form any hacks in the U.S. may take remains to be seen: CNN reports that the FBI warned local governments and companies to be on the watch for ransomware. Ransomware attacks like the one that crippled the Colonial Pipeline last year—causing sporadic gasoline shortages—are typically launched by independent hackers in Russia trying to make money not by government agents. But ransomware groups typically operate with some tacit approval from the regime of Vladimir Putin and the Russian government may be more tolerant of hacks on major Western targets if tensions continue to ramp up. Since so much infrastructure is tied to networked computers that can be deliberately or unintentionally targeted by ransomware such attacks in the past have disrupted everything from the fuel pipeline to shipping to schools and hospitals. Even attacks on Ukrainian targets could unintentionally spread malware to computers in the U.S. and other countries as happened with the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017 which chiefly targeted Ukrainian computers but caused havoc around the world. </source> [/INST] <claim>If United States increases cyber protections Russia will attack </claim> <psg>As President Biden intensifies sanctions against Russia in response to the invasion of Ukraine experts warn that cyberattacks against public and private targets in the United States are a possibility. The Department of Homeland Security this week warned U.S. organizations to be prepaBCred for a cyberattack Officials in the U.K. issued a similar warning FBI warned local governments and companies to be on the watch for ransomware. Ransomware attacks like the one that crippled the Colonial Pipeline last year—causing sporadic gasoline shortages—are typically launched by independent hackers in Russia trying to make money not by government agents. But ransomware groups typically operate with some tacit approval from the regime of Vladimir Putin and the Russian government may be more tolerant of hacks on major Western targets if tensions continue to ramp up. Even attacks on Ukrainian targets could unintentionally spread malware to computers in the U.S. and other countries as happened with the NotPetya ransomware attack in 2017 which chiefly targeted Ukrainian computers but caused havoc around the world.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> No threat facing America has grown as fast or in a manner as difficult to understand as the danger from cyberattacks. While the cyber threats to U.S. interests are real the digital sky is not falling. As such the U.S. must do more to secure its networks—but first it must do no harm. While prior Administrations have taken some steps to improve the overall security of the nation’s networks it has not been enough. Add to this the constantly changing threats and vulnerabilities in the cyber domain and the U.S. remains unprepared. There have been several legislative fights over cyber bills. While some have characterized these as partisan battles that have left America exposed to a growing variety of cyber threats this is not generally true. Many cyber bills have had bipartisan support as well as bipartisan opposition. The fight is not over a need for appropriate cyber legislation. the fight is over how to define “appropriate.” One of the main points of contention is the degree to which federal regulatory powers should play a role in cybersecurity. Many seem to think reflexively that this 19th-century solution is the answer. Those with a little more understanding of the dynamic and fast-moving nature of cyber threats see regulation as far too slow and clumsy and recognize that it might actually hinder security by building a culture of mere compliance with regulations and a false sense of security against enemies who are agile motivated and clever. In terms of the threats the U.S. faces nation-state hackers are the most serious. Russia presents the most sophisticated cyber threat with China as a close second. The U.S. has implicated Russia in efforts to hack U.S. political entities such as the Democratic National Committee. Russian hackers are also believed to be behind multiple cyberattacks that took down portions of Ukraine’s electric grid. </source> [/INST] <claim>Russia is the U.S. biggest threat in cyber security </claim> <psg>No threat facing America has grown as fast or in a manner as difficult to understand as the danger from cyberattacks While prior Administrations have taken some steps to improve the overall security of the nation’s networks it has not been enough. Add to this the constantly changing threats and vulnerabilities in the cyber domain and the U.S. remains unprepared. In terms of the threats the U.S. faces nation-state hackers are the most serious. Russia presents the most sophisticated cyber threat with China as a close second. The U.S. has implicated Russia in efforts to hack U.S. political entities such as the Democratic National Committee. Russian hackers are also believed to be behind multiple cyberattacks that took down portions of Ukraine’s electric grid.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Cyberattacks and espionage are costly to the U.S. and global economy. Cyber breaches are projected to cost the global economy $2.1 trillion by 2019 more than quadrupling the cost since 2015. IBM’s 2016 Cyber Security Intelligence Index says that health care financial services and manufacturing are the top three sectors targeted by hackers due to of the vast quantity of personal information and potential monetary gain that exist in those fields. Multiple firms project that by 2020 30 billion devices will be connected to the “Internet of things ” a huge growth in devices that connects ever more of daily life to the Web. The cyber-insurance industry is already estimated to be worth well over $3 billion and will provide a market mechanism for quantifying cyber risks and encouraging companies to improve their security. </source> [/INST] <claim>A Russian cyber attack would be extremely expensive for the United States</claim> <psg>Cyberattacks and espionage are costly to the U.S. and global economy. Cyber breaches are projected to cost the global economy $2.1 trillion by 2019 more than quadrupling the cost since 2015. . Multiple firms project that by 2020 30 billion devices will be connected to the “Internet of things ” a huge growth in devices that connects ever more of daily life to the Web.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> A simplistic analysis of the current situation of tensions between privacy and security (the prevalent narrative in media) will probably state the following: States are spying on national and foreign citizens and the trend will only increase as they acquire cheaper technologies proportional to their military and technological power. The private sector does it too but not with inherently bad intentions or political purposes. What the private sector is concerned about is the “experience” of the user and the maximum capture of their data and how to offer the best products and services. Collateral damage such as the abuse of Facebook data by companies like Cambridge Analytica is the exception to the rule.2 As for the people they are not really concerned about their government spying on them. They are somewhat concerned about private sector surveillance but they are willing to allow it especially if that enables them to enjoy “free” services or improve their overall experience. This is despite the fact that privacy awareness is gradually increasing and rules are slightly improving in some regions especially in Europe for example after the entering into force of the General Data Protection Directive (GDPR) patching a broken system of systemic privacy erosion and data extractivism. </source> [/INST] <claim>The U.S. is using cyber security to expand their foreign oversight</claim> <psg>A simplistic analysis of the current situation of tensions between privacy and security will probably state the following: States are spying on national and foreign citizens and the trend will only increase as they acquire cheaper technologies proportional to their military and technological power. 2 As for the people they are not really concerned about their government spying on them. They are somewhat concerned about private sector surveillance but they are willing to allow it especially if that enables them to enjoy “free” services or improve their overall experience.</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> After tracing the doctrinal origins of the interpretation of “respect for sovereignty” as a primary rule of international law the subsequent sections examine three broad trajectories among states’ attitudes toward the status of sovereignty in cyberspace under international law. Before addressing the legal opinions of the growing number of states that have endorsed the “sovereignty-as-rule” position I investigate two categories of states that for political-ideological reasons conceive cyberspace in ways fundamentally irreconcilable with this emerging consensus: “cyber imperialism ” embodied by the U.S. and its closest allies and “cyber-Westphalia ” as represented by China Russia and Iran. </source> [/INST] <claim>The United States is imperialist already in cyber space the AFF would make it worse</claim> <psg>Before addressing the legal opinions of the growing number of states that have endorsed the “sovereignty-as-rule” position I investigate two categories of states that for political-ideological reasons conceive cyberspace in ways fundamentally irreconcilable with this emerging consensus: “cyber imperialism ” embodied by the U.S. and its closest allies and “cyber-Westphalia ” as represented by China Russia and Iran</psg></s>

<s>[INST] Construct an argument in XML format made of an argument claim (<claim>....</claim>) and selected passages from the source text (<psg>...</psg>). Use the source passage: <source> Obviously skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war  polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers after Afghanistan Iraq Syria Libya and others. Russia’s invasions and aggression in in South Ossetia Abkhazia Nagorno Karabakh Transnistria and more recently in Ukraine and Syria don’t evoke a similar response among Turks. </source> [/INST] <claim>Turkish voters support Ukraine but they blame NATO for the war.</claim> <psg>Obviously skyrocketing anti-American sentiments in Turkey and a traditional mistrust for the West limit the possibilities for cooperation on Ukraine. Whereas the majority of Turks support Ukraine in this war  polls show that more than 48 percent blame the United States or NATO for the conflict while only 34 percent hold Russia responsible. There is a widespread belief in Turkish society that the war in Ukraine is just another regional conflict instigated by Western powers</psg></s>